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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
WHY WAS THIS EVALUATION DONE? 
TO LEARN LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
This report presents the findings of the 
2011 Regional Level Evaluation of the 
Commission of the European Union’s co-
operation with the Caribbean Region. The 
evaluation was carried out to provide mean-
ingful feedback to the Commission and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), 
but also to the general public on the results 
achieved by the Commission’s co-operation 
strategies and their implementation for the 
period 2003-2010 at regional level of the 
Caribbean Region. This means that this 
evaluation covered the Regional Strategy 
Papers for the ninth European Develop-
ment Fund (EDF9; 2003-2007) and 
EDF10 (2008-2013), but also taking into 
consideration activities during the evalua-
tion period that had been financed with re-
sources from EDF8. It covered the different 
sectors that the Commission supported and 
all financing modalities used in this period. 
Thematically, the focus was on regional 
economic and political integration but also 
private sector development, human re-
sources development, natural disaster pre-
vention and mitigation, and reduction of 
drug related crime. Lessons from this eval-
uation shall improve the current and future 
strategies of the European Union in co-
operating with the Caribbean Region. It has 
been checked if the recommendations of the 
previous regional level evaluation covering 
the period 1996-2002 have been taken into 
account. 
METHODOLOGY: HOW WAS THE EVALUA-
TION DONE? 
The evaluation was conducted in four major 
phases with pre-defined activities and inter-
im-reports. During the process, the Evalua-
tion Team interacted closely with a Refer-
ence Group (RG).  
As a first step, the evaluators reconstructed 
the intended logic of intervention based 
on an analysis of the Commission’s region-
al strategy and other policy documents. The 
evaluation is based on nine Evaluation 
Questions (EQs) that were agreed with the 
Reference Group established for this evalu-
ation. The questions cover major intended 
results and outcomes as well as different 
transversal issues of the Commission’s 
strategy and its implementation.  
During the desk phase, the evaluators col-
lected information on relevant interventions 
to answer the EQs through documented 
evidence of results, in the form of evalua-
tions or progress reports, monitoring data, 
and documents from other development 
donors. The team also conducted inter-
views with EU officials in Brussels, held 
preliminary discussions with the EU Dele-
gation and the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) Secretariat in Guyana, carried 
out a survey addressed to the National Au-
thorising Officers as well as business and 
private sector organisations The evaluators 
used information from these sources to de-
velop a set of preliminary answers and a 
methodology for testing them during the 
field phase.  
During the field phase, desk phase hypoth-
eses were validated through meetings with 
the Delegation of the European Union Guy-
ana and the CARICOM Secretariat (CCS), 
visits by team members to seven Caribbe-
an countries (Barbados, Dominican Re-
public (DR), Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, 
St. Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago) and a 
presentation of the findings at a Reference 
Group meeting in Brussels. The team also 
conducted case studies on four representa-
tive programmes.  
Overall, the Team contacted over 160 per-
sons in the Caribbean and Brussels and 
consulted over 200 documents during the 
course of the evaluation. The sample of 
programmes evaluated account for 90% of 
the total volume of EU regional support. 
In the synthesis phase, the evaluators ana-
lysed the information collected, checked its 
reliability, made cross-analyses and formu-
lated conclusions and recommendations. 
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CONTEXT OF CO-OPERATION  
The Caribbean Forum of ACP states 
(CARIFORUM) was established in 1992 as 
a base for regional co-operation and eco-
nomic dialogue with the EU. It includes 15 
Caribbean Community member states, 
Cuba and the Dominican Republic. The 
Organisation of East Caribbean States 
(OECS) and CARICOM are regional inte-
gration organisations bound by treaties 
while CARIFORUM is a mode of regional 
co-operation.  
Economically, the Caribbean region is little 
integrated. CARICOM’s intra-regional ex-
ports were in 2008 only 15% of the total 
exports, compared to 67% in the EU and 
25% within the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Remittances are a 
significant contributor to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in many countries, on 
CARICOM-level they grew from 
US$1.7 billion in 2000 to US$4 billion in 
2009.
 
The Caribbean region is recovering 
from a severe recession. The magnitude of 
the economic difficulties is summed up in 
the fact that out of the 30 most indebted 
countries, Caribbean countries make up 15. 
Trade preferences have not delivered the 
expected results. The high concentration of 
products, the small sizes of the markets and 
important transportation costs are major 
factors of low competitiveness. 
”Brain drain” from the Caribbean region 
is the highest in the world. The problem of 
illicit drugs particularly affects Haiti and 
the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and To-
bago, Guyana and Jamaica, but also the 
region more generally with the notorious 
„Caribbean Route” used for illicit drug 
transits mainly to the United States and 
Europe. In addition, the Caribbean is one of 
the most natural disaster-prone areas in the 
world. 
EU-CARIBBEAN RELATIONS 
With the exception of Cuba, left out of this 
evaluation, all CARIFORUM states have 
signed the Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
with the EU, which entitles them to EDF 
support. Trading arrangements were re-
placed by the CARIFORUM-EU Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) signed in 
October 2008 by 13 Caribbean states, and 
shortly after by Guyana and Haiti. The key 
distinction between the EPA and traditional 
regional trade agreements is that the devel-
opment dimension, particularly the support 
to the regional integration process, is taken 
into account. CARIFORUM appointed an 
EPA Coordinator at the CARIFORUM 
Ministerial Summit in Belize in 2011. The 
Joint EU-CARIFORUM Parliamentary As-
sembly met for the first time in June 2011. 
Only the formation of the Civil Society 
Consultation Committee is still pending.  
The EDF9 funds for the region (€97.8M) 
were highly concentrated on the focal sector 
of Trade and Regional Integration, fol-
lowed by Transport and Infrastructure, Dis-
aster/Emergency Response, and Education. 
The slow disbursement of funds
1
 by end of 
2010, due mostly to inefficiencies of the 
CCS, is indicated by the large difference 
(almost €100M) between the total amount 
allocated and the total already paid. Under 
EDF10 (€165M), the concentration on re-
gional economic integration remained the 
same with the difference that EPA priority 
areas were added to the focal sectors.  
Figure 1: Disbursements of EDF9 and 10 funds 
2003-2010 by sectors (€108.9M) 
Trade & reg. econ. integration
Disaster Response
Education
Governance/ Civil Society
other/mixed
Infrastructure (Transport/ ICT/
Energy)
MAIN FINDINGS 
1. Relevance of EU support 
The EU co-operation with the Caribbean 
region responds adequately to the priorities 
of CARIFORUM and to the development 
strategies of the EU, but regional integra-
                                                 
1 EDF9 funds including open projects from EDF8 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of EU co-operation with the Caribbean Region - English Summary 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
Page ix 
tion has lost political momentum in many 
Caribbean countries.  
 
2. Efficiency of EU support  
The institutional frameworks and aid mo-
dalities were not the most adequate: effi-
ciency and effectiveness of interventions 
tended to decline between EDFs 8 and 9, 
the implementation of EDF8 was very late, 
and so was programming and execution of 
EDF9. Programming of EDF10 suffered 
delays. The EU supported the CCS but has 
not succeeded in raising substantially its 
capacity. Wages for CCS staff remain low. 
Capacities to apply regional policies are 
limited at national levels. Donor coordina-
tion was poorly supported by the CCS and 
weak except for disaster management, en-
ergy and EPA negotiations. Working com-
mittees of CCS and donors have been creat-
ed in a conference in July 2011. They were 
supposed to meet before end of year, but 
did not. A new coordination conference is 
supposed to meet by mid-year 2012.   
 
3. Regional Integration 
By supporting the CCS with implementa-
tion of the Caribbean Single Market and 
Economy (CSME) Work Plan, the EU sup-
port facilitated the process. However, EU 
interventions could not help overcoming the 
delays in implementation. The free circula-
tion of persons is still very limited. Intra-
Caribbean merchandise exports, apart from 
oil, are still marginal. Stakeholders agree 
that intra-Caribbean services have not sig-
nificantly increased in recent past and that 
the completion of the Single Economy is on 
hold.  
 
4. Sub-regional integration  
The exports of the countries of the Organi-
sation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) 
to CARICOM members reached US$161M 
in 2008, representing 76% of the total ex-
ports of OECS countries. The EU supported 
the development the OECS Secretariat’s 
capacities. The EDF10 programme 
(€12.6M) will have a direct impact on inte-
gration as it is meant to enhance the tech-
nical capacity of OECS to conform an Eco-
nomic Union. The EU interventions regis-
tered limited results on DR-Haiti co-
operation, but are likely to have more im-
pact under the EDF10.  
 
5. Competitiveness of the region 
The EU support to a more competitive Car-
ibbean region was significant, but results 
are modest, due to a poor business climate. 
The only significant increase of exports of 
goods over the period
2
 was crude materials, 
mineral fuels and chemical products, all 
related to Jamaican bauxite and Trinidad 
and Tobago oil and gas. There are a few 
exceptions like rum exports that grew from 
US$6M in 2006 to US$100M in 2008, or 
the DR becoming the third biggest ACP 
producer of banana. Business Support Or-
ganisations (BSOs) have been strengthened, 
but are far from being self-sustainable.  
 
6. Economic Partnership Agreement  
EU regional funding has been critical for 
the negotiation process. Support for negoti-
ations was a model for donor coordination. 
EU support contributed substantially to the 
establishment of negotiation capacity for 
the Caribbean Regional Negotiation Ma-
chinery (CRNM) proved by the ease with 
which CARICOM moved into trade agree-
ment negotiations with Canada. Neverthe-
less, progress in EPA implementation is 
slow at both regional and national levels. 
Few countries have operational implemen-
tation units. Funds allocated for Non-State 
Actors on EDF9 Caribbean Integration 
Support Programme (CISP) stayed mostly 
unused.  
 
7. Reduction of crime and drug traffick-
ing 
EU interventions benefited law enforcement 
agencies through increased training and 
capacity development. With EU support, 
the Drug Councils’ sharing of information 
contributed to better programmes for de-
mand and supply reduction. Still, the intel-
                                                 
2 Available data refer to 2002-2009 
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ligence mechanisms and services available 
to member states of the region were not 
efficiently utilised. The regional network 
was expanded and a draft Regional Counter 
Narcotics Strategy elaborated, but there is 
no indication of improved policy coordina-
tion and formulation.  
 
8. Disaster management 
The EU provided support to the Regional 
Comprehensive Disaster Management 
Strategy 2007-2012 through national capac-
ity building. However, results emerged later 
than planned. The EU was effective at 
building local capacity for preparedness and 
also contributed to Comprehensive Disaster 
Management Strategy. Support for four 
radars will be an important part of the en-
hanced disaster management capacity. EU 
is recognised for strong post-disaster sup-
port and leadership in programming coordi-
nation, however, the visibility of EU disas-
ter management initiatives in the region is 
low. 
 
9. Education and Training 
The results of the sector interventions have 
been modest so far, owing to three reasons: 
1) there were considerable delays in the 
implementation of the (main) Caribbean 
Knowledge Learning Network (CKLN) 
projects; 2) projects prioritised the Infor-
mation and Communication Technology 
(ICT)-infrastructure more than foreseen in 
the regional strategy sector objectives; 
3) other projects planned in this regional 
strategy were abandoned. No evidence of a 
better labour market match is available as 
yet. Initially expected based on commercial 
terms, financial CKLN-sustainability will 
now apparently require government subsi-
dies. 
OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
The relevance of the strategy designed for 
the time scope of the evaluation period is 
high. However, in sectors reviewed during 
the evaluation, with exception of the sup-
port to the EPA negotiations, the results of 
EU interventions could have been improved 
by better selection of implementation part-
ners, a more effective complementarity be-
tween the regional and the national pro-
grammes, strengthening of Delegations in 
charge of regional programmes and better 
visibility. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Principal conclusions 
1. The regional strategies of the EDFs 9 
and 10 were highly responsive to the 
priorities of CARIFORUM, thanks to an 
increased political dialogue. They were 
coherent with CARIFORUM policies 
on poverty reduction, sustainable devel-
opment and integration into the world 
economy. 
2. With the exception of OECS, the Carib-
bean region is still little integrated. The 
effectiveness of the international efforts 
to enhance regional integration has been 
significantly reduced by the lack of a 
donor coordination framework.  
3. Two important efficiency issues are the 
weaknesses of the CARICOM secretari-
at and the limited capacity at the nation-
al level to implement policies decided at 
the regional level. 
4. Effectiveness and impact of the regional 
EU support is limited by the fact that 
regional integration has lost some polit-
ical momentum in many Caribbean 
countries.  
5. In most areas reviewed during the eval-
uation, the outcomes and results of EU 
interventions were modest, with the 
positive exception of the support to the 
EPA negotiations and the growth of 
some exports (like rum for the entire re-
gion, and bananas for Dominican Re-
public). 
Complementary Conclusions  
6.  The Delegations report there is a lack 
of sufficient staff for effective pro-
gramme management considering the 
many components of EDFs 9 and 10.  
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7. The coordination and complementarity 
between national and regional pro-
grammes was weak.  
8. Finding the right implementing agency 
for the regional programme remains a 
challenge. 
9. Taking into account the recommenda-
tions of the previous evaluation, all 
crosscutting issues have been taken into 
consideration in the EDF10 Regional 
Programme. 
10. EU Visibility remains low in the case of 
disaster management projects and the 
CKLN project. 
Sector-related Conclusions 
11. The Single Currency has become a 
long-term objective after the decision at 
the Summit of Heads of State in July 
2011 to concentrate on overcoming the 
obstacles and delays incurred in the 
completion to the Single Market. 
12. Only in a few cases (e.g. rum for entire 
region, bananas for Dominican Repub-
lic), the EU interventions contributed to 
increase the international competitive-
ness of industries of the region.  
13. In spite of support from the EU and 
other donors, Dominican Republic-Haiti 
co-operation has not progressed much.  
14. EU support is likely to impact positively 
on the East-Caribbean sub-regional in-
tegration. 
15. EU resources were critical to the suc-
cess of EPA negotiations but the in-
volvement of Non-State Actors was 
minimum.  
16. While the EU is a recognised sector 
lead donor, its internal co-ordination 
can be enhanced and its support for 
building disaster management capacity 
has produced modest results. 
17. The overall results of the interventions 
in human resource development have 
been limited and the prospects for fi-
nancial sustainability of the CKLN-
projects are not entirely clear. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The general recommendations are: 
1. The EU should continue to support the 
development and adoption of the com-
prehensive and efficient donor coordi-
nation system that was due to be pre-
sented by the CCS in June 2011. 
2. In application of new programming 
guidelines, complementarity should be 
enhanced by drafting the Regional 
Strategy before the National Strategies 
and by making it a frame of reference 
for the bilateral cooperation of EU 
member states with the region.  
3. The Delegations should press for the 
application of visibility rules by all EU 
funded projects/programmes in the Re-
gion. 
The sector-related recommendations are  
4. The EDF10 should include the attend-
ance and involvement of NSA in EPA 
related activities. 
5. Progress in regional integration requires 
an improved competitiveness of Carib-
bean economies. The interventions 
should be coordinated with the other 
donors supporting competitiveness.  
6. The involvement of the Commission’s 
DG ECHO in disaster management 
programmatic discussions should be 
strengthened. 
7. The EU should develop a disaster man-
agement strategy (or programming 
framework) for the Caribbean and dis-
seminate it widely among do-
nors/development partners and coun-
tries, ensuring that the selected execut-
ing agencies address EU visibility. 
8. The EU should analyse how regional 
interventions in the education and 
training sector can add value in a syn-
ergetic interplay with national sector 
interventions, incl. through harmonisa-
tion of post-secondary interventions, 
labour market assessments and 
knowledge management with the needs 
of CSME. 
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Figure 2:  Map of wider Caribbean Region 
Source: European Commission (DG Trade), 2006 “European Union- Caribbean Economic Partnership Agreement” 
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RESUME EXECUTIF  
POURQUOI LA PRESENTE EVALUATION ? 
POUR TIRER DES LEÇONS POUR L'AVENIR 
Ce rapport présente les conclusions de 
l'évaluation 2011 de la coopération de la 
Commission de l'Union Européenne (UE) 
avec la région des Caraïbes. L'évaluation a 
été effectuée pour fournir des commen-
taires utiles à la Commission et au Service 
Européen pour l’Action Extérieure 
(SEAE), mais aussi pour le grand public 
sur les résultats obtenus par les stratégies 
de coopération de la Commission et leur 
mise en œuvre pour la période 2003-2010 
dans la région des Caraïbes. Cela signifie 
que cette évaluation a couvert les docu-
ments de stratégie régionale pour le neu-
vième Fonds Européen de Dévelop-
pement (FED9) et FED10, mais tenant 
également en compte les activités finan-
cées avec des ressources FED8 au cours de 
la période d'évaluation. Elle couvre les 
différents secteurs que la Commission a 
soutenus et toutes les modalités de finan-
cement utilisées au cours de cette période. 
Thématiquement, l'accent était mis sur 
l'intégration économique et politique ré-
gionale, mais aussi le développement du 
secteur privé, le développement des res-
sources humaines, la prévention et 
l’atténuation des catastrophes naturelles, et 
la réduction de la criminalité liée au trafic 
de drogues. Les leçons de cette évaluation 
devront améliorer les stratégies actuelles et 
futures de l'Union européenne dans sa coo-
pération avec la région des Caraïbes. Les 
évaluateurs ont aussi vérifié à quel point 
les recommandations de l'évaluation pré-
cédente de niveau régional, couvrant la 
période 1996-2002, ont été prises en 
compte. 
METHODOLOGIE : COMMENT L'EVALUA-
TION A ETE FAITE ? 
L'évaluation a été menée en quatre grandes 
phases, avec activités prédéfinies et rap-
ports intermédiaires. Au cours du proces-
sus, l'équipe d'évaluation a collaboré étroi-
tement avec un Groupe de Référence (GR).  
Dans un premier temps, les évaluateurs ont 
reconstruit la logique d'intervention basée 
sur l'analyse de la stratégie régionale de la 
Commission et les autres documents de 
politique de coopération. L'évaluation est 
basée sur neuf Questions évaluatives (QE) 
élaborée avec le GR. Ces questions cou-
vrent les principales réalisations et résultats 
attendus ainsi que les différentes questions 
transversales dans la stratégie de la Com-
mission et dans sa mise en œuvre.  
Durant la phase documentaire, les éva-
luateurs ont recueilli des renseignements 
sur les interventions pertinentes pour ré-
pondre aux QE, fournis par des preuves 
appuyées sur documents des résultats, 
sous la forme de rapports d’évaluation, 
d'avancement, ou de suivi de l’intervention 
et de documents provenant d'autres parte-
naires de développement. L'équipe a éga-
lement mené des entrevues avec des fonc-
tionnaires de l'UE à Bruxelles, a tenu des 
discussions préliminaires avec la Déléga-
tion de l'Union Européenne (DUE) et le 
Secrétariat de la Communauté des Caraïbes 
(SCC) au Guyana, et elle a effectué une 
enquête auprès des ordonnateurs natio-
naux ainsi que des entreprises et des orga-
nisations du secteur privé. Les évaluateurs 
ont utilisé les informations provenant de 
ces sources pour élaborer un ensemble de 
réponses préliminaires et une méthodolo-
gie pour les recherches au cours de la 
phase de terrain.  
Pendant la phase de phase de terrain, les 
hypothèses ont été vérifiées par le biais de 
réunions avec la DUE au Guyana et le 
SCC, des visites de membres de l'équipe 
dans sept pays des Caraïbes (Barbade, 
République Dominicaine, Grenade, Guya-
na, Jamaïque, Sainte-Lucie et Trinité-et-
Tobago) et une présentation des résultats 
lors d'une réunion du groupe de réfé-
rence à Bruxelles. L'équipe a également 
effectué des études de cas sur quatre pro-
grammes représentatifs.  
Dans l'ensemble, l'équipe a interviewé plus 
de 160 personnes dans les Caraïbes et 
Bruxelles et consulté plus de 200 docu-
ments au cours de l'évaluation. L'échantil-
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lon des programmes évalués représente 
90% du volume total du soutien de l'UE à 
la région. 
Dans la phase de synthèse, les évaluateurs 
ont analysé les informations recueillies, 
vérifié leur fiabilité, fait des analyses croi-
sées et formulé des conclusions et recom-
mandations. 
CONTEXTE DE LA COOPERATION  
Le Forum des pays ACP de la région Ca-
raïbe (CARIFORUM) a été créé en 1992 
comme base pour la coopération régionale 
et le dialogue économique avec l'UE. Il 
comprend 15 États membres de la Com-
munauté des Caraïbes (CARICOM), 
Cuba et la République Dominicaine 
(RD). L'Organisation des Etats de la Ca-
raïbe Orientale (OECO) et le CARICOM 
sont des organisations régionales d'inté-
gration liées par des traités, tandis que le 
CARIFORUM est un mode de coopération 
régionale.  
Sur le plan économique, la région des Ca-
raïbes est peu intégrée. Les exportations 
intra régionales du CARICOM s’élèvent en 
2008 à seulement 15% du total de ses ex-
portations totales, comparées à 67% au 
sein de l'UE et 25% au sein de l'Associa-
tion des Nations du Sud-Est Asiatique 
(ASEAN). Les transferts de fonds des émi-
grés représentent une contribution élevée 
au Produit Intérieur Brut (PIB) dans de 
nombreux pays, passant sur l’ensemble des 
pays du CARICOM de 1,70 Mrd US$ en 
2000 à 4 Mrd US$ en 2009. La région des 
Caraïbes se remet d'une sévère récession. 
L'ampleur des difficultés économiques est 
résumée dans le fait que sur les 30 pays les 
plus endettés du monde, on compte 15 
pays de la région. Les préférences com-
merciales n'ont pas livré les résultats es-
comptés. La forte concentration de pro-
duits, la petite taille des marchés et des 
coûts de transport élevés sont d'importants 
facteurs de faible compétitivité. 
La « fuite des cerveaux » de la région des 
Caraïbes est la plus élevée dans le monde. 
Le trafic de drogues illicites affecte parti-
culièrement Haïti et la République Domi-
nicaine, Trinité-et-Tobago, le Guyana et la 
Jamaïque, mais aussi la région de façon 
plus générale avec la célèbre « Route des 
Caraïbes » utilisée pour le transit de 
drogues illicites principalement vers les 
États-Unis et l'Europe. En outre, les Ca-
raïbes sont l'une des zones du monde les 
plus sujettes aux catastrophes naturelles. 
RELATIONS UE-CARAÏBES 
A l'exception de Cuba, hors champ de cette 
évaluation, tous les États CARIFORUM 
ont signé l’Accord de Partenariat de Coto-
nou avec l'UE, qui leur donne droit au sou-
tien du FED. Les accords commerciaux ont 
été remplacés par l’Accord de partenariat 
économique (APE) CARIFORUM-UE 
signé en octobre 2008 par 13 États des 
Caraïbes et peu de temps après par le 
Guyana et Haïti. La distinction essentielle 
entre l'APE et les accords commerciaux 
régionaux traditionnels, c'est que la dimen-
sion du développement, notamment l'appui 
au processus d'intégration régionale, est 
prise en compte. CARIFORUM a nommé 
un coordonnateur de l'APE au sommet 
ministériel CARIFORUM de Belize en 
2011. L'Assemblée parlementaire paritaire 
EU-CARIFORUM s’est réunie pour la 
première fois en juin 2011. Seule la for-
mation du Comité de consultation de la 
société civile est toujours en attente.  
Les fonds du FED9 pour la région 
(97,8 M€) ont été très concentrées sur le 
secteur « Commerce et Intégration régio-
nale », suivi par le secteur « Transports et 
Infrastructures », puis « Réponse aux ca-
tastrophes et situations d'urgence » et enfin 
« Éducation ». Le décaissement lent du 
FED9 jusqu’à la fin 2010, dû principale-
ment à l'inefficacité du SCC, est indiqué 
par la grande différence (presque 100 M€) 
entre le montant total alloué et le montant 
total payé. Dans le FED10 (16 M€), la 
concentration sur l'intégration écono-
mique régionale est restée la même, avec 
la différence que les domaines prioritaires 
de l'APE ont été ajoutés au secteur de con-
centration.  
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Figure : Débours 2003-2010 du FED9 et 10 par 
secteurs (108,9 M€) 
Commerce / Intégr. Écon.
Réponse aux catastrophes
Éducation
Gouvernance/Soc. Civile
autres
Infrastructures (Transport/
ICT/ Energie)
 
PRINCIPALES CONCLUSIONS 
1. Pertinence du soutien de l'UE 
La coopération de l'UE avec la région des 
Caraïbes répond adéquatement aux priori-
tés du CARIFORUM et des stratégies de 
développement de l'UE, mais l'intégration 
régionale a perdu un élan politique dans de 
nombreux pays des Caraïbes.  
2. Efficacité du soutien de l'UE  
Les cadres institutionnels et les modalités 
d'aide n'étaient pas les plus appropriés : 
l'efficience et l'efficacité des interventions 
ont eu tendance à diminuer entre le FED8 
et le FED9, la mise en œuvre du FED8 a 
pris beaucoup de retard, de même que la 
programmation et l'exécution du FED9. La 
programmation du FED10 a subi des re-
tards. L'UE appuie le SCC mais n'a pas 
réussi à augmenter considérablement sa 
capacité. Les salaires du personnel du SCC 
restent faibles. La capacité d'appliquer des 
politiques régionales est limitée au niveau 
national. La coordination des donateurs a 
été mal prise en charge par le SCC et est 
déficiente sauf dans les secteurs gestion 
des catastrophes et énergie, et pour la con-
duite négociations de l’APE. Des commis-
sions de travail réunissant SCC et bailleurs 
de fonds ont été créées lors d'une confé-
rence en juillet 2011. Elles devaient se 
réunir avant la fin de l'année, mais ne l'ont 
pas fait. Une nouvelle conférence de coor-
dination est censée se réunir en milieu 
d'année 2012.  
3. Intégration régionale 
En soutenant le SCC le plan de mise en 
œuvre du Marché et de l’économie unique 
des Caraïbes (CSME), l'UE a facilité le 
processus d’intégration régionale. Toute-
fois, les interventions de l’UE n’ont pu 
aider à surmonter les retards dans cette 
mise en œuvre. La libre circulation des 
personnes est encore très limitée. Les ex-
portations intra caribéennes, en dehors du 
pétrole, sont encore marginales. Le com-
merce intra caribéen de services n'a pas 
significativement augmenté ces dernières 
années et l'achèvement de l'économie 
unique est en attente.  
4. Intégration sous régionale  
Les exportations des pays de l'Organisation 
des États de la Caraïbe Orientale (OECO) 
aux membres du CARICOM ont atteint 
161 M US$ en 2008, ce qui représente 
76% du total des exportations des pays de 
l'OECO. L'UE a soutenu le développement 
des capacités du Secrétariat de l'OECO. Le 
programme du FED10 (12,6 M€) aura un 
impact direct sur l'intégration car il vise à 
renforcer la capacité technique de l'OECO 
à avancer vers une union économique. Les 
appuis de l’UE à la coopération RD-Haïti 
ont enregistré des résultats limités, mais 
sont susceptibles d'avoir plus d'impact sous 
le FED10.  
5. Compétitivité de la région 
Le soutien de l'UE à une région des Ca-
raïbes plus compétitive a été important, 
mais les résultats sont modestes, en raison 
d'un climat des affaires assez pauvre. La 
seule augmentation forte des exportations 
de biens sur la période 2002-2009 relève 
des matières premières, combustibles mi-
néraux et produits chimiques (liés à la 
bauxite de Jamaïque et aux hydrocarbures 
de Trinité-et-Tobago). Il y a quelques ex-
ceptions comme les exportations de rhum 
qui sont passés de 6 M US$ en 2006 à 
100 M US$ en 2008, ou la RD qui devient 
le troisième plus grand producteur ACP de 
bananes. Les organisations d’appui au sec-
teur privé (OASP) ont été renforcées, mais 
sont loin d'être autonomes.  
6. Accord de Partenariat Economique 
Le financement régional de l'UE a été es-
sentiel pour le processus de négociation. 
Le soutien aux négociations a été un mo-
dèle de coordination pour les donateurs. Le 
soutien de l'UE a considérablement contri-
bué à la création des capacités de négocia-
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tion de l’Organisation de négociation ré-
gionale de la Caraïbe (CRNM), ce qui a été 
révélé par la facilité avec laquelle le CA-
RICOM a entamé les négociations d'un 
accord commercial avec le Canada. Néan-
moins, les progrès réalisés dans la mise en 
œuvre de l'APE sont lents, tant au niveau 
régional que national. Peu de pays ont des 
unités de mise en œuvre opérationnelles. 
Les fonds alloués aux acteurs non étatiques 
(ANE) sur Programme d’appui à 
l’intégration des Caraïbes (CISP) du FED9 
sont restés essentiellement inutilisés.  
7. Réduction de la criminalité et du tra-
fic de drogue 
Les interventions de l’UE ont bénéficié 
aux institutions anti-drogue à travers une 
formation accrue et le développement des 
capacités. Avec le soutien de l'UE, les 
échanges d’information des comités anti-
drogue ont contribué à réduire la demande 
et l'approvisionnement. Cependant, les 
mécanismes de renseignement et les ser-
vices offerts aux États membres de la ré-
gion ne sont pas efficacement utilisés. Le 
réseau régional a été élargi et un projet de 
stratégie régionale de lutte anti-drogue a 
été élaboré, mais il n'y a aucune indication 
d’amélioration dans la formulation et la 
coordination des politiques.  
8. Gestion des catastrophes 
L'UE a soutenu la Stratégie régionale de 
gestion intégrée des catastrophes 2007-
2012 en renforçant les capacités nationales. 
Cependant, les résultats sont apparus plus 
tard que prévu. L'UE a été efficace pour 
renforcer les capacités locales et a égale-
ment contribué à la Stratégie régionale. 
L’appui à l’installation de quatre radars 
sera une partie importante de la capacité de 
gestion améliorée des catastrophes. L’UE 
est reconnue pour son appui solide après 
les catastrophes et son leadership dans la 
coordination de la programmation. Cepen-
dant, la visibilité des initiatives de l’UE 
dans la gestion des catastrophes est faible 
dans la région. 
9. Education et formation 
Les résultats des interventions dans le sec-
teur ont été modestes, à cause de trois rai-
sons: 1) retards considérables dans la mise 
en œuvre des projets du Caribbean 
Knowledge Learning Network (CKLN); 
2) les projets ont donné (plus que prévu 
dans les objectifs de stratégie régionale) la 
priorité aux infrastructures d’Information 
et Technologie de la Communication 
(ITC) ; 3) d'autres projets prévus dans cette 
stratégie régionale ont été abandonnés. 
Aucune preuve d'une meilleure adéquation 
au marché du travail n'est disponible en-
core. La viabilité financière du CKLN, 
initialement prévue par des ressources 
commerciales, dépendra apparemment de 
subventions publiques. 
ÉVALUATION GLOBALE 
La pertinence de la stratégie conçue pour la 
période d'évaluation est élevée. Toutefois, 
dans les secteurs examinés lors de l'éva-
luation, à l'exception de l’appui à la négo-
ciation de l'APE, les résultats des interven-
tions de l’UE auraient pu être améliorés 
par une meilleure sélection des partenaires 
de mise en œuvre, une complémentarité 
plus efficace entre les régions et les pro-
grammes nationaux, un renforcement des 
DUE chargées des programmes régionaux 
et meilleure visibilité. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusions principales 
1. Les stratégies régionales du FED9 et 
du FED10 ont été très sensibles aux 
priorités du CARIFORUM, grâce à un 
dialogue politique accru. Elles sont co-
hérentes avec les politiques CARIFO-
RUM sur la réduction de la pauvreté, le 
développement durable et l'intégration 
dans l'économie mondiale. 
2. A l'exception des pays membres de 
l'OECO, la région des Caraïbes est en-
core peu intégrée. L'efficacité des ef-
forts internationaux pour renforcer 
l'intégration régionale a été sensible-
ment réduite par l'absence d'un cadre 
de coordination des donateurs. 
3. Deux questions d'efficacité importantes 
sont les faiblesses du SCC et la capa-
cité limitée au niveau national pour 
mettre en œuvre des politiques régio-
nales. 
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4. L'efficacité et l'impact de l'appui de 
l'UE à la région sont limités par le fait 
que l'intégration régionale a perdu son 
élan politique dans de nombreux pays 
de la Caraïbe.  
5. Dans la plupart des domaines passés en 
revue lors de l'évaluation, les réalisa-
tions et les résultats des interventions 
de l’UE sont modestes, à l'exception 
positive de l'appui à la négociation des 
APE et de la croissance de certaines 
exportations comme le rhum pour toute 
la région et les bananes pour la RD. 
Conclusions complémentaires  
6. Les DUE affirment qu’elles manquent 
de personnel pour la gestion efficace 
du programme régional, compte tenu 
des nombreuses composantes du FED9 
et du FED10.  
7. La coordination et la complémentarité 
entre les programmes nationaux et ré-
gionaux ont été faibles.  
8. Trouver l’organisation adéquate pour la 
mise en œuvre des programmes régio-
naux reste un défi. 
9. Tenant compte des recommandations 
de l'évaluation précédente, les thèmes 
transversaux ont été prises en considé-
ration dans le programme régional du 
FED10. 
10. La visibilité de l'UE est restée faible 
dans le cas des projets de gestion des 
catastrophes et le projet CKLN. 
Conclusions relatives aux secteurs 
11. La monnaie unique est devenue un 
objectif à long terme après la décision 
du Sommet des chefs d'État en juillet 
2011 de se consacrer plutôt à surmon-
ter les obstacles et les retards encourus 
dans l'achèvement du marché unique. 
12. Seulement dans de rares cas (p. ex. 
rhum pour l'ensemble de la région, ba-
nanes pour la RD) les interventions de 
l'EU ont contribué à accroître la com-
pétitivité internationale des industries 
de la région.  
13. En dépit de l'appui de l'UE et d'autres 
donateurs, la coopération RD-Haïti n'a 
pas beaucoup progressé.  
14. Le soutien de l'UE est susceptible 
d'avoir une incidence positive sur 
l'intégration sous régionale de la Ca-
raïbe orientale. 
15. Les ressources européennes ont été 
essentielles pour la réussite des négo-
ciations de l’APE mais l'implication 
des ANE a été minimale.  
16. Alors que l'UE est reconnue comme le 
principal bailleur de fonds du secteur 
gestion des catastrophes, la coordina-
tion interne peut être améliorée et son 
soutien au renforcement des capacités 
de gestion des catastrophes a produit 
des résultats modestes. 
17. Les résultats des interventions en déve-
loppement des ressources humaines ont 
été limités et les perspectives de viabi-
lité financière des projets CKLN ne 
sont pas entièrement claires. 
RECOMMANDATIONS 
Les recommandations générales sont : 
1. L'UE devrait continuer à favoriser le 
développement et l'adoption d’un sys-
tème de coordination efficace des do-
nateurs qui devait être présenté par le 
SCC en juin 2011. 
2. En application des nouvelles directives 
de programmation, la complémentarité 
devrait être renforcée par l'élaboration 
de la stratégie régionale avant les stra-
tégies nationales et en faisant de cette 
programmation régionale un cadre de 
référence pour la coopération bilatérale 
des États membres avec la région.  
3. Les délégations doivent appuyer l'ap-
plication des règles de visibilité par 
tous les projets et programmes financés 
par l'UE dans la région. 
Les recommandations relatives aux sec-
teurs sont  
4. Le FED10 devrait inclure la présence 
et la participation des ANE dans la 
mise en œuvre de l’APE. 
5. Les progrès dans l'intégration régionale 
exigent une amélioration de la compé-
titivité des économies des Caraïbes. 
Les interventions devraient être coor-
données avec les autres donateurs sou-
tenant la compétitivité.  
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6. La participation de la DG ECHO de la 
Commission dans la programmation de 
la gestion des catastrophes devrait être 
renforcée. 
7. L'UE devrait développer une stratégie 
de gestion des catastrophes (ou cadre 
de programmation) pour les Caraïbes et 
la diffuser largement parmi les bail-
leurs de fonds et les pays concernés, 
tout en veillant à ce que les agences 
d'exécution sélectionnées respectent les 
règles de visibilité de l’EU. 
8. L'UE devrait analyser comment les 
interventions régionales dans l'éduca-
tion et la formation peuvent ajouter de 
la valeur dans une interaction synergé-
tique avec les interventions sectorielles 
nationales, y compris par le biais de 
l'harmonisation avec les besoins du 
CSME des interventions post secon-
daires, des évaluations du marché du 
travail et de la gestion des connais-
sances. 
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RESUMEN EJECUTIVO 
¿POR QUÉ ESTA EVALUACIÓN?  
APRENDER LECCIONES PARA EL FUTURO 
Este informe presenta las conclusiones de 
la evaluación 2011 de la cooperación de la 
Comisión de la Unión Europea con la 
región del Caribe. La evaluación se llevó a 
cabo para proporcionar informacion a la 
Comisión, al Servicio Europeo de Acción 
Exterior (SEAE) y al público en general 
sobre los resultados obtenidos por las 
estrategias de cooperación de la Comisión 
y su implementación para el período 2003-
2010 a nivel de la región del Caribe. Esto 
significa que esta evaluación cubre los 
documentos de estrategia regional para el 
Noveno Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo 
(FED9) y FED10, pero también toma en 
cuenta actividades durante el período de 
evaluación que han sido financiados con 
recursos del FED8. Han sido cubiertos los 
diferentes sectores apoyados por la 
Comisión y todas las modalidades de 
financiación utilizadas en este periodo. 
Temáticamente, se centra en la integración 
regional económica y política, pero 
también en el desarrollo del sector privado 
y de los recursos humanos, en la pre-
vención y mitigación de desastres naturales 
y reducción de delitos relacionados con las 
drogas. Las lecciones de esta evaluación 
sirven para mejorar las estrategias actuales 
y futuras de la Unión Europea en su 
cooperación con la región del Caribe. El 
equipo ha demostrado también que se han 
tomado en cuenta las recomendaciones de 
la evaluación previa de nivel regional para 
el período 1996-2002. 
METODOLOGÍA: ¿CÓMO SE REALIZÓ LA 
EVALUACIÓN? 
La evaluación se llevó a cabo en cuatro 
fases principales con actividades pre-
definidas e informes intermedios. Durante 
el proceso, el equipo de evaluación 
interactúo estrechamente con un Grupo de 
Referencia (GR).  
Como primer paso, los evaluadores 
reconstruyeron el marco lógico basándose 
en un análisis de la estrategia regional de la 
Comisión y otros documentos de política. 
La evaluación se basa en nueve Preguntas 
Evaluativas (PE) acordadas con el Grupo 
de Referencia. Las preguntas abarcan los 
principales efectos directos y resultados 
previstos así como los diferentes temas 
transversales de la estrategia de la 
Comisión y de su implementación.   
Durante la fase documental, los 
evaluadores recolectaron información 
sobre las intervenciones pertinentes para 
responder a las PE a través de evidencias 
documentadas de resultados, en forma de 
evaluaciones o informes de progreso, de 
monitoreo, de datos y documentos de otros 
donantes para el desarrollo. El equipo 
también realizó entrevistas con funciona-
rios de la UE en Bruselas, entrevistas 
preliminares con la Delegación de la UE 
(DEU) y la Secretaría de la Comunidad del 
Caribe (SCC) en Guyana, llevó a cabo una 
encuesta dirigida a los ordenadores nacio-
nales así como a empresas y organiza-
ciones del sector privado. Los evaluadores 
utilizaron información de estas fuentes 
para desarrollar un conjunto de respuestas 
preliminares y elaborar una metodología de 
pruebas para la fase de campo.  
Durante la fase de campo, las hipótesis 
fueron validadas a través de reuniones con 
la DEU de Guyana y con la SCC, de 
visitas de los miembros del equipo de 
evaluación a siete países del Caribe 
(Barbados, República Dominicana, 
Granada, Guyana, Jamaica, Santa Lucía y 
Trinidad y Tobago); los hallazgos fueron 
presentados en una reunión del GR en 
Bruselas. El equipo realizó también 
estudios de caso en cuatro programas 
representativos.  
El equipo contactó con más de 160 
personas en el Caribe y Bruselas y consultó 
más de 200 documentos durante el curso 
de la evaluación. La muestra de programas 
evaluados representa 90% del monto 
financiero total del apoyo regional de la 
UE. 
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En la fase de síntesis, los evaluadores 
analizaron la información recopilada, com-
probaron su fiabilidad, cruzaron informa-
ción, y formularon sus conclusiones y 
recomendaciones. 
CONTEXTO DE LA COOPERACIÓN  
En 1992 se creó el Foro del Caribe de los 
Estados ACP (CARIFORUM) para la co-
operación regional y el diálogo económico 
con la Unión Europea. Incluye 15 Estados 
miembros de la Comunidad del Caribe 
(CARICOM), Cuba y República Domi-
nicana. La Organización de Estados del 
Caribe Oriental (OECO) y CARICOM son 
organizaciones de integración regional 
regidas por tratados, mientras 
CARIFORUM es una organización de 
cooperación regional.  
Económicamente, la región del Caribe está 
poco integrada. Las exportaciones 
intrarregionales de CARICOM alcanzaron 
en 2008 solo el 15% de las exportaciones 
totales, al contrario del 67% en el seno de 
la UE y al 25% en la Asociación de 
Naciones del Sudeste Asiático (ANSA). 
Las remesas en muchos países contribuyen 
de manera significativa al Producto Interno 
Bruto (PIB) y a nivel de CARICOM 
pasaron de 1,7 billones US$ en 2000 a 4 
billones US$ en 2009.
 
La región del Caribe 
se está recuperando de una severa recesión. 
La magnitud de las dificultades econó-
micas se resume en que entre los 30 países 
más endeudados del mundo, 15 se 
localizan en la región del Caribe. El 
sistema de preferencias comerciales 
acordadas no ha dado los resultados 
esperados. La alta concentración de 
productos, el pequeño tamaño de los 
mercados y el elevado costo del transporte 
son importantes factores que determinan 
una baja competitividad. 
La «fuga de cerebros» de la región del 
Caribe es la más alta del mundo. El 
problema de las drogas ilícitas afecta 
especialmente a Haití, República Domi-
nicana, Trinidad y Tobago, Guyana y 
Jamaica, pero también la región con la 
famosa "ruta del Caribe" utilizada 
principalmente para el tránsito de drogas 
hacia Estados Unidos y Europa. Además, 
el Caribe es una de las zonas más afectadas 
por desastres naturales del mundo. 
RELACIONES UE-CARIBE 
Con excepción de Cuba, excluida de esta 
evaluación, todos los Estados del 
CARIFORUM han firmado el Acuerdo de 
Cotonou con la UE, por el cual son 
elegibles para la ayuda proporcionada a 
través de los fondos FED. Los acuerdos de 
acceso preferencial unilateral fueron 
substituidos por el Acuerdo de Asociación 
Económica (AAE, o EPA por sus siglas en 
ingles) CARIFORUM-UE firmado en 
octubre de 2008 por 13 Estados del Caribe 
y poco después por Guyana y Haití. La 
distinción clave entre el AAE y los 
acuerdos comerciales regionales tradicio-
nales es que se toma en cuenta la 
dimensión de desarrollo, particularmente el 
apoyo al proceso de integración regional. 
CARIFORUM nombró a un coordinador 
de la AAE en la Cumbre Ministerial de 
CARIFORUM en Belice en 2011. La 
Asamblea Parlamentaria Paritaria EU-
CARIFORUM se reunió por primera vez 
en junio de 2011. Solamente la conforma-
ción de la Comisión de Consulta de la 
Sociedad Civil está todavía pendiente.  
Los fondos para la región del FED9 
(97.8 M€) fueron altamente concentrados 
en el sector focal de Comercio e 
Integración Regional, seguido por los 
sectores de transporte e infraestructura, de 
respuesta de emergencia frente a desastres 
y de educación. El lento desembolso de los 
fondos del FED9 a finales de 2010, debido 
principalmente a la ineficacia de la SCC, 
se evidencia en la gran diferencia (casi 
100 M€) entre el total asignado y el total 
pagado. Con el FED10 (165 M€), la con-
centración en la integración económica 
regional sigue siendo la misma además de 
las prioridades definidas en los AEE. 
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Figura: Desembolsos 2003-2010 de los fondos del 
FED9 y 10 por sectores (108.9 M€) 
Comercio / Integr. econ.
Respuesta de emergencia
frente a desastres
Educación
Gob./Soc. civil
otros
Infraestructura (Transporte/
ICT/ Energía)
 
PRINCIPALES HALLAZGOS  
1. Importancia del apoyo de la UE 
La cooperación de la UE con la región del 
Caribe responde adecuadamente a las 
prioridades del CARIFORUM y a las 
estrategias de desarrollo de la UE, pero la 
integración regional ha perdido impulso 
político en muchos países del Caribe.  
2. Eficiencia de apoyo de la UE  
Los marcos institucionales y las 
modalidades de ayuda no fueron los más 
adecuados: la eficiencia y la eficacia de las 
intervenciones bajaron entre el FED8 y el 
FED9. La implementación del FED8 se 
atrasó mucho, al igual que la programación 
y la ejecución del FED9. La programación 
del FED10 sufrió también retrasos. La UE 
ofreció apoyo la SCC pero no logró 
aumentar de manera substancial su 
capacidad. Los salarios del personal de la 
SCC siguen bajos. Las capacidades para 
aplicar políticas regionales a nivel nacional 
son limitadas. La coordinación entre 
donantes recibió escaso apoyo de parte de 
la SCC y fue débil salvo en asuntos de 
negociaciones del AAE, de energía y de 
gestión de desastres. Se crearon comités de 
trabajo de la SCC y de donantes en una 
conferencia en julio de 2011. Se suponía 
que debían reunirse antes del fin de ese 
año, pero no lo hicieron. Una nueva 
Conferencia de coordinación está prevista 
a mediados del año 2012.  
3. Integración regional 
La UE facilito el proceso apoyando la SCC 
en la implementación del Plan de Trabajo 
del Mercado y Economía Única del Caribe 
(CSME). Sin embargo las intervenciones 
de la UE no lograron evitar retrasos en la 
implementación. La libre circulación de 
personas es aún muy limitada. Las 
exportaciones de mercancías dentro del 
Caribe, aparte de petróleo, son todavía 
marginales. Los actores consultados están 
de acuerdo que el comercio de servicios 
dentro del Caribe no ha aumentado 
significativamente en los últimos años y 
que la realización de la Economía Única 
queda en espera.  
4. Integración subregional  
Las exportaciones de los países de la 
Organización de Estados del Caribe 
Oriental (OECO) a los miembros de la 
CARICOM alcanzaron 161 M US$ en 
2008, que representan el 76% de las 
exportaciones totales de los países de la 
OECO. La Unión Europea apoya el 
desarrollo de capacidades de la Secretaría 
de la OECO. El programa del FED10 
(12,6 M€) tendrá un impacto directo sobre 
la integración, ya que se pretende aumentar 
la capacidad técnica de la OECO para 
conformar una Unión Económica. Las 
intervenciones de la UE registraron 
resultados limitados en la cooperación DR-
Haití, pero es probable que tengan mayor 
impacto en el FED10.  
5. Competitividad de la región 
El apoyo de la UE para alcanzar mayor 
competitividad en la región fue 
significativo, sin embargo los resultados 
son modestos debido a un clima de 
negocios todavía poco favorecedor. El 
único aumento significativo de 
exportaciones de mercancías durante el 
período 2002-2009 fue de materias primas, 
combustibles minerales y productos 
químicos, relacionados con la bauxita de 
Jamaica y los hidrocarburos de Trinidad y 
Tobago. Hay algunas excepciones como 
las exportaciones de ron de la región, que 
crecieron de 6 M US$ en 2006 a 
100 M US$ en 2008, o la Republica 
Dominicana convirtiéndose en el tercer 
mayor productor de los ACP de banano. 
Las organizaciones de apoyo al sector 
privado se han fortalecido, pero están lejos 
de ser autosostenibles.  
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6. Acuerdo de Asociación Económica 
La financiación regional de la UE ha sido 
fundamental para el proceso de 
negociación. El apoyo a las negociaciones 
fue un modelo para la coordinación de los 
donantes. El apoyo de la UE contribuyó 
sustancialmente a la creación de capacidad 
de negociación de la Maquinaria de 
Negociación de la Región del Caribe 
(CRNM) demostrado por la facilidad con la 
que CARICOM se ha podido embarcar en 
un proceso de negociación para un acuerdo 
de comercio con Canadá. Sin embargo, el 
progreso en la aplicación del AAE es lento 
a nivel regional y nacional. Pocos países 
cuentan con unidades de implementación 
operativa. Los fondos asignados para 
actores no estatales en el Programa de 
apoyo a la integración del Caribe del FED9 
(CISP) permanecieron mayormente no 
utilizados.  
7. Reducción del crimen y narcotráfico 
Los organismos policiales y jurídicos se 
beneficiaron de las intervenciones de la UE 
a través del aumento de entrenamientos y 
el desarrollo de capacidades. Con el apoyo 
de la UE, las agencias anti drogas 
compartieron informaciones, contribuyen-
do a mejorar los programas de reducción 
de la demanda y de la oferta. Aun así, los 
mecanismos de inteligencia y servicios 
disponibles para los Estados miembros de 
la región no fueron eficientemente utili-
zados. Se amplió la red en la región y se 
elaboró un borrador de estrategia regional 
de lucha contra las drogas, pero no hay 
ninguna indicación de una mejor formula-
ción y coordinación de las políticas.  
8. Gestión de desastres 
La UE apoyó la estrategia regional de 
manejo de desastres 2007-2012 a través de 
la creación de capacidades institucionales a 
nivel nacional. Sin embargo, los resultados 
se vieron más tarde de lo planeado. La UE 
fue efectiva en el fomento de capacidades a 
nivel local para la prevención y prepara-
ción y también contribuyó a la estrategia 
de manejo de desastres. El apoyo a la 
instalación de cuatro radares será una parte 
importante de la capacidad de gestión de 
desastres. La UE es reconocida por su im-
portante apoyo a los manejos de desastres 
naturales y su liderazgo en la coordinación 
de la programación; sin embargo, la 
visibilidad de las iniciativas de gestión de 
desastres de la UE en la región, es baja. 
9. Educación y formación 
Los resultados de las intervenciones del 
sector han sido modestos hasta ahora, 
debido a tres razones: 1) considerables 
retrasos en la implementación  de los 
proyectos de la Red de difusión de 
conocimientos del Caribe (CKLN); 2) los 
proyectos priorizaron las infraestructuras 
de la tecnologías de la información y la 
comunicación (TIC) más alla de lo previsto 
en los objetivos sectoriales de la estrategia 
regional; 3) otros proyectos previstos en 
esta estrategia regional fueron abandona-
dos. Todavia no hay evidencia de una 
mejor adecuación del mercado laboral. La 
sostenibilidad financiera de la red CKLN, 
planeada inicialmente en términos 
comerciales, dependerá aparentemente de 
subsidios de los gobiernos. 
EVALUACIÓN GENERAL 
La pertinencia de la estrategia diseñada 
para el período de evaluación es alta. Sin 
embargo, en sectores revisados durante la 
evaluación, con excepción del apoyo a las 
negociaciones del AAE, los resultados de 
las intervenciones de la UE podrían haber 
sido más altos con una mejor selección de 
socios en la ejecución, una complementa-
riedad más eficaz entre los programas 
regionales y nacionales, un fortalecimiento 
de las Delegaciones encargadas de los 
programas regionales y una mejor 
visibilidad. 
CONCLUSIONES 
Conclusiones principales 
1. Las estrategias regionales de FED9 y 
FED10 fueron en línea con las 
prioridades del CARIFORUM, gracias 
a un mejor diálogo político. Fueron 
coherentes con las políticas CARI-
FORUM de reducción de la pobreza, 
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desarrollo sostenible e integración en la 
economía mundial. 
2. A excepción de la OECO, la región del 
Caribe es todavía poco integrada. La 
eficacia de los esfuerzos internacio-
nales para mejorar la integración 
regional se ha reducido considerable-
mente por la falta de un marco de 
coordinación entre donantes. 
3. Dos cuestiones de eficiencia importan-
tes son las debilidades de la SCC y la 
capacidad limitada a nivel nacional 
para aplicar políticas decididas a nivel 
regional. 
4. La eficacia y el impacto de la ayuda 
regional de la UE están limitados por el 
hecho que la integración regional ha 
perdido impulso político en muchos 
países del Caribe.  
5. En la mayoría de las áreas examinadas 
durante la evaluación, los efectos direc-
tos y los resultados de las intervencio-
nes de la UE fueron modestos, con la 
excepción positiva del apoyo a las 
negociaciones de la AAE y el creci-
miento de algunas exportaciones como 
el ron para toda la región y plátanos 
para la República Dominicana. 
Conclusiones complementarias  
6. Las Delegaciones señalan una falta de 
personal para la gestión eficaz de los 
programas teniendo en cuenta los 
componentes del FED9 y el FED10.  
7. La coordinación y la complementarie-
dad entre los programas nacionales y 
regionales fue débil.  
8. Averiguar las instituciones adecuadas 
para implementar el programa regional 
sigue siendo un desafío. 
9. Teniendo en cuenta las recomendacio-
nes de la evaluación anterior, todos los 
temas transversales han sido tomados 
en consideración en el Programa 
Regional del FED10. 
10. La visibilidad de la UE sigue baja en el 
caso de proyectos de gestión de 
desastres y del proyecto CKLN. 
Conclusiones a nivel de sectorial 
11. La moneda única se ha convertido en 
un objetivo a largo plazo después de la 
decisión de la Cumbre de Jefes de 
Estado en julio 2011 de concentrarse 
en la superación de los obstáculos y 
retrasos incurridos en la realización del 
mercado único. 
12. Solo en algunos casos (por ejemplo, 
ron para toda la región, bananos para 
República Dominicana), las interven-
ciones de la EU contribuyeron a 
aumentar la competitividad internacio-
nal de las industrias de la región.  
13. A pesar del apoyo de la Unión Europea 
y otros donantes, la cooperación entre 
la República Dominicana y Haití no ha 
progresado mucho.  
14. Es probable que el apoyo de la UE 
impactaría positivamente en la integra-
ción subregional del Caribe Oriental. 
15. Los recursos de la UE fueron claves 
para el éxito de las negociaciones del 
AAE, pero la participación de los 
actores no estatales fue mínima.  
16. La UE está reconocida como el 
donante líder del sector de manejo de 
desastres, pero puede mejorar su 
coordinación interna y su apoyo para 
aumentar la capacidad de gestión de 
desastres que ha producido resultados 
modestos. 
17. Los resultados generales de las 
intervenciones en el desarrollo de 
recursos humanos han sido limitados y 
las perspectivas de sostenibilidad 
financiera de los proyectos de la red 
CKLN no están claras. 
RECOMENDACIONES 
Las recomendaciones generales son: 
1. La UE debería seguir apoyando el 
desarrollo y la adopción del sistema de 
coordinación entre donantes que debía 
ser presentado por la SCC en junio de 
2011. 
2. En aplicación de las nuevas directrices 
de programación, la complementarie-
dad debe mejorarse mediante la redac-
ción de la estrategia regional antes de 
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las estrategias nacionales y haciendo de 
la estrategia regional un marco de 
referencia para la cooperación bilateral 
de los Estados miembros de la UE con 
la región.  
3. Las delegaciones deben presionar para 
la aplicación de las reglas de 
visibilidad por todos los proyectos y 
programas de financiación comunitaria 
en la región. 
Las recomendaciones a nivel sectorial  
4. El FED10 debe incluir la asistencia y 
las actividades relacionadas con la 
participación de los actores no estatales 
en el AAE. 
5. El progreso en la integración regional 
requiere una mejora de la 
competitividad de las economías 
caribeñas. Las intervenciones deben 
coordinarse con los demás donantes 
apoyando la competitividad.  
6. Debe fortalecerse la participación de la 
DG ECHO de la Comisión en discusio-
nes programáticas de gestión de 
desastres. 
7. La UE debe desarrollar una estrategia 
de manejo de desastres (o marco de 
programación) para el Caribe y 
difundirla ampliamente entre los 
donantes y los países, asegurando que 
los organismos de ejecución 
seleccionados respeten normas de 
visibilidad de la UE. 
8. La UE debería analizar cómo las inter-
venciones regionales en la educación y 
en el sector de la formación pueden 
agregar valor en una interacción 
sinérgica con las intervenciones del 
sector nacional, incluyendo la 
armonización de las intervenciones en 
educación postsecundaria, evaluación 
del mercado de trabajo y en la gestión 
del conocimiento con las necesidades 
del CSME. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The evaluation of the Commission of the European Union’s support to the Caribbean Region 
(Regional Level Evaluation) is part of the 2010 evaluation programme approved by the Exter-
nal Relations and Development Commissioners. This evaluation has been allocated under the 
Consortium Contract “FWC EVA 2007/geo-acp LOT 3” lead by ECO Consult. The Evalua-
tion’s Terms of Reference (TOR) are included as an annex. 
1.1 Objectives  
As stated in the TOR the main objectives of the evaluation are to:  
 Provide the relevant external co-operation services of the European Union (EU) and 
the wider public with an overall independent assessment of the Commission’s past and 
current co-operation relations with the Caribbean Region;  
 Identify key lessons in order to improve the current and future strategies and pro-
grammes of the EU’s external co-operation services in regard to the Caribbean Re-
gion. 
The focus in the evaluation of the EU
3
 geographical programmes lies on the results and im-
pact (effects) against the background of greater concentration of external co-operation and 
increasing emphasis on result-oriented approaches, particularly in the context of the pro-
grammes of the EuropeAid Development and Co-operation Directorate General (DG 
DEVCO) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). 
The evaluation seeks an appropriate balance between a) comprehensiveness in order to fulfil 
the contribution to fund management accountability and b) specificity in order to identify rel-
evant lessons that can be used by the EU and its partners for increasing the amount of positive 
results deriving from its support both in regard to the region and in a more general, global 
context of external co-operation. 
1.2 Scope of the Evaluation 
The scope of the evaluation covers the EU’s co-operation strategies and their implementation 
for the period 2003-2010, thereby covering the current programming cycle 2008-2013 and the 
previous one, 2003-2007. Though not specifically mentioned in the TOR, the evaluation also 
covers interventions programmed under the European Development Funds (EDFs) 7and 8 still 
on-going at the start of the period under evaluation. Therefore, the evaluation has assessed: 
 the relevance and coherence of the EU’s co-operation strategies (all instruments in-
cluded) for the period (strategic level); 
 the consistency between programming and implementation for the same period; 
 the value added of the EU interventions (strategic and implementation levels); 
 the 3 Cs: Coordination and complementarity of the EU interventions with other do-
nors’ interventions (i.e. of EU member states), and coherence between the EU devel-
opment co-operation and other EU policies likely to affect the partner region; 
                                                 
3 In this report the consultants will refer to the EuropeAid Development and Co-operation Directorate General (DG DEVCO) 
and the European External Action Service (EEAS) that was created with the Treaty of Lisbon (entry into force on December 
1, 2009) as opposed to the former DG AIDCO and DG RELEX. The term 'EU support' will not include development support 
by EU Member States, but only development support managed by the Commission of the EU (e.g. in form of EDF or EU 
budget line funding) in coordination with the EEAS. 
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 the implementation of the EU’s co-operation, focusing on impact, sustainability, effec-
tiveness and efficiency for the period under the programming cycle; 
 whether cross-cutting and key issues were actually taken into account all along from 
programming to implementation; and 
 whether the recommendations of the previous regional level evaluation covering the 
period 1996-2002 have been taken into account. 
Key documentation for the evaluation was assessed in order to avoid overlaps with the al-
ready completed and on-going related evaluations. The evaluation also took into account other 
relevant non-programmable financing available to the Caribbean region as far as they con-
cerned the region and not just specific countries. Thematically, the evaluation team focused 
on Regional integration, international competitiveness, Economic Partnership Agreement, 
Crime and Illegal Drug Trafficking, Disaster Management and Human Resource Develop-
ment. 
1.3 Methodology and Phases of the Evaluation 
As depicted in the figure below, the evaluation was conducted in four major phases with pre-
defined activities and interim-reports (or in the case of the field phase, a presentation) stand-
ing at the end of each phase. The detailed methodology and description of the various evalua-
tion steps can be found in Annex II. 
Figure 3:  Process of the evaluation in four phases
4
 
 
* Note: The round shapes stating “RG” symbolise the four meetings with the Reference Group 
During the process, the Evaluation Team interacted closely with a Reference Group (RG), 
composed by representatives of the concerned EU services in Brussels (namely DG DEVCO, 
DG TRADE and the EEAS) and at the Regional Delegation of the European Union (EUD) in 
Guyana, as well as representatives of CARIFORUM. 
                                                 
4 Contrarily to what is foreseen in EU methodology, the Final Report has not been presented at a Seminar in the region. It 
was cancelled due to budgetary problems and a certain lack of interest from major stakeholders. 
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In the inception phase, the team studied the EU-Caribbean relations and strategic planning 
documents in respect to: 
 The main sectors and modalities of intervention, and  
 The “faithful” intervention logic applied under EDFs 9 and 10.  
On this background, the team reconstructed the intervention logic for the whole evaluation 
period (see Figure 12). The reconstructed intervention logic, and the evaluation criteria and 
issues mentioned in the TOR, were the points of departure for the team’s identification of nine 
evaluation questions (EQs). With corresponding judgement criteria (JCs) and indicators, the 
EQs provided the framework for the further work of the evaluation. 
For the elaboration of the Desk Report, the evaluation team: 
 Collected data and project/programme documentation, including statistical infor-
mation, 
 Conducted interviews with the concerned EU services in Brussels, 
 Held preliminary discussions with the EUD and the CARICOM Secretariat in Guyana, 
 Elaborated questionnaires for a survey addressing the National Authorising Officers 
(NAOs) and Business and Private Sector Organisations in the region,  
 Analysed the information provided through the above mentioned sources to elaborate 
preliminary answers to the evaluation questions and hypotheses to be tested during the 
field mission, 
 Elaborated the methodology and a detailed work plan for the field phase.  
Figure 4: Synthesis of the evaluation  
 
The field phase comprised team briefings at the EUD Guyana and at the CARICOM Secre-
tariat (CCS), visits by team members to seven Caribbean countries (Barbados, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago) and a presentation of 
the findings at a Reference Group meeting in Brussels. 
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In order to allow for in-depth analysis of specific programmes, projects or cooperation issues 
that may be of interest to the overall assessment, four case studies were carried out during the 
field phase: 
 Caribbean Integration Support Programme (CISP, EDF9) 
 Project supporting the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (EDF8) 
 Multi-Country Drug Demand Reduction Programme (EDF8) 
 Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network (CKLN, centred on delays, EDF8) 
In the figure below the limitations to this evaluation are summed up. Only four National Au-
thorizing Officers (NAOs) and 19 Private Sector Organisations (PSO) responded to the sur-
veys. 
Figure 5: Limitations and Approach to the Evaluation  
 
* NB: EDF interventions 
regard those regional 
interventions made 
available by the Commis-
sion’s data base CRIS 
(state December 2010) 
falling in the evaluation 
period (4 EDF7 major 
interventions closed 
during evaluation period, 
17 for EDF8, 23 for 
EDF9 and 7 for the cur-
rently running EDF10). 
 
In the Synthesis Phase, the team adjusted the preliminary findings of the desk phase accord-
ing to the field findings in order to arrive at the draft final EQ answers. Crosscutting analyses 
of the answers led to the overall conclusions in response to the objectives of the evaluation 
and to recommendations that originate from the conclusions. The revised findings, conclu-
sions and recommendations are integrated in this Final Report.  
1.4 Structure of the Report 
The report is structured in six chapters. After the introductive chapter that will in the follow-
ing also explain the methodology and phases of the evaluation, chapter 2 presents the context 
and the main challenges of the Caribbean region, reviews key issues of the EU-Caribbean 
relation and provides a quantitative analysis of the EU support to the region. Chapter 3 goes 
on by presenting the answers to the evaluation questions as well as the judgements and evalu-
ation findings on which they are based. Chapter 4 draws general conclusions on the EU inter-
vention strategy in general and by sectors. Finally, chapter 5 provides the main recommenda-
tions deriving from the evaluation. 
The annexes include the Terms of Reference, the Information Matrix containing the findings 
at the indicator level on which the judgement criteria (JC) and EQ answers are based; a list of 
persons consulted; a bibliography; surveys that were sent to NAOs and PSOs in the Caribbe-
an; the inventory of EU financed projects and programme within the scope of the evaluation 
and a number of data related to the context and the findings of the evaluation. 
Limited survey 
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Information/ persons 
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2 THE CONTEXT OF CO-OPERATION WITH THE CARIBBEAN REGION 
2.1 Institutional Context 
The wider Caribbean region, subject of this evaluation, includes 15 ACP countries. There are 
16 CARIFORUM countries: 15 CARICOM countries minus Montserrat, plus Dominican Re-
public and Cuba. As ACP and CARIFORUM member, Cuba has signed a 'partial scope' free 
trade zone agreement with CARICOM. However, the country is not a signatory of the Coto-
nou Agreement and consequently not benefiting from EDF support, and is therefore not in-
cluded in the Evaluation.  
The region is mostly comprised of small island states (more than 7,000 islands, islets, reefs, 
and cays) scattered over a wide geographical area and surrounded by the Caribbean Sea and 
the Atlantic Ocean (see Figure 2: Map of wider Caribbean Region on page 6). While five 
(Barbados, Cuba, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago) can be seen as 
larger island countries and economies, seven (Antigua & Barbuda, the Bahamas, St. Kitts & 
Nevis, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines) are small-island states, 
and three are mainland countries (Belize, Guyana, and Suriname). The only Least Developed 
Country is Haiti.
5
 
The variety of cultures, languages,
6
 levels of economic development and differences in popu-
lation constitute a challenge for a comprehensive evaluation. Complexity is broadened by the 
historical background of the Caribbean states,
7
 as well as by the location of EU Outermost 
Regions (OMR)
8
 and Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs)
9
 in the Region. There is a 
special EU-OCT cooperation framework, however, the OCTs also have access to regional 
programmes and they are encouraged to participate in regional cooperation
10
. Differently 
from OCTs, the French OMR are part of the EU, and may thus benefit from specific 
measures.  
Regionalism as expressed in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) helps the members to 
jointly tackle shared problems and to participate more in international affairs. The CARICOM 
as further described in box 1 is a community of 15 Caribbean countries.  
                                                 
5 These classifications are provided by the United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Coun-
tries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (August 2010); see: 
http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/  
6 English, French, Spanish and Dutch are official languages and spoken alongside indigenous languages and local dialects. 
7 The great majority of the Caribbean countries were British colonies and only gained full independence in the 1970s/1980s. 
8 OMRs in the Caribbean include: French Guiana, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Saint Barthélemy and Saint Martin (all are 
French, the first three being “départements d'outre-mer”/ DOMs). 
9 OCTs in the Caribbean included in the evaluation period: Anguilla, Aruba, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Mont-
serrat, the Netherlands Antilles and Turks & Caicos Islands (The Netherlands Antilles were formally dissolved by 
10.10.2010. Out of the 5 islands that make up the Antilles, 2 of them gained country status within the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands (Curaçao and St. Maarten). They will remain OCTs. 3 of them acquired the status of Dutch municipalities with special 
status, but continue to have OCT status (Bonaire, Saba and St.Eustatius). 
10 See Region Level Evaluation; Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT), Final Report, EU October 2011 
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Box 1:  The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
In 1972, Commonwealth Caribbean leaders decided to transform the Caribbean Free Trade Association 
(CARIFTA) into a Common Market and establish the Caribbean Community, of which the Common Mar-
ket would be an integral part. The Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community (signed in Chaguara-
mas on 4
th
 July 1973) was a defining moment in the history of the Commonwealth Caribbean. CARIFTA 
established a free trade area, but did not provide for the free movement of labour and capital, or the co-
ordination of agricultural, industrial and foreign policies. 
The objectives of the community (Article 6 of the Revised Treaty) are: to improve standards of living and 
work; the full employment of labour and other factors of production; accelerated, coordinated and sus-
tained economic development and convergence; expansion of trade and economic relations with third 
states; enhanced levels of international competitiveness; organisation for increased production and 
productivity; achievement of a greater measure of economic leverage and effectiveness of member states 
in dealing with third States, groups of States and entities of any description and the enhanced co-
ordination of member states’ foreign and foreign economic policies and enhanced functional co-
operation. In 1989, the Heads of Government decided to transform the Common Market into a single 
market and economy in which factors move freely as a basis for internationally competitive production of 
goods and provision of services. It was also decided that for the transformation to take place, the Treaty 
would have to be revised. Between 1993 and 2000, nine protocols amended the Treaty. These nine proto-
cols were later combined to create the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean 
Community, including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME). Allowances have been made 
for the subsequent inclusion in the Revised Treaty, by way of additional protocols, of new issues such as 
e-commerce, government procurement, trade in goods from free zones, free circulation of goods, and the 
rights contingent on the free movement of persons. 
The Forum of Caribbean ACP states (CARIFORUM) of 17 countries was established in 
1992 as a forum for regional co-operation that includes a broader group than the 15 
CARICOM members: Cuba
11
 and the Dominican Republic. It manages and coordinates both 
intra-regional and inter-regional policy dialogue, coordinates the allocation of resources and 
manages the implementation of Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) financed by the EDF. 
The CARICOM Secretariat (CCS) has now four Directorates, which include one for CARI-
FORUM. On April 2011, the 18
th
 meeting of the Caribbean Community Council of Ministers 
decided that the new CARIFORUM structure should include both the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) Implementation Unit and the traditional programming and development co-
operation function, with its own dedicated staff. It was also agreed that the current position of 
Assistant Secretary General of CARIFORUM should be designated as Director General and 
assume the position of CARIFORUM EPA Coordinator.  
The broadest regional co-operation organisation in the Caribbean is the Association of Car-
ibbean States (ACS) where, in addition to the CARIFORUM countries, neighbouring coun-
tries and France, through its OMR, are engaged. The Organisation of East Caribbean 
States (OECS), a sub- regional organisation, and CARICOM are integration organisations 
bound by treaties and CARIFORUM and ACS are modes of regional cooperation. Figure 6 
below schematically depicts the regional architecture. 
                                                 
11 Cuba, being the 16th Caribbean ACP state is located in the Caribbean region, member of CARIFORUM and has signed a 
'partial scope' free trade zone agreement with CARICOM. However, the country is not a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement 
and consequently not benefiting from EDF support. The EU relations with Cuba are based on the Common Position adopted 
in 1996. See: Common Position of 2 December 1996 defined by the Council based on Article J.2 of the Treaty on European 
Union, on Cuba. Cooperation was re-launched in 2008. An indicative allocation of €20M was earmarked for Cuba for the 
period 2011-2013 under the EU Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). 
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Figure 6:  Caribbean Regional Integration and Cooperation Architecture 
 
The below standing table depicts the five different EU delegations that are in charge of project 
implementation within the Caribbean region. The implementation of the Caribbean regional 
programme is mainly the responsibility of the Delegation in Guyana. Still, some programmes 
covered under the Regional Strategy Papers (RSPs) are also supervised and implemented un-
der the umbrella of other Delegations, in particular, the Delegation in Barbados responsible 
for seven East Caribbean states. 
Table 1:  EU Delegations in the Caribbean region 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES (AND OCTS) RESPONSIBLE EU DELEGATION 
Barbados, Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia,  
St. Vincent & the Grenadines; (Anguilla, Montserrat, British Virgin Islands) 
Barbados 
Dominican Republic, Cuba Dominican Republic 
Guyana, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, (Netherlands Antilles12, Aruba) Guyana 
Haiti Haiti 
Jamaica, Belize, the Bahamas; (Turks & Caicos Islands, Cayman Islands) Jamaica 
Source: Own compilation based on information of DG DEVCO and the Delegations’ websites. 
2.2 Socio-Economic Context 
As indicated in the table below, most Caribbean countries are middle-income countries. How-
ever, the region is very heterogeneous in size and population. Likewise, the table shows wide 
differences of the Human Development Index (UNDP) and the Corruption Perception Index 
(Transparency International), with Barbados and Haiti standing at the extremes for both in-
dexes. 
                                                 
12 On 10 October 2010, the Netherlands Antilles were dissolved into several units. However, this does not affect their status 
as one OCT in the evaluation period. 
Source: Reconstruction from RIP 2003-2013. 
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Table 2:  Overview of Caribbean Countries 
Country 
Size 
in sq. Km 
Population mid 
2010 
(.000 persons) 
Per Capita GDP 
2009 
(in current USD) 
HDI Ranking 
2010 
CPI Ranking 
2010 
Antigua and Barbuda 443 89 12,474 … … 
Bahamas 13,880 346 21,570 43 (high) … 
Barbados 430 257 13,820 42 (very high) 17 
Belize 22,966 313 4,356 78 (high) … 
(Cuba) 110,860 11,203 5,560 … 69 
Dominica 751 67 5,608 … 44 
Dominican Republic 48,670 9,899 8,410 88 (medium) 101 
Grenada 344 104 5,912 … … 
Guyana 214,969 761 2,658 104 (medium) 126 
Haiti 27,750 10,089 653 145 (low) 146 
Jamaica 10,991 2,730 4,566 80 (high) 87 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 261 52 10,121 … … 
Saint Lucia 616 174 5,548 … 22 
Saint Vincent & Grenadines 389 109 5,371 … 31 
Suriname 163,820 524 4,190 94 (medium) 75 
Trinidad and Tobago 5,128 1,344 15,777 59 (high) 73 
TOTAL 622,268 38,061 118,661   
Sources: Size- CIA fact book / Population & Per Capita GDP- statistical yearbook, Latin America and the Caribbean 
UNDP/ CPI- Corruption Perception Index 2010 Report, Transparency International/ HDI- HDR 2010 UNDP 
A recent report of the CCS notes that there is still a significant level of poverty in CARICOM 
countries, despite the middle level per capita income that has been achieved. The level of 
poverty is reported to be 27% in St. Kitts, 15.9% in Nevis, 37.7% in Grenada, 18.4% in Anti-
gua and Barbuda, 14.5% in Jamaica, 28.8% in St. Lucia, and 16.7% in Trinidad and Tobago.
13
 
In contrast to the majority of African and Pacific signatory countries of the Cotonou Agree-
ment, the tertiary sector of most CARIFORUM member states makes close to two thirds of 
their GDP. The average percentage for those countries has grown slightly between 2000 and 
2009 (see figure below). In Guyana and Haiti, the primary sector still contributes to about a 
quarter of the GDP. In the Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and Antigua 
and Barbuda, it is the secondary sector that creates a proportion of around 25% of the national 
economy (2009). A detailed repartition of CARIFORUM GDPs (except Cuba) per sector can 
be found in the tables in Annex IX). 
Figure 7: GDP per sector- average for CARIFORUM countries in 2000 & 2009 
     
Sources: Calculation based on data for CARIFORUM member countries (except Cuba) from DG Trade website- statistics on 
bilateral relations http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/ (state March 2010), NB: 
Cuba is not included; data for Haiti is taken from CIA fact book for 2000 and 2010 
                                                 
13 CARICOM Trade and Investment Report, published by Ian Randle Publications for The CARICOM Secretariat, 2010. 
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Table 3:  CARIFORUM trade in services by category for 2003-2008 (in million US$) 
YEAR  
Service Type  
2003 
export 
2003 
import 
2004 
export 
2004 
import 
2005 
export 
2005 
import 
2006 
export 
2006 
import 
2007 
export 
2007 
import 
2008 
export 
2008 
import 
Transport 1,074 2,572 1,189 2,678 1,126 3,133 1,246 3,391 1,338 3,861 1,152 3,793 
Travel* 8,426 1,227 8,905 1,391 9,902 1,500 10,831 1,492 11,477 1,526 10,027 1,231 
Communications 422 123 489 145 437 165 466 176 481 189 415 162 
Construction 4 60 4 42 6 80 7 271 13 245 1 73 
Insurance 232 530 288 529 322 698 301 755 348 808 84 592 
Financial services 51 75 59 91 116 80 119 99 162 97 61 81 
Computer and 
information 78 38 78 93 80 37 67 45 57 52 48 43 
Royalties and li-
cence fees 51 104 52 103 54 114 57 124 59 160 63 138 
Other business 
services 600 1,123 758 1,310 839 1,523 839 1,603 916 1,769 806 1,714 
Personal, cultural & 
recreational services 21 5 28 6 30 4 31 7 30 9 39 8 
Government ser-
vices n.i.e. 228 338 250 325 308 358 303 403 331 432 308 340 
TOTAL 11,187 6,194 12,100 6,713 13,221 7,694 14,267 8,365 15,212 9,149 13,004 8,174 
Source: UNCTAD Stat (2011);  
* includes goods and services acquired from an economy by non-resident travellers during visits shorter than 1 year. 
However, tourism related exports continue to dwarf the other exports of service. Also, as can 
be read in table 3, the trade surplus in services tends to deteriorate, imports growing at a faster 
rate than exports. 
As detailed in the next section, CARICOM’s intra-regional exports were in 2008 only 16% of 
the total of CARICOM exports.
14
 This can be compared to 67% for the EU and to 25% for 
ASEAN. Still, it is higher than MERCOSUR (15%). This small share is due to many factors, 
the main ones being the lack of complementarity and of competitiveness, the transport costs 
within the archipelago, and the liberalisation of trade with other countries. Petroleum repre-
sented around 60% of the intra-CARICOM trade. 
The tourism sector in the Caribbean is expanding very slowly. Besides services (in particular 
financial and tourism), mineral and petroleum based industries are the major recipients of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), while foreign investment in agriculture and manufacturing 
sectors amounts to virtually nothing. In the latest Caribbean Trade and Investment Report 
(CARICOM, 2010), it is pointed out that: “FDI inflows into CARICOM countries continue to 
originate from the traditional sources of North America and Europe. However, in recent 
years, significant FDI flows have been received from other sources, including Spain, China 
and the Middle East”- a diversification that should be intensified according to CARICOM.15 
Remittances are a significant contributor to GDP in many countries, particularly in Guyana 
and Jamaica (23% and 16% respectively). Remittances from the Diaspora are the fastest grow-
ing source of currency inflows. They are three times the total value of all agricultural exports and 
roughly two-thirds of earnings from tourism. Remittances to CARICOM countries grew from 
US$1.7 billion in 2000 to US$4 billion in 2009.
16
 Remittances to the Caribbean since 2008 
have slowed down considerably and it was expected that remittances will continue to diminish 
in 2010 and beyond.
17
  
                                                 
14 See CARICOM website under http://tradsysonline.caricomstats.info/Home.aspx 
15 CARICOM (2010) „Caribbean Trade and Investment Report, 2010“, executive summary p.5. 
16 Claremont Kirton, Migration & Remittances Trends: The Caribbean Experience. PPT Presentation, Mona, UWI, 2011 
17 Regional economic outlook: Western hemisphere, IMF, Oct 10, 2010  
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Greater than the on-going economic crisis is the development challenge for the region. Over 
the last 40 years, the Caribbean economies grew, on average, by only 2.2% per year while 
Latin America’s grew by 3.4% overall. Compared to other regions in the world, the Caribbe-
an's productivity gains also lagged. The magnitude of the pending economic difficulties is 
summed up in the fact that out of the 30 most indebted countries in the world (based on debt 
per capita), Caribbean countries make up 15.
18
 
2.3 Main Challenges for Development of the Caribbean Region 
2.3.1. Lagging Integration and Competitiveness 
The region experienced growth supported by high flows of FDI, trade preferences, and public 
investment, although at a lower rate than most developing countries. In the last twenty years, 
the Caribbean has also seen significant improvements in human development in all countries 
except Haiti, which is reflected in the 2010 Human Development Index (HDI) rankings (see 
Table 2 , chapter 2.2).  
Although preferential trading arrangements were established with the EU and the USA as a 
development tool to stimulate and diversify Caribbean exports, the prevailing consensus is 
that trade preferences have not delivered the expected results of overall trade performance. 
The region’s export structure shows increased concentration of products. In 1997, the top 20 
products account for 51% of total exports and this share increased to 70% in 2007.
19
 Table 4 
below depicts the value of CARICOM domestic exports per commodity classification at the 
beginning of the evaluation period and in 2009. Data for the year 2007 give an indication of 
the trend before the economic crisis that started at the end of that same year. The only sectors 
of significant weight and growth (shown in table 4 in current US dollar rates) are mineral 
fuels and chemical products, accounting for more than 70%.
20
  
Table 4:  Value of CARICOM domestic exports per commodity (2002, 2007, 2009 in million US$) 
Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) Commodity  Description 
2002 2007 2009 2009/2002 2007/2002 
Value Value Value Value Value 
All sections 5,257 16,647 11,138 212% 317% 
Food and live animals 863 1055 818 95% 122% 
Beverages and tobacco 174 332 323 186% 191% 
Crude materials inedible, except fuels 789 1924 811 103% 244% 
Mineral fuels, lubricants, related materials 1,974 9,318 7,141 362% 472% 
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 6 8 8 133% 133% 
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 645 2919 1099 170% 453% 
Manufactured goods  460 781 495 108% 170% 
Machinery and transport equipment 70 105 59 84% 150% 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 124 125 101 81% 101% 
Not classified elsewhere 151 80 283 187% 53% 
Source: CARICOM Stats 
The high concentration of products, the small sizes of the markets and high transportation 
costs are major factors of low competitiveness. Nevertheless, the region followed the global 
trend towards trade liberalisation. Average applied Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs fell 
                                                 
18 Regional economic outlook: western hemisphere, IMF, Oct 10, 2010  
19 See Caribbean: Accelerating Trade Integration, World Bank and OAS, April 2009. 
20 See http://www.caricomstats.org/Files/Databases/Trade/eXCEL%20FILES/CC_Total.htm 
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from over 20% in 1996 to just below 10% in 2005. Still, there is some tariff dispersion with 
average tariffs on 10% of goods over 20%. 
The Caribbean countries are redefining their relations with their main trading partners, includ-
ing the European Union through the recently signed Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA); 
they are also exploring the possibility of moving from unilateral to reciprocal arrangements 
with the United States and Canada. At the same time, the region is redesigning the process of 
regional trade integration with the on-going implementation of the CARICOM Single Market 
and Economy (CSME).  
The CSME, the cornerstone of the regional integration agenda of CARICOM, focuses mainly 
on four areas: (i) the free movement of goods; (ii) a common external tariff and trade policy; 
(iii) sectorial development policies and (iv) macro-economic policies. While important pro-
gress has been made in liberalising the movement of goods, the CSME agenda has shown few 
results in the other areas. The latest Summit of Heads of State of CARICOM in July 2011 
decided to concentrate efforts on the completion of the Single Market, making of the Single 
Economy only a long-term objective.  
CARICOM’s intra-regional total exports are still small:21 US$3.8 billion in 2008 out of which 
more than 60% is mineral fuels and derivatives from Trinidad and Tobago. The intra-regional 
exports constitute only 16% of total exports of the CARICOM countries.
22
  
Additionally, the competitiveness of many Caribbean economies is undermined by high costs 
of doing business and other factors as measured for instance in the “Ease of Doing Business”- 
Index of the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). As Figure 8 
demonstrates, all CARIFORUM countries except for St. Lucia and Antigua & Barbuda rank 
among the lower third in the world (Barbados and Cuba are not ranked). Some other ACP 
countries, like Mauritius (rank 20), Botswana (52) or Vanuatu (60) show a relatively better 
performance for the measured period (June 2009 – June 2010). 
Figure 8:  Ease of Doing Business- Caribbean states aggregate rankings (June 2009-June 2010) 
 
Source: World Bank and IFC (2011) „Doing Business 2011“;  
* Singapore is shown as a benchmark for the best rating and Chad for the worst rating. 
In sum, trade liberalisation in the Caribbean is being implemented in a fragile macroeconomic 
and structural environment. Trade liberalisation (and more specifically the EPA implementa-
                                                 
21 See Annex IX, table CARICOM Intra-regional total exports by country in US$ ‘000: 2004-2008 
22 See CARICOM website under http://tradsysonline.caricomstats.info/Home.aspx 
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tion process) needs to pay attention to these constraints, which cover a very large range of 
issues.  
2.3.2. Other Challenges 
Politically, the Caribbean states are diverse, but share similar practices holding regular na-
tional elections and showing common elements of good governance and rule of law. Yet, 
some of these mostly democratic systems are restrained by too little institutional and financial 
capacity. With the exception of the most populated countries, Haiti and the Dominican Re-
public (DR), positive common trends can be seen in the high average of human development 
in most of the countries. However, the fact that the Caribbean region is internationally ranking 
second in magnitude of HIV/AIDS rates (with mostly women and young people concerned 
and the highest rate in Haiti) affects social as well as economic standards in the region.  
Although the countries are mostly classified as high- and middle-income countries, there is a 
high proportion of poverty and great inequalities of wealth and income. Women are more 
likely to be unemployed, thus gender inequality persists.  
The fragility of most Caribbean economies, high rates of unemployment, high population 
density and the proximity of highly developed economies to which it is relatively to emigrate 
partly explains the high out-migration rates in the region. In addition national and transnation-
al crime and security problems (in particular drug related) impact negatively on FDI and con-
tribute to the high rate of migration and loss of skills (“brain drain”) as families and individu-
als leave the region for security reasons. Brain drain from the Caribbean is the highest in the 
world: in 2000, the emigration rate for tertiary level graduates averaged 65% for 13 
CARICOM countries; in five of these, the rate exceeded 70%.
23
. The problem of illicit drugs 
particularly affects Haiti and the DR, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Jamaica, but also the 
Caribbean region in general concerning drug smuggling on the famous “Caribbean route” 
preferred by Colombian and other drug cartels.  
Many Caribbean islands are classified as one of the world’s hotspots24 in regard to conserva-
tion of international biodiversity supporting exceptionally diverse ecosystems that, however, 
have been devastated by deforestation (regionally 71% of the energy consumption derives 
from charcoal) and human encroachment (e.g. through coastal maritime pollution). Moreover, 
the region struggles with a scarcity of fresh water resources and is environmentally vulnerable 
to natural hazards and their aftermath (such as hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic 
eruptions) and global climate change, which includes rising sea levels, leading, inter alia, to 
floods.  
As a partly correlated result, the Caribbean is one of the most natural disaster-prone areas in 
the world, making it very vulnerable, despite its high and middle-income designation: disas-
ters and environmental devastation have a strong and immediate impact on the economy both 
through contraction of economic output or through worsening of the balance of payments or 
of the budget. The main service sector in the great majority of the Caribbean states, tourism, is 
severely affected in the event of natural disasters.
25
 
                                                 
23 Pienkos, Andrew; Caribbean Labour Migration: Minimizing Losses and Optimizing Benefits 
24 As defined by Conservation International. 
25 Disaster is defined here as “a sudden, calamitous event that causes serious disruption of the functioning of a community or 
a society causing widespread human, material, economic and/or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected 
community or society to cope using its own level of resources.“ UN/ISDR 2004; definition also used by DG ECHO. 
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3 EU-CARIBBEAN RELATIONS 
3.1 Political Dialogue 
Some EU member states have strong historic ties with the Caribbean region. The EU is even 
part of the Caribbean through the Outermost Regions (OMRs) and Overseas Countries and 
Territories (OCTs).  
The CARIFORUM contains 16 Caribbean countries. With the exception of Cuba, they have 
all signed the Cotonou Partnership Agreement with the EU, which entitles them to EDF sup-
port. In 2006, the EU articulated the following aims in its communication “An EU-Caribbean 
Partnership for Growth, Stability and Development" (COM (2006) 86)
26
 that were confirmed 
by the European Council that same year: 
 strengthen its political partnership with the region; 
 support regional integration and help Caribbean countries respond to foreign compe-
tition; and 
 help the region address its specific vulnerabilities, including increasing its ability to 
respond to natural disasters and combat drug trafficking. 
Since the adoption of the 2006 strategy, other important factors have influenced relations with 
the EU: 
 Since the conclusion of the EPA between the EU and CARIFORUM in October 2008, 
the relations are no longer based on unilateral preferential trade regimes and a donor-
recipient relationship, but on a partnership with mutual obligations.  
 The financial crisis hit the economies of the region. 
 The same crisis placed some Caribbean states in the forefront of criticism for their 
non-transparent offshore financial services. 
 Progress towards the completion of the CSME has slowed down. 
 The end of preferential trade regimes for sugar and bananas created tensions between 
EU and CARICOM members.  
 The controversies surrounding the EPA negotiations and delays in the implementation 
of some development aid programmes. 
 Climate change became of vital interest for the Caribbean and the EU. 
 Drug trafficking and related crimes increased their damage. 
 The new US administration showed renewed interest in the Caribbean region.  
 The EU negotiated association agreements in Latin America and the Caribbean region 
like the ones with Mexico, Chile, Colombia/Peru, Central America and the MER-
COSUR. 
 Negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with Canada are on-going. 
 New international players like China, Brazil and Venezuela show increased interest in 
the region.  
                                                 
26 See European Commission (2006) An EU-Caribbean Partnership for Growth, Stability and Development: 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/communication_86_2006_en.pdf 
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Taking stock of such factors, the EU and CARIFORUM Heads of State and Government 
adopted an outline for a Joint EU-Caribbean Strategy during the May 2010 EU-
CARIFORUM Summit which is coherent with the two regions' wish for bi-regional political 
dialogue to become the main vehicle for addressing a range of issues of common interest. The 
five priorities, which are identified by the strategy are (i) regional integration and cooperation; 
(ii) reconstruction and support to Haiti; (iii) climate change and natural disasters: (iv) crime 
and security; and (v) joint action in bi-regional, multilateral and global fora. All are opera-
tional. The Joint communiqué 
27
 thereby specifically stressed the following points: 
 commitment to the UN Charter, respect of universal human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law; 
 will to strengthen the political partnership and work together to improve the quality of 
life of all their peoples; 
 commitment to increasing CARICOM integration process;  
 establishment of a Caribbean Infrastructure Trust Fund advancing EPA implementa-
tion;  
 co-operation on the use of innovation and technology, including in the pursuit of food 
security in the Caribbean region; 
 need to increase co-operation in the fields of climate change and the biodiversity loss 
 commitment to the reconstruction of Haiti following the devastating earthquake of 12th 
January 2010; and 
 agreement to meet again on the occasion of the VII Summit of Heads of State and 
Government of the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean in 2012 or 
at any earlier date. 
3.2 Trade Relations and EPA  
Total EU trade with the Caribbean region amounts to more than €8.5 billion per year. Main 
EU exports to the Caribbean include machinery and transport equipment, followed by agricul-
tural products. The main Caribbean exports to the EU include fuels and mining products, to-
gether with agricultural products.
28
  
The following figure shows that, except for the year 2008, the EU is exporting more goods to 
the Caribbean than the Caribbean is exporting to the EU.  
                                                 
27 See EU-CARIFORUM Joint Communiqué: 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/iv_eu_cariforum_summit_joint_communique_en.pdf 
28 See Annex IX; Figures: EU imports from the Caribbean Countries and EU exports tot he Caribbean countries (2006, 2008, 
2010). 
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Figure 9:  EU’s trade balance with Caribbean ACP countries (2006-2010) 
 
Source Commission of the EU- DG Trade (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/economic-
partnerships/negotiations-and-agreements/#caribbean) 
Following various international trade disputes (in particular related to the WTO “bananas 
case”), the traditional (non-reciprocal) trading arrangements with the Caribbean and other 
ACP countries had to be brought into compliance with WTO rules. As provided for in the 
Cotonou Agreement of 2000, the traditional trade regime was finally replaced by the CARI-
FORUM-EU EPA signed in 2008. Haiti, the only Least Developed Country of the region and 
the sole country not to sign in 2008 did so in 2009. The EPA not only allows for preferential 
access to certain traditional exports like sugar, banana and rice to continue for a short period, 
but also opens a new trade relationship between the two regions. It is the first agreement of its 
kind (bi-regional) and the first (and so far the only) comprehensive regional Economic Part-
nership Agreements signed with an ACP sub-group of states. The key distinction between the 
EPA and traditional regional trade agreements is the developmental dimension, which is not 
only included in the text, but also expressed in various areas like support to the regional inte-
gration process, differentiated treatment of certain sub-groupings like the OECS countries, 
longer phase out periods (up to 25 years) and other developmental aspects. The 10
th
 European 
Development Fund (EDF10) regional programme supports the regional integration process 
and is complementary to the EPA. 
The main benefits of the EPA are: 
 Predictability in market access into the EU, the largest import market for goods and 
services; 
 Duty-free-quota-free (DFQF) market access into the EU for all CARIFORUM prod-
ucts; 
 EU exports to be liberalised over 25 years (some 82% liberalised within 15 years, ris-
ing to about 87%) with exclusions and long phase in periods (i.e. up to 25 years) for 
sensitive products; 
 Improvements in the rules of origin with a wide range of products which adds flexibil-
ity to the sourcing of raw material including areas as for instance garments of knit and 
non-knit fabric (which can now be produced from non-originating material); 
 Market opening beyond WTO commitments in the services sector with a special pro-
tocol for cultural industries; 
 Companies can set up a commercial presence in the EU. Sales staff, investors and 
graduate trainees can make short-term business visits and travel temporarily to Eu-
rope; and 
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 Increase of transparency and improvement of business climate as well as strengthening 
of a harmonised legal framework through inclusion of trade-related rules in competi-
tion, procurement and intellectual property rights (IPR), Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), environmental standards, rules and co-
operation in social areas. 
The EPA took four years to be negotiated (2004-2007). The negotiating parties were repre-
sented by the Commission of the European Union and the Caribbean Regional Negotiating 
Machinery (CRNM). The final agreement was signed in October 2008 by 13 Caribbean states, 
with Guyana and Haiti following shortly after. To date not all EU and CARIFORUM coun-
tries have ratified the agreement and only five CARIFORUM countries have started their 
phased customs duty reduction according to the agreement. In May 2010, the CARIFORUM 
heads of state met and agreed on a general administrative framework of the implementation of 
the agreement. 
3.3 Main Sectors of EDF Interventions 
As indicated in the table below, the EDF9 funds for the region after the Mid-Term Review of 
2005 and the transfers from previous EDF, increased from €57M to €97.8M. Those funds 
were highly concentrated on the focal sectors of Regional Integration (91% of the total).  
Table 5:  EU Commitments to CARIFORUM Region under EDF9 (2003 –2007) 
 
Initial indicative allocation 
Indicative allocation after Nov. 
2005 MTR 
(incl. transfers from prev. EDFs) 
Focal Sectors: Reg. integration incl. transport infra-
structure, cultural coop. & EPA process 
€42.8 – 51.3M 75 - 90 % €88.9M 91% 
Non-Focal Sector: Environmental protection, fight 
against major vulnerabilities & disaster management 
€6.3 - 8M 11 - 14 % €5.9M 6% 
Non-Focal Sector: TCF for policy dialogue, pro-
gramme review, monitoring & auditing 
€1.7 – 2.3M 3 - 4% €3M 3% 
Total €57M 100% €97.8M 100% 
Source: Addendum to Caribbean RSP and RIP 2003 2007 
 
Figure 10: EU Commitments to CARIFORUM Region under EDF9 (2003 –2007) 
 
Source: Own presentation according to Caribbean RIP 2008 - 2013 
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From EDF9 to EDF10, the regional support increased from €97.8M to €165M. As depicted in 
Table 6, the concentration on regional economic integration remained about the same (87% of 
the total) with the difference that EPA priority areas were added to the focal sectors. 
Table 6:  EU Commitments to CARIFORUM Region under EDF10 (2008 – 2013) 
 Initial indicative allocation 
Focal Sectors: Regional Econ. Integration/ Coop. & EPA priority areas ca. €143M 87% (or 85-90%) 
Econ. Integr. & Trade of OECS 6.6 4% 
CSME & CARICOM integr. 24.8 15% 
Intra-CARIFORUM econ. & soc. Coop. 23.1 14% 
CARIFORUM/DOM/OCT/EU/LAC econ. Coop. & Trade 6.6 4% 
EPA Implementation & accompanying measures 72.6 44% 
Investing in human capital 9.9 6% 
Non- Focal Sectors: Vulnerability & Soc. Issues ca. €22M 13% (or 10-15%) 
Crime & Security Coop. 9.9 6% 
Civil Society Participation 8.3 5% 
Institutional support/ programme implementation 3.3 2% 
Total €165M 100% 
 Source: Own presentation according to Caribbean RIP 2008 – 2013 
Figure 11: EU Commitments to CARIFORUM Region under EDF10 (2008 – 2013) 
 
Source: Own presentation according to Caribbean RIP 2008 - 2013 
The sectors with the largest amount that remained to be disbursed from EDFs 7 and 8 are 
Trade and Regional Economic Integration (€15M), followed by Environment (€10M) and, for 
smaller amounts, Governance and Civil Society (€5M) as well as Education (€1M). 
The largest amount allocated under EDF9 was by far Trade and Regional Economic Integra-
tion, followed by Transport and Infrastructure, Disaster/Emergency Response (which includes 
allocations from the B-envelope), and Education. In the area of drugs and crime, no new allo-
cations were made. The slow disbursement of the EDF9
29
 at the end of 2010 is indicated by 
the large difference (almost €100M) between the total allocated and the total amount already 
paid (see Table below). 
                                                 
29 Including allocations from previous EDFs   
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According to the data extracted from CRIS
30
 in December 2010, the amount allocated under 
EDF10 was still limited to €82M and the amount disbursed still remained under €1M (see 
Table below). 
Table 7:  EDF regional level assistance per sector (period: 2003-2010, amounts in €) 
Sector 
EDF7 EDF8 
Total 
EDF7 & 8 
EDF9 EDF10 Total EDF9 & EDF10 
Remaining 
amount 
to be paid 
Remaining 
amount to 
be paid 
Remaining 
amount to 
be paid 
Amount 
allocated 
Amount 
paid 
Amount 
allocated 
Amount 
paid 
Amount 
allocated 
Amount 
paid 
FOCAL (EDF9 & 10): 
Trade & reg. econ. 
integration (incl. tourism) 
167,793 15,197,254 15,365,047 127,650,518 58,183,428 78,400,000 0 206,050,518 58,183,428 
Transport/ Infrastructure/ 
ICT/ Energy 
0 261,602 261,602 15,246,812 10,940,176 0 0 15,246,812 10,940,176 
Disaster/Emergency 
Response 
0  0 39,400,539 29,556,810 0 0 39,400,539 29,556,810 
Drugs & Crime 0 315,713 315,713 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Education 0 1,284,688 1,284,688 13,688,900 6,862,900 0 0 13,688,900 6,862,900 
Environment 0 9,851,931 9,851,931 2,500,000 383,708 0 0 2,500,000 383,708 
Governance/ Civil 
Society 
4,623,962 184,363 4,808,325 1,315,000 406,812 4,000,000 724,309 5,315,000 1,131,121 
Technical Cooperation 
Facility 
0 0 0 2,582,920 1,834,666 0 0 2,582,920 1,834,666 
Total 4,791,755 27,095,551 31,887,306 202,384,688 108,168,500 82,400,000 724,309 284,784,688 108,892,809 
Source: data extracted from CRIS (state December 2010) / NB: data excludes funding for Caribbean OCTs 
As mentioned above, from the table appears that under the EDF9 the large gap at the end of 
2010 (almost €100M) between the total allocated and the total amount already paid is mostly 
due to the focal sector of Trade and Regional Economic Integration.  
3.4 Co-operation Modalities and Intervention Logic 
The EU institutions (Commission plus EU member states) have been the largest donor to the 
Caribbean region since 1975. Development co-operation under the EDF has been guided since 
1994 through the CARIFORUM.  
In application of Article 1 of the Cotonou Agreement, support to the Caribbean region is fo-
cused on the achievement of the MDGs. Article 28 focuses on integrating ACP countries into 
the world economy by promoting economic cooperation; the free movement of persons, goods 
and capital; the diversification of economies, and trade expansion. Co-operation in the area of 
regional economic integration is covered by Articles 29, 30 and 35. 
The Cotonou Agreement is implemented through the EDF, which is funded by EU member 
states outside the EU budget process. The Caribbean region’s programme under the EDF 6 
targeted agriculture and tourism with supported sectors being trade, transport and human re-
sources. The EDF7 regional programme included regional integration and co-operation (pri-
vate sector and trade development, agriculture, tourism and communications), and sustainable 
development (human resource development and environmental management). Non-focal areas 
included technical assistance, studies, and cultural and linguistic actions. The EDF8 regional 
programme focused on trade facilitation and private sector development, tourism, agriculture, 
infrastructure, human development and capacity building, drug trafficking and money laun-
dering, and disaster prevention.  
                                                 
30 i.e., the database “Common Relex Information System” 
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The period covered by this evaluation relates to the EDFs 9 and 10, although it will also take 
into account the interventions carried out from the EDFs 7 and 8 during the period 2003-2010.  
The present evaluation also considers the recommendations of the previous evaluation (Eval-
uation of the European Commission Strategy for the Caribbean Region, 2005).
31
 In the box 
below, five main recommendations out of a total of 13 are listed. 
 
Box 2:  Five Main Recommendations of the previous EC-Caribbean evaluation 
At the strategic level: 
(1) “Develop analytical tools to formulate and monitor a strategy for the construction of a regional in-
tegrated space that maximises the development benefits for the region.”  
(2) “Deepen and extend the policy dialogue to be pursued on the regional objectives to one of identify-
ing the major constraints to be overcome and the priority actions to be taken; and from there exploit 
fully the comparative advantages of the Commission in playing a proactive role in this dialogue. “  
 
At the operational level: 
(3) “Improve capacity to monitor the strategy and interventions so as to assess progress and results.”  
(4) “An easy to use guide as to where information from other agencies can be located should be pre-
pared to assist those involved in design, implementation, monitoring and assessment of pro-
grammes.” 
 
At both levels: 
(5) “In the design of its strategy as well as in the implementation of its interventions, the Commission 
needs to address the development asymmetries of the Caribbean countries. Sustainability, cross-
cutting issues and the 3Cs (coordination, complementarity and coherence) also need to be factored 
in the Commission’s interventions, both at programming and implementation stages.” 
 
The following diagram (Figure 12) presents the reconstructed logic of intervention for the 
full evaluation period (including EDFs 9 and 10 as well as interventions of previous EDFs 
conducted in the intervention period from 2003-2013).  
The nine evaluation questions selected for the present evaluation are placed within the Inter-
vention Logic on output and result/specific impact level. The intervention logic as faithful 
representation in diagrams for EDF9 and EDF10 are to be found in Annexe III. 
                                                 
31 See Executive Summary in Annexe V. 
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Figure 12:  Reconstructed intervention logic for the evaluation period – 2003-2013 
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4 FINDINGS AND ANSWERS TO EVALUATION QUESTIONS 
While the data collected specifically in relation to the various Evaluation Questions (EQs), all 
findings and detailed answers are documented in evaluation matrices in Annex XIII, the synthe-
sis of the constitutive elements of the findings and responses to the respective EQs (listed in 
table 8 below) is presented in this section. As noted in the introduction, the approved EQs for 
this evaluation were chosen with the help of the Intervention Logic diagrams of intended ef-
fects. The answers to each EQ are based on several Judgement Criteria (JCs). 
Table 8:  Overview of Evaluation Questions 
EQ 1 To what degree did EU cooperation objectives respond to CARIFORUM priorities and were in line with 
EU Member States' and other donors' objectives?' 
EQ 2 To what extent did the institutional frameworks and aid modalities support the achievement of expected 
regional strategy results? 
EQ 3 To which extent have the interventions of the Commission contributed to deeper and wider regional eco-
nomic integration? 
EQ 4 To which extent have the EU interventions contributed to the integration of sub-regions within the group 
of CARIFORUM members? 
EQ 5 To what extent have EU interventions contributed to a more competitive Caribbean region within the 
global economy? 
EQ 6 To what degree has the EU co-operation contributed to create the context for deepened trade relations 
between the EU and the CARIFORUM member states and among the CARIFORUM member states? 
EQ 7 To what extent has the EU support contributed to the fight against crime and illegal drug trafficking in the 
Caribbean Region? 
EQ 8 To what extent did the EU interventions strengthened the capacity of the region to better manage disas-
ters? 
EQ 9 To what extent has EU support for education and training contributed to regional economic integration? 
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4.1 Strategy and Coherence 
 
JUDGEMENTS AND RELATED FINDINGS 
JC 1.1 The intervention strategy responds to the CARIFORUM agenda 
No         Yes 
The EU interventions operate at both country and regional levels whereas most important de-
velopment partners like Canada and the United Kingdom now tend to operate on a regional 
level only. The EU co-operation is (due to the Cotonou Agreement) more formally tied into co-
operation with the CARICOM Secretariat (along with CARIFORUM) than the co-operation of 
most other partners.  
Political dialogue increased (see section 3.1, page 20), but policy dialogue remained difficult. The 
EU and the Caribbean Region, through CARICOM and CARIFORUM, have a long history of 
continued and fruitful political dialogue. However, regional integration has lost political mo-
mentum in many Caribbean countries. The new generation of Caribbean political leaders has 
lost part of the global perspective (i.e. they are less “regionalist”). Therefore, national interests 
and agendas interfere in the dialogue between the EU and the region. The level of debt and the 
economic crisis has made short-term urgent responses a priority for many Caribbean govern-
ments.  
A Roadmap was elaborated by the region for the implementation of EDF10. It was supposed to 
be reviewed annually by the CARIFORUM and thus to facilitate measurement and possible 
adjustments of the RIP’s contribution to the regional development, integration and cooperation 
agenda. In fact it was produced late and has not been updated for the last 20 months. In addi-
tion, it is of little use for the region as almost 70% of the needs are indicated as high priority 
actions.  
In EDFs 9 and 10, the priorities and strategies of EU co-operation are consistent with the CAR-
IFORUM agenda, including in the choice of focal and non-focal sectors (see Indicators 1.1.1 & 
1.1.2 in Annex Information Matrix). The best example is the Caribbean Integration Support 
Programme (CISP), the largest programme launched during the period under consideration, 
which is consistent with CARICOM and CARIFORUM policies for regional integration.  
During the time scope of the evaluation, the participation and capacity of regional institutions 
has increased in programming, identification and formulation (Indicator 1.1.3). 
 
EQ1: To what degree did EU co-operation objectives respond to CARIFORUM priorities and were 
in line with EU member states' and other donors' objectives? 
Justification: CARIFORUM being embedded within the CARICOM Secretariat is an expression of the willingness 
of the region to engage in a dialogue with the EU and make the best of the co-operation managed by the Commis-
sion of the EU. Still the definition of priorities of the region and the strategy of the co-operation is a permanent chal-
lenge. 
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JC 1.2 The EU intervention strategy is in line with the EU co-operation objectives and other 
relevant EU development policies. 
No         Yes 
The overall objectives of the Commission’s interventions in the Caribbean region correspond to 
those of the Commission’s development policy and of the ACP successive agreements: poverty 
reduction, sustainable development and integration into the world economy. The EU interven-
tions are coherent with the other policies of Aid for Trade policy and support to regional inte-
gration.  
The unique experience of the EU in regional integration brings a special added value to the ef-
forts of the region towards integration, although it is an explicit EU policy not to impose on 
partners or export to them the EU model (Indicator 1.2.1).  
The Commission has adopted a strategy of open regionalism by supporting achievement of 
these objectives through the construction of a regional integrated space to which the regional 
programmes and parts of the national programmes, together with non-programmable instru-
ments, are contributing (Indicator 1.2.2).  
 
JC 1.3 The EU co-operation strategy at regional level is complementary with its strategies at 
the national levels. 
No         Yes 
The complementarity between regional and National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) works bet-
ter than in other regions, but it is still weak with the exceptions of the NIPs of Barbados, DR, 
Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Most of the smaller CARIFORUM States have lim-
ited their national programmes to other priorities as they were aware of the fact that economic 
and trade matters would be covered under the regional programmes. The EU support in educa-
tion at regional level is reported not very well coordinated with it’s the sector support at the 
national level (see EQ9). 
According to the Programming Guidelines of the EU (2007), the RIP should be designed first, 
and the NIPs later. However, since the design of the EDF10 was delayed, the NIPs were drafted 
and signed first. Although the NIPs were designed with a financial reserve to complement the 
regional interventions, coherence is consequently not always adequate.  
A major bottleneck that has been identified in the independent CSME appraisal and Result-
Orientated Monitoring (ROM) reports is the lack of administrative capacity at national level 
therefore a disconnection between national absorption capacity and the activities developed at 
regional level.  
In the context of present challenges for the region, there is also complementarity on the issue of 
enhancing international competitiveness. Disaster management is the one sector where com-
plementarity seems highest and most effective. On the opposite, the EU regional support in the 
education sector is not very well coordinated with the support at the national level (Indica-
tor 1.3.1). 
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JC 1.4 The EU interventions are coordinated with interventions of other donors, taking in ac-
count the commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the EU Code 
of Conduct. 
No         Yes 
Coordination of interventions of the development partners is still poor.  
After the disappearance of the Caribbean Group for the Cooperation in Economic Development 
(CGCED) led by the World Bank (WB), coordination of interventions of development partners 
and the CCS has been weak, except in the East Caribbean Region through the East Caribbean 
Development Group (ECDG). Still coordination has not yet reached the point of joint pro-
gramming or evaluation missions. In addition, institutional assessments are often duplicated. 
Until now, coordination between donors has been driven by the donors themselves.  
The main reason of the poor coordination is the lack of willingness of the CCS. At a donors 
meeting in December 2010, the CCS presented a “Preliminary Outline for a Strategic Plan for 
Regional Development” (SPRD), a resource mobilisation strategy, which consists in the design 
of programmes offered to donors for support, and for the first time again a matrix of donor in-
terventions. However, at least for the EU interventions, this matrix is not complete and it is only 
useful if turned into a database. A meeting was supposed to be called six months later to review 
proposals for an improvement of donor coordination. Three working committees that put to-
gether CCS and donors have been created in a conference in July 2011. They were supposed to 
meet before end of year, but did not. A new coordination conference is supposed to meet by 
mid-year 2012.  
The areas of most advanced coordination of donors are in Disaster Management
32 
and in the 
energy sector. The electronic database developed by the German Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) will offer a sustainable energy-clearing house this year. The CCS is also 
drafting a Caribbean energy roadmap and strategy with the support of the International Devel-
opment Bank (IDB) (Indicator 1.4.1).  
Interventions have been coordinated between the Commission and EU member states active in 
the region. Interventions in the region are not always complementary, but coordination meet-
ings are called for in the region and in Brussels (Indicator 1.4.2). 
The guiding principle of the EU Code of Conduct (maximum of two focal sectors) is applied. 
Coordination has not yet reached the point of joint diagnostic, programming or evaluation mis-
sions. Also institutional assessments are often duplicated. There is no sector yet with a lead 
ownership (Indicator 1.4.3). 
 
JC 1.5 The EU took into account the recommendations of the previous evaluation (2005). 
No         Yes 
The main recommendations of the previous evaluation (2005) were in large part taken into con-
sideration: the programming was improved (in depth analysis of the integration process, identi-
fication of the main constraints, prioritisation of actions contributing to the creation of a region-
al integrated space); the policy dialogue involving partner and donors was enhanced; it led to a 
                                                 
32 See EQ8 
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road map, but this one was short of expectations; more systematic consultations were organised 
with the private sector, although not sufficient; development asymmetries were taken into con-
sideration for both focal and non-focal sectors in the EDF10 programming (Indicator 1.5.1). 
The reporting on the management response to the previous evaluation (Fiche contradictoire of 
the 2005 Evaluation) indicates that those responses have been implemented in the initial steps 
of the programming of the EDF10 (Indicator 1.5.2). All crosscutting issues have been consid-
ered in the EDF10 strategy (Indicator 1.5.3). 
 
ANSWER TO EVALUATION QUESTION 1 
The EU co-operation responds highly to the priorities of CARIFORUM. Political dialogue in-
creased, but policy dialogue with CARIFORUM remained difficult. Regional integration has 
lost political momentum in many Caribbean countries. Therefore, national interests and agendas 
interfere in the dialogue between the EU and the region.  
A Roadmap was elaborated by the CCS for the implementation of EDF10. However, this 
Roadmap was neither based on a clear strategy and priorities nor produced in a timely manner. 
It contained no timetable and was not updated since September 2009. The EDF9 was scattered 
with too many components and so was also EDF10, although more focused.  
The overall strategy for the Commission’s interventions is coherent with its development policy 
and the EU-ACP agreements on poverty reduction, sustainable development and integration 
into the world economy. The unique experience of the EU in regional integration brings a spe-
cial added value to the efforts of the region towards integration. The complementarity between 
regional and national indicative programmes is weak with the exceptions of Barbados, Domini-
can Republic, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. According to the Programming Guidelines of 
the EU (2007), the RIP should be designed first but the NIPs were drafted and signed first.  
Until now, coordination between donors has been driven by the donors themselves. The guiding 
principle of the EU Code of Conduct (maximum of two focal sectors) is applied. Coordination 
has not yet reached the point of joint diagnostic, programming or evaluation missions. Also 
institutional assessments are often duplicated. There is no sector yet with a lead ownership. In-
terventions have been coordinated between EU and EU member states active in the region. 
They are not always complementary but coordination made them at least coherent. 
The main recommendations of the previous evaluation (2005) are reflected in the programming 
of EDF10 where due consideration is also given to crosscutting issues. 
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4.2 EQ2 Aid Efficiency 
 
JUDGEMENT CRITERIA RELATED FINDINGS 
JC 2.1 The EU organisation enables adequate implementation of the regional strategy. 
No         Yes 
The EU organisation did not enable optimum implementation of the regional strategy. 
The planning and execution of interventions did not meet timelines. The execution of EDF8 
was so late that €39.8M of EDF8 was transferred to EDF9, increasing significantly its amount 
from €57M to €97.8M. So was the execution of EDF9 (2003-2007): at the end of 2010, out of 
€202M allocated, only €108M had been paid. The programming of EDF10 was also around a 
year late: in December 2010, the amount allocated under EDF10 was still limited to €82M and 
the amount disbursed still remained under €1M.33 
The Guyana EUD asked Head Quarters of the EU for a reinforcement of its staff dedicated to 
the regional programme. So did the Barbados EUD, in charge of a significant number of re-
gional projects, which increased during the EDF10 due to the EPA implementation programme 
through international organisations based in Barbados. However, the delays in planning and 
execution are also and far more due to the limited capacities of the CCS in programming and 
execution. The slow pace of activities is also due to a loss of political momentum of the objec-
tive of Caribbean integration and to a governance issue. All decisions of the CCS require con-
sensus, hence the slow pace of policy adoption and implementation (Indicator 2.1.1).  
The activities across the region have been poorly coordinated between donors during the time 
scope of the evaluation (see JC 1.4). Contrary to the Programming Guidelines, the RIP of 
EDF10 was elaborated months after the NIPs, while planned to be ready first. This makes the 
coordination of the implementation difficult. Progress in regional integration requires that each 
CARIFORUM member have the capacity to implement the policies adopted at the regional lev-
el. This issue was adequately addressed by the EU when the CISP was extended. The resources 
were reallocated and focused not only on areas that will continue to receive support under 
EDF10, but particularly on reinforcing the capacity of the national CSME focal points in the 
CARIFORUM countries (Indicator 2.1.2). 
In general, the design of regional programmes and later of the corresponding activities did not 
adequately assess the absorption capacity of each CARIFORUM country, nor did the EU and 
its development partners take quick action for remedy. The CCS is so aware of this shortcoming 
that it commissioned its Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Office to investigate the issue. A 
                                                 
33 See details in section 2.4.2 of this report 
EQ2: To what extent did the institutional frameworks and aid modalities support the achievement 
of expected regional strategy results? 
Justification: The question is meant to assess how much the evolution of aid modalities and their use in the con-
text of the institutional frameworks in place on the EU side as well as on the Caribbean side, contribute to ensure 
that the results and expected impacts of the interventions of the Commission are achieved.  
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report on the issue of the implementation of EDF9 regional programmes by Caribbean member 
states is due before end of 2011. According to the monitoring reports retrieved from CRIS, 
most projects and programmes with budgets of more than €1M are monitored under the ROM 
mechanism (Indicator 2.1.3). 
 
JC 2.2 The EU support contributed to create capacity of CARICOM Secretariat to be the key 
partner for formulation and implementation of the EU regional strategy. 
No         Yes 
The EU has not succeeded in improving significantly the capacity of the CCS in formulation 
and implementation of the EU regional strategy.  
An impressive number of staff was recruited under the CISP (up to 86 by the end of 2010), but 
the Secretariat lacked the flexibility or willingness to internally move staff to address the short-
ages. Programming has been hampered by lack of staff in the CARIFORUM Directorate. Im-
plementation was difficult due to slow staff recruitment at the start, not enough people in pro-
ject management and procurement, too many small tenders and almost no large international 
tenders. Improvement since 2010 and lessons learned should facilitate a smoother start of the 
EDF10 CSME Programme.  
The staffing levels at the CCS did not meet the operational requirements stated in institutional 
work plans. The Secretariat suffers from a very high turnover because more than 40% of the 
staff is hired on temporary contracts, out of which half by international donors. In addition, the 
CCS has not done a salary alignment to the market since 2003. Mainly for budgetary reasons, 
the recommendations on human resources management commissioned by the CCS in 2009 and 
2010 have not been implemented.
34
  
The CARIFORUM Directorate needs more staff. The CISP provided staff, but not much long-
term capacity building. The slow pace of activities of EDF9 is also due to a governance issue: 
all decisions of the CCS require consensus between all CARIFORUM member states, hence the 
slow pace of policy adoption and implementation.  
The programming of EDF10 suffered long delays due to staffing limitations of the CARIFO-
RUM Directorate. The Council of Ministers of CARIFORUM decided in July 2011 that the 
Director General of CARIFORUM will be the coordinator of the EPA unit. The positions of 
Executive Director of CARIFORUM and Head of Resource Mobilisation of CCS were separat-
ed. The Ministers also decided to carry out an institutional assessment of CARIFORUM Direc-
torate (Indicator 2.2.1). 
The CCS is funded from two main sources: contributions from the 15 CARIFORUM member 
states, marginal contributions of the five associate members, and funds for the projects of do-
nors, mostly EU, DfID, USAID, CIDA, IDB, UNAIDS, UNDP, United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Domini-
can Republic, Italy, Spain and Japan. The CARICOM member states, most of them under 
budgetary constraints since the start of economic crisis, have frozen the budget of the Secretari-
at since 2008. According to Financial Statements, the 2009 budget was even lower than the 
                                                 
34 “Evaluation and Classification of all Non- Executive Positions at the CCS”, Trevor Hamilton & Associates International 
Management Consultants April 2009. “CARICOM Performance Management System” Delta Partnership /Hassell & Lynch 
Associates Ltd, December 2010 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of EU co-operation with the Caribbean Region 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG  
Page 28 
budget of the previous year (US$44.6M against 44.7M). The budget for 2011 will be difficult to 
finance. The Community Council of CARICOM mandated the Secretariat to look for solutions 
(Indicator 2.2.2).  
According to the second institutional assessment,
35
 the CCS benefits from a robust internal con-
trol environment, with mechanisms and controls in place that ensured that the funds of the Con-
tribution Agreement (CA) for CSIP were spent for their intended purpose(s). However, the lev-
el of financial increase of a second CA under EDF10 would require that those mechanisms and 
controls be significantly strengthened. The institutional assessment also stressed the insufficient 
capacity of staff and consequent slow implementation of activities. It therefore suggested 
speeding up recruitment and training of new recruits.  
The reason given for slow implementation by the CCS is usually the complexity or lack of 
knowledge of the EDF procedures. But in fact, the EU provided training on EDF procedures to 
the staff of the CARIFORUM Secretariat and offers it whenever asked for.  
A recurring problem that has affected the efficiency of the management of donor funding is 
weak procurement management. Out of 192 tenders launched within the CISP, 33 have been 
cancelled. 12 of them have been completely cancelled, the rest were re-launched (once or 
twice). Also 91 contracts (i.e., nearly half of the total) have been concluded using "simplified 
procedure": 44 contracts under €5,000 (threshold for EDF9), and 47 contracts under €10,000 
(current threshold under EDF10). These figures reveal that more than half of the contracts 
awarded used the direct award procedure. Moreover, when the new rules of EDF10 became 
applicable to the CA, the contracts moved "en masse" from under €5,000 to under €10,000. 
Also, in spite of the recommendation of the first institutional assessment, there is no formalised 
risk assessment procedure at the CCS. The CCS has plans, but so far it has not developed a 
good system for monitoring implementation and results attained at the regional or at the mem-
ber state level (Indicator 2.2.3). 
JC 2.3 The aid modalities chosen were appropriate for obtaining the expected outputs. 
No         Yes 
The aid modalities chosen (implementation partners and Contribution Agreement) were not the 
most adequate for obtaining the expected outputs. A calculation of the latest marks in the moni-
toring reports of regional projects/programmes indicates that the efficiency and the effective-
ness of the interventions tended to decline between EDF8 and EDF9 (see following table). Ac-
cording to the Handbook for ROM of EU assistance
36
, the marks have the following meanings:  
a. The project is very good, fully according to or better than to plan. There is every indica-
tion that it will achieve its Purpose and Objectives. 
b. This is a good project, broadly progressing as planned. But certain corrective measures 
might be required if the project is to fully reach its Purpose and Objectives. 
c. The project has problems. Without corrective measures it will not meet its Purpose and 
Objectives. 
                                                 
35 Moore Stephens, Chartered Auditors, Oct 19. 2009 
36 EC Results-Oriented Monitoring - Handbook for the ROM System, EuropeAid, Brussels, 2008 
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d. The project has serious deficiencies. Substantial corrective measures, major redesign or 
termination of the project is necessary (Indicator 2.3.1). 
Table 9: Per cent of Marks in latest monitoring reports of regional /programmes  
 Efficiency Effectiveness 
 A B C D A B C D 
EDF8 0% 67% 17% 17% 17% 67% 17% 0% 
EDF9 0% 43% 57% 0% 14% 36% 50% 0% 
Under EDF9, the EU tried to improve aid effectiveness in choosing the form of a Contribution 
Agreement for the major components of the main regional programme, the Caribbean Integra-
tion Support Programme (CISP). This aid modality was supposed to increase ownership and 
reduce transaction costs. But in practice the adoption of a hybrid CA slowed down implementa-
tion instead of reducing transaction costs. The CCS uses its own recruitment rules for hiring 
staff, while it is supposed to use the EU procurement rules for services, equipment and supplies.  
The EDF10 RSP reads on page viii: « The implementation modalities will be designed to secure 
timely programming and efficient implementation through a limited number of pro-
jects/programmes and through the use of quick disbursing mechanisms which maintain trans-
parency and accountability ».  
In principle, a Contribution Agreement with the CCS responds to those objectives. However, 
the second institutional audit (2010) concluded that the conditions were not yet in place for the 
implementation of the EPA support programme of the EDF10 under this modality.  
The third institutional assessment confirmed that the CCS is far from offering satisfactory 
standards, at least for internal control standards and procurement. A recent mission of the Court 
of Auditors confirms that CCS is not eligible for "contribution agreements" and a fortiori for 
"budget support". The CCS remains a partner for the main donors like EU, UK or Canada, but 
became less important as implementer than other organisations in the region like for instance 
CRNM
37
, Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Eastern 
Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), OECS, WB or UNDP.  
The CCS implemented CISP, but is not the only implementer that reduced the efficiency of EU 
interventions. In several other cases, the implementer chosen by the EU was far from delivering 
the expected results. The weakness of the Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management 
(CDEMA) reduced the value of EU support (see section 4.8). This was also the case for the 
Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) whose operation were widely criti-
cised to the point that the Director was demised on charges of corruption (see section 4.7). 
Likewise the results of Caribbean Knowledge Learning Network (CKLN) resulted mediocre in 
part due to an inefficient management and loss of interest by the World Bank (see section 4.9; 
Indicator 2.3.2). 
                                                 
37 Now integrated into the CARIFORUM Secretariat as OTN 
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ANSWER TO EQ2 
The aid modalities chosen (implementation partners and Contribution Agreement) were not the 
most adequate. The implementation of EDF8 was very late and so was the programming and 
the execution of EDF9. The programming of EDF10 also suffered delays.  
The Guyana and Barbados EUD are understaffed. More important, the EU has not succeeded to 
contribute successfully to strengthen the capacity of the CCS to become an effective partner in 
formulation and implementation of the regional strategy. Programming of EDF10 has been 
hampered by lack of staff in the CARIFORUM Directorate. Implementation was difficult due to 
slow staff recruitment at the beginning, not enough people in project management and pro-
curement, too many small tenders and almost no large international tenders. Up to 86 staff was 
recruited under the CISP, but the CCS lacked the flexibility or willingness to move staff inter-
nally to address the shortages.  
The CCS suffers from a very high staff turnover. The recommendations of two studies on hu-
man resources management commissioned by the CCS in 2009 and 2010 have only partly been 
implemented. 
Improvement since 2010 and lessons learned should facilitate a smoother start of the EDF10 
CSME Programme.  
A review of marks of ROM reports indicates that the efficiency and effectiveness of the inter-
ventions tended to decline between EDF8 and EDF9.   
Under EDF9, the aid modality of a Contribution Agreement (CA) was supposed to increase 
ownership and reduce transaction costs. But the lack of provision of a start-up phase slowed 
down implementation instead of reducing transaction costs. For EDF10, the institutional as-
sessment concluded in 2010 that the conditions were not yet in place for the implementation of 
the EPA support programme under this modality. The third institutional assessment confirmed 
that the CCS is far from offering satisfactory standards at least for internal control standards 
and procurement. A 2011 mission of the Court of Auditors confirms that CCS is not eligible for 
contribution agreements and a fortiori for budget support. The CCS remains a partner for the 
main donors like EU, UK or Canada, but donors tend now to prefer implement their pro-
grammes through other regional or international organisations. However, several other imple-
menters chosen by the EU were also far from delivering the expected results, like the Caribbean 
Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), the Implementation Agency for 
Crime and Security (IMPACS) or the World Bank, for CKLN. 
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4.3 EQ3 Regional Economic Integration 
 
JUDGEMENT CRITERIA RELATED FINDINGS 
JC 3.1 The EU interventions enhanced the capacities of CARICOM Secretariat and RIOs38 to 
implement the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME). 
No         Yes 
The main regional project of EDF9, the CISP, strengthened the capacities of several key re-
gional institutions to implement the CSME, mostly, Caribbean Regional Organisation for 
Standards and Quality (CROSQ) and the OECS Secretariat.
39 
The number of human resources 
of the CCS was improved significantly through the CISP programme, which recruited up to 86 
persons for the CCS, reduced at the end of 2010 to 46, out of a total CCS staff of around 480. 
Nearly all of the 11 sub-components of the CSME support programme involving most of the 
units in the CCS required strengthening of technical expertise and even more for managing the 
administrative tasks of the projects. Still, progress towards the improvement of the implementa-
tion capacity of the CCS has been slow and limited. For instance, implementation was difficult 
due to slow staff recruitment at the start, not enough people in project management and pro-
curement, too many small tenders and almost no large international tenders. Up to 86 staffed 
was recruited by the end of 2010, but the CCS lacked the flexibility or willingness to internally 
move staff to address the shortages. The CCS suffers from a very high turnover
40
 (Indicator 
3.1.1). 
The CCS capacities have been supported in the past by Technical Cooperation Facilities. The 
main support is provided under component 9 of the CSME, with €5.9M for increasing the ca-
pacity of CCS to co-ordinate the regional programmes and to enhance the effectiveness of their 
financial management. Within the CSME activities, €1.1M was also dedicated to support the 
start-up phase of the legal and institutional division of the CCS and also, under activity 6, 
€1.9M to support CSME administrative capacity at national and regional levels. The CSME 
                                                 
38 Regional Integration Organisation 
39 See respectively EQ6, EQ5 and EQ4 
40 See EQ2 JC 2.2 
EQ3: To which extent have the interventions of the EU contributed to deeper and wider regional 
economic integration? 
Justification: Deeper economic integration is a key objective of the EU co-operation strategy in EDF9, EDF10, and 
before. Wider regional economic integration is the objective of the support to the co-operation between the region 
and Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) and (French) Overseas Departments (DOMs).  
 
Funds allocated for regional integration during the period account for €93M (EDF8 and 9 only) Allocations already 
made under EDF10 from 2011 amount to €101.3M. For details on interventions see Project portfolio in Annex V. 
EDF8 allocations and disbursements for Montserrat New Airport, Caribbean regional tourism sector development 
and regional technical assistance centre amount to €17.7M. EDF9 included Transitional institutional support to 
CARIFORUM, Caribbean trade and private sector development programme (CTPSD), the huge Caribbean Integra-
tion Support Programme (CISP) and support to the competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean amount. Out 
of €75.3M allocated, by the end of 2010 only €58.1M had been disbursed. 
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dedicated €1.6M to provide institutional support to the CARICOM Work Programme manage-
ment and administration. The CSME also supported the improvement of human resources in the 
statistical office of the CCS within a total budget of statistics of €3.4M. With the extension and 
budget reallocations of CISP done by mid-2010, an additional €1M within the CSME compo-
nent was transferred to support the MS national administrations
41
. The Caribbean Regional In-
formation and Translation Institute (CRITI) and the Competition Commission (in charge of 
keeping at bay anti-competitive practises), are new organisations created and staffed with sup-
port of the same CISP regional programme. 
The CCS capacity is supported under the EDF10 by several projects foreseen by the EDF10 
Regional Indicative Programme in order to achieve its means “Strengthening of capacities of 
agencies/institutions involved in the implementation of regional programmes“(RSP/RIP, p. 42). 
The Identification Fiche of the EDF10 CSME and Economic Integration Programme draws the 
lessons of the previous and still on-going CSME programme of the EDF9. It, therefore, plans to 
strengthen the capacities at the CCS, with the set-up of a dedicated Project Management Team, 
recruiting persons who are now working on the EDF9 CISP. It will also strengthen the absorp-
tion capacities at the national level, which have been a major the obstacle for CSME implemen-
tation (Indicator 3.1.2). 
 
JC 3.2 The EU interventions contributed to CSME implementation. 
No         Yes 
Continued support was directed for establishing a regional framework, but the CARICOM is far 
from achieving its objectives in harmonisation of policies, laws and regulation. The five core 
regimes of the Caribbean Single Market (CSM) have the necessary legislative framework in 
place but are not always complied with. The five regimes are intra-CARICOM movement of 
goods, services, skills and of capital, plus right to establishment. 
Table 10:  Legislative compliance of countries participating in the Caribbean Single Market 
Compliance category No. of Compliance 
instruments required 
No. of Compliance 
Instruments in effect 
Percentage 
in effect 
Legal and Institutional Infrastructure  113 77 68% 
Free Movement of Goods  83 49 59% 
Free Movement of Persons  88 43 49% 
Right of Establishment  113 67 59% 
Movement of Capital  16 11 69% 
Free Movement of Services  700 307 44% 
Intellectual Property  45 27 60% 
Other 8 4 50% 
TOTAL  1,166 585 50% 
Source: The quest for regional integration in the Caribbean, Norman Girvan, Appendix 4, 2010 
                                                 
41 Addendum n°1 to FA N° 9582/REG 
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The Single Market
42
 is still far from being completed. According to the audit carried out in 
2009 by the CSME Unit, member states had complied with just 50% of the measures required 
to give full effect to the Caribbean Single Market (CSM).
43
 The table 10 above gives a break-
down of compliance of countries participating to the CSM according to compliance categories. 
The circulation of persons is still very limited and is subject of conflicts between CARICOM 
Member States. This is also a grey area since labour market information is not reliable and the 
lack of statistical data does not allow determining the level of implementation of the CSME 
objective of free movement of persons. CARICOM’s intra-regional total exports are still small: 
US$3.8 billion in 2008 out of which around 60% is mineral fuels and derivatives. The intra-
regional trade was then only 15.3% of total exports of the CARICOM countries.
44
 As the region 
has made no major headway since, the intra-CARICOM trade is likely to have remained of the 
same percentage. The CCS does not produce statistics on intra-Caribbean exchange in services. 
Our hypothesis based on the dominance of tourism and financial services directed at markets 
outside the Caribbean is that intra-Caribbean trade in service has not significantly increased in 
the recent past.  
For the Caribbean Single Economy the objective is very far from achieved. The CCS plans es-
tablishing a framework by 2015 that focuses on monetary and fiscal policy. Little progress has 
been made in terms of policy coordination and the legal and institutional framework. The re-
gion failed in particular to iron out an agreement on monetary union, on harmonisation of in-
centives, and on the CARICOM agreements on investment and on financial services.  
The process is complex and slow because of the governance set up where CCS elaborates and 
proposes, but has no supranational authority (like the EU institutions) and depends on decisions 
of meetings of Heads of Governments and action at the level of the CARICOM member states. 
The challenge is also the political will and the capacity for Caribbean countries to integrate the 
regional policies into their national plans. Outcome of the latest meeting of Head of States in 
July 2011 was a decision to concentrate on overcoming the obstacles and delays incurred in the 
completion of the Single Market making the Single Currency (part of the Single Economy) only 
a long term objective (Indicator 3.2.1 to 4). 
The CSME has encouraged Intra-regional foreign direct investments, which have averaged 10% 
of total FDI inflows to the member states in the most recent years, mostly in banking and insur-
ance, tourism, distribution and manufacturing (Indicator 3.2.5). 
 
JC 3.3 The EU interventions contributed to the economic integration of the Caribbean OCTs and 
DOMs into the region. 
No         Yes 
Apart from the new Montserrat airport, so far the EU interventions contributed little to the eco-
nomic integration of OCTs and Départements d’Outre-Mer (DOMs) into the region. Four task 
forces were created with EU support for the promotion of DOM and OCT co-operation with 
CARIFORUM countries. Only the trade task force meets on a regular basis. In the meantime 
                                                 
42 Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. 
43 CARICOM Secretariat, Summary Report of the Appraisal of the State of Implementation of the Single Market. CSME 
(CONV)/2009/1/6. and October 2009 
44 See CARICOM website under http://tradsysonline.caricomstats.info/Home.aspx 
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the trade of Caribbean OCTs with CARIFORUM has not significantly increased over the years 
2004-2008. In fact, the trade of the OCTs with the Caribbean is marginal, with exports below 
US$0.3M in 2008 and imports below US$0.2M in the same year. Apart from the lack of eco-
nomic complementarity, OCTs and DOMs suffer from insufficient transport infrastructures, 
particularly the low connectivity of shipping lines, as was stressed in the Evaluation of EC’s 
cooperation with Overseas Countries and Territories
45
 (Indicator 3.3.1). 
Figure 13:  Caribbean OCTs’ trade with CARIFORUM (2004-2008) 
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Source: DFC, Analysis of the Regional Economic Integration Processes OCTs within their region and with the EU, Jan. 2010. 
According to latest figures available (only until 2008), none of the three (French) DOMs in the 
Caribbean has developed significant trade with the Caribbean Region. Imports by Martinique 
from the Caribbean ACP were in 2008 only 1% of its total imports, and 2% of its total exports. 
The figure is only slightly better for imports of Guadeloupe, but remains marginal. The same 
isolation from the ACP Caribbean is true for the Department of Guyana, with marginal imports 
and exports. 
OCTs and DOMs integration in the region remain impaired by a similar offer, but also deficien-
cies in transport (Indicator 3.3.2). 
                                                 
45 See shipping lines connectivity index in volume II page 139 
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ANSWER TO EQ3 
By supporting the CCS with the implementation of the CSME Work Plan, the EU support has 
been facilitating the reform process. However, the EU interventions could not make a decisive 
change in the delays in CSME implementation. 
The EU provided continued support to CCS and regional organisations, but the CARICOM, in 
the absence of sufficient political will and adequate governance, is far from achieving its objec-
tives of harmonising policies, laws and regulations. The effects on the integration process itself 
have been limited. The main regional project of EDF9, namely the CISP, increased the re-
sources and human capacities of several key regional institutions, including the Caribbean Re-
gional Information and Translation Institute (CRITI) and the Competition Commission created 
and staffed with its support. CISP funded up to 86 staff positions, out of a total CCS staff of 
around 480. The EDF10 plans to strengthen not only the capacities of the CCS, but also the 
absorption capacities of region related interventions at the national level, which has been a ma-
jor the obstacle for CSME implementation.  
Still, the implementation of the CSME is slow, due to a loss of political momentum and lack of 
capacities at the national level. According to the evaluation carried out in 2009 by the CSME 
Unit, member states had complied with just 50% of the measures required for the completion of 
the Single Market side of the CSME. The free circulation of persons is still very limited. Intra-
regional exports are still small: in 2008, only 15.3% of total exports of member states were ex-
changed between CARICOM countries. For the Single Economy side of CSME, little progress 
has been made in terms of policy coordination and the legal and institutional framework.  
Also, the EU interventions contributed little to the economic integration of OCTs and DOMs 
into the region. OCTs trade with the Caribbean is marginal. Equally, none of the three DOMs 
has developed significant trade with the Caribbean Region. In both cases, economic integration 
into the region is hampered by a similar offer and deficiencies in transports. 
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4.4 EQ4 Sub-regional Co-operation 
 
JUDGEMENT CRITERIA RELATED FINDINGS 
JC 4.1 The intervention of the EU contributed to the delivery of the OECS47 strategic plans and 
their implementation. 
No         Yes 
The EU interventions did not contribute significantly to the delivery of OECS strategic plans 
and their implementation. They supported only indirectly the OECS Secretariat capacities in the 
past, strengthening its Export Development Unit (EDU) institutional capacity for effective pro-
gramme administration and execution, one of the components of the CTPSD. However, the 
EDF10 programme (€12.6M), about to start, is meant to enhance the technical capacity of 
OECS and EDU to manage an expanded portfolio of interventions (details under the following 
indicator). The institutional assessment undertaken in 2010 concluded that the EDF10 pro-
gramme supporting the OECS Secretariat could not be implemented through a contribution 
agreement but through a decentralised project approach using the EU procurement procedures, 
since it did not meet the criteria required for accounting and procurement.  
The OECS was created in 1981 on the grounds of the Eastern Caribbean Common Market 
(ECCM) created as early as 1968, that is, before independence. It harmonised Customs legisla-
tion in each Member State. It achieved full monetary integration with a single currency pegged 
to the US dollar, and managed by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB). The OECS in-
tegration includes also common policies in functional areas. The OECS has a single telecom-
munications regulator body, a common judiciary and Supreme Court, a single Civil Aviation 
Authority and joint diplomatic representations. With the project to conform an Economic Un-
ion, the OECS will become a stronger sub-region within CARICOM and CARIFORUM, and 
                                                 
46 Hispaniola is the name of the island divided between Dominican Republic and Haiti. 
47 The 9 OECS countries are Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, British Virgin Islands, Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada,  
Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts)  Nevis, St. Vincent & the Grenadines 
EQ4: To what extent have the EU interventions contributed to the integration of sub-regions within 
the group of CARIFORUM members? 
Justification: The CARIFORUM countries register very different levels of development. One of the recommenda-
tions of the previous Evaluation (2005) was to take the asymmetries in the region more into consideration. Within 
the CARICOM countries, only six are considered as “more developed countries” by the Revised Treaty of Cha-
guaramas, while the other eight are considered as” less developed countries”. Supporting sub-regional integration 
like the OECS and better integration of the Hispaniola Island46 on is one of the strategies that can contribute to a 
more equal development of the region.  
 
2 OECS related projects on capacity building of human resources and export capacities dating still from EDF7 over 
€7.1M continued till 2009 while new allocations were only made in EDF9 Dominica air access and Caribbean trade 
and private sector development (CTPSD) for about €22.5M of which €9.0M have been disbursed till end of 2010. 
Important regional funds were allocated and mostly disbursed for the Transborder environmental Programme on 
Hispaniola (€13.2M on EDFs 8 and 9) and the economic development of the Hispaniola Northern Corridor (€53.9M, 
EDF9) 
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the most advanced integration project in the Latin America and Caribbean region. Hence, the 
process is relevant and needs support.  
The OECS received support from the EU already under EDF7 with the OECS Export En-
hancement Programme, which provided financial and technical support to its Export Develop-
ment Unit (EDU). A component of EDF9 and Caribbean Trade and Private Sector Development 
Programme (CTPSD) seeks to strengthen the EDU’s institutional capacity for effective pro-
gramme administration and execution. CTPSD also supported the OECS mission in Geneva 
which has contributed to improving the OECS capacity to participate more effectively in trade 
negotiations and other trade related matters.  The EDF10 programme (€12.6M) is meant to en-
hance the technical capacity of the OECS and EDU to manage an expanded portfolio of inter-
ventions. In order to facilitate smooth commencement of the project, the OECS Secretariat re-
cruited additional technical staff. Also the “All ACP” Trade.com programme (total volume of 
€60M) held six workshops and trained 52 officials of the OECS sub-region in drafting trade 
laws.  
Many other donors have supported, or still support, the OECS, like WB, CDB, UNDP, IDB, 
and above all CIDA with its on-going Institutional Support Programme (ISP).  
The member states of the OECS have developed the most integrated space in the Latin America 
and Caribbean region. The OECS established an Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) 
with its own Common External Tariff, which was later harmonised with that of the wider 
CARICOM (Indicator 4.1.2).  
The EDF9 contributed significantly, through the support of the CTPSD programme, to the de-
velopment of exports. The exports of goods of OECS countries to the rest of the CARICOM 
countries increased by 171% over the period 2004-2008. This is a better performance than the 
growth of total exports of intra-CARICOM states (303%), since those are mostly due to Trini-
dad and Tobago exports of fuels (see EQ3).  
Tourism service has declined or stagnated. Comprehensive figures on trade of services, includ-
ing financial services, are not available (Indicator 4.1.3). 
 
JC 4.2 The EU support contributed to the economic integration of Hispaniola Island. 
No         Yes 
Bilateral trade has increased rapidly in recent years but is only due to the growth of Dominican 
exports to Haiti, today its second export market, with US$624M in 2009. That same year, Haiti 
bought 10% of Dominican exports, while the United States absorbed 54%. Haitian exports to 
the DR remain insignificant (US$13M in 2009). The trade imbalance, in favour of the DR, is 
more than US$611M
48
. This trade imbalance has quadrupled since 2005 (US$154M). Real 
trade is in fact higher because intense smuggling in both directions is estimated to be at least of 
US$100M (Indicator 4.2.1) 
There was no evidence of active co-operation and decisions until the meeting of the Joint 
Commission
49
 in September 2010. This is confirmed by the recent evaluation of EC’s co-
                                                 
48 Source : Central Bank of the Dominican Republic 
49 A bilateral “Comisión Haiti-Dominicana" (CHD, the Commission) was conceived in 1995 under President Balaguer to sup-
port bi-national cooperation. 
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operation with the Dominican Republic “organizational and institutional frameworks are only 
just beginning to take effect, and mostly after the period covered by this evaluation”.50 For the 
first time in 10 years, the sub-committees met and established work-plans in the areas of in-
vestment, financial services, tourism, environment protection, health and transport. The EDF10 
Bi-national Project is meant to support the plans of the Joint Commission. In his speech to the 
UN Security Council on March 30 2011, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican 
Republic also suggested that alternative energy sources should be developed and that intercon-
nection of Haitian and Dominican electrical and gas distribution networks should be offered to 
transform Haiti’s energy matrix (Indicator 4.2.2). 
The North Coastal Road built with the support of the EU joins Dajabon on the Dominican side 
of the boarder to Cap Haitien (75 km). The time required driving from the Dominican boarder 
to Cap Haitien, an average of three hours, was cut by more than half.
51
 It facilitates access to 
the industrial zone of Ouanaminthe and the agro production of the North of Haiti. The traffic 
intensified and the Dajabon market days are very busy. However, the bridge crossing the river 
Massacre was not completed as planned before end of 2010 and the market in Dajabon was not 
fully ready as planned in 2010, neither by mid-2011.
52
 The termination of the Dajabon market 
is planned with the financial support of EDF10. In conclusion, the implementation will be at 
least two years late, but an impact is already positive and visible (Indicator 4.2.3). 
ANSWER TO EQ4 
The EU contribution to the integration of sub-regions within the group of CARIFORUM mem-
bers has been fairly limited.  
The EU contributed only indirectly to develop the OECS Secretariat’s capacities in supporting 
the institutional capacity of its Export Development Unit, but it contributed significantly, 
through the support of the CTPSD programme, to the development of exports. The exports of 
OECS countries to CARICOM members increased by 171% over 2004-2008. They reached 
US$161M in 2008, representing a very high percentage (76) of the total exports of OECS coun-
tries. The EDF10 programme (€12.6M) is meant to enhance the technical capacity of OECS to 
conform an Economic Union. 
The EU interventions registered limited results on DR-Haiti co-operation. Trade between the 
DR and Haiti increased rapidly to US$624M in 2009, with a huge imbalance in favour of the 
DR, but data on the influence of the EU in bringing about this increase in trade are not availa-
ble. However, the North Coastal Road built with the support of the EU joins Dajabon on the 
Dominican side more than halved the time required driving from the Dominican boarder to Cap 
Haitien and facilitated access to the industrial zone of Ouanaminthe and the agro production of 
the North of Haiti. The termination of the Dajabon market and other infrastructures are planned 
with the support of EDF10.  
There was little evidence of active DR-Haiti co-operation and decisions until the meeting of the 
Joint Commission in September 2010 and the meetings, for the first time in 10 years, of the 
sub-committees. The EUD in Santo Domingo has put into place an important informal process 
of policy dialogue in order to keep the two countries working on common issues and the EDF10 
bi-national project is meant to support the plans of the Joint Commission.  
                                                 
50 See page 186 of Evaluation of EC’s co-operation with the Dominican Republic 2001-2009, vol. 2, 2011.  
51 See page 191 of Evaluation of EC’s co-operation with the Dominican Republic 2001-2009, vol. 2, 2011. 
52 Idem. 
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4.5 EQ5 International Competitiveness 
 
JUDGEMENT CRITERIA RELATED FINDINGS 
JC 5.1 EU interventions contributed to increased competitiveness of traditional industries in 
the region. 
No         Yes 
The EU interventions contributed to increase the international competitiveness of traditional 
industries, but not to the extent of making them competitive in the global economy. As indicat-
ed in the graph below, the only significant increase of exports over the period 2002- 2009 was 
crude materials, mineral fuels and chemical products, all related to Jamaican Bauxite and Trini-
dad and Tobago oil and gas. 
Figure 14:  Value of CARICOM domestic exports per commodity (2002, 2007 & 2009, US$ 
million) 
 
Source: CARICOM, http://www.caricomstats.org/Files/Databases/Trade/eXCELper cent20FILES/CC_Total.htm
 
 
EQ5: To what extent has the EU contributed to a more competitive Caribbean region within the 
global economy? 
Justification: International competitiveness is a key result expected of the EU co-operation during the period cov-
ered by the evaluation. The aim of CRSP/CRIP of EDF9 refers to it through the concept of “global repositioning” 
while the overall objective of CRSP/CRIP of EDF10 makes a nominal reference to “increased international competi-
tiveness”.  
The OECS export capability enhancement programme of EDF7, the Caribbean regional tourism sector develop-
ment program of EDF8, the Caribbean trade and private sector development programme phase 1 and 2 of EDF9, 
the Support to the competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean of EDF9 again, and two All ACP programmes 
of EDF8, the Integrated development programme for Caribbean rum industry and the Programme “Initiative Pesti-
cides”, for a total of €145.5M out of which €132M was disbursed at the end of 2010. 
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The Sugar Accompanying Measures and the Special Framework of Assistance (for Bananas), 
and the Programme of support to the Caribbean rice industry focused on improving competi-
tiveness and, in the first two cases, on supporting diversification. None of those products in-
creased their exports on the world markets. 
There are still a few exceptions. The Rum Support Programme was meant to increase produc-
tivity, change the entire strategy by shifting from export of bulk rum to branded rum and im-
prove waste management. The programme resulted in increased exports and diversified mar-
kets. The “Authentic Caribbean Rum” mark developed under the EU programme is registered 
in 41 countries plus the member states of the EU (as an EU Community mark). CARIFORUM 
rum exports grew from US$6M in 2006 to US$100M in 2008 only.
53
 Another exception is the 
DR becoming the third biggest ACP producer of banana over the last 10 years. Exports to the 
EU increased by several hundred%. Suriname also restarted banana exports with the help of EU 
support (Indicator 5.1.1). 
Some major associations of main traditional industries improved their capacity to undertake 
competitiveness studies: the regional West Indies Rum and Spirits Producers' Association 
(WIRSPA), with the support of the regional EDF8 Rum Support Programme and in the coun-
tries concerned the national associations of banana and sugar industries, with of the support of 
the corresponding EU interventions (Indicator 5.1.2).  
However, only a few countries made significant progress in developing their exports, like the 
DR for its bananas, mangos and a few other fruits thanks mostly due to the cheapest labour in 
the region coming from Haiti. In the area of non-traditional exports Antigua has initiated its 
first shipment of mango exports to the UK market. Horticultural exports from the Dominican 
Republic to the EU (as well as the US and Canada) are also expanding. All rum producers of 
the region expanded their exports (Indicator 5.1.3). 
 
JC 5.2 EU interventions helped diversifying the CARIFORUM economies. 
No         Yes 
Except for tourism in some countries, supported by the Caribbean regional tourism sector de-
velopment program of EDF8, there is yet no indication that EU interventions helped to diversi-
fy significantly the CARIFORUM economies during the time scope of the evaluation. As indi-
cated in the graph above, the only sectors of significant weight and growth in exports in current 
US dollars are Mineral Fuels & Chemical products.  
The export structure of CARICOM countries shows increased concentration of products. In 
1997, the top 20 products account for 51% of total exports and this share increased to 70% in 
2007.
54
 The Regional Strategy of the EDF10, partly based on this diagnostic, seeks to frame the 
assistance to CARIFORUM countries in their economic diversification efforts, namely to move 
away from over-dependence on commodity exports and into services.  
Major constraints to competitiveness of new industries include insufficient transport infrastruc-
ture and mostly poor business environment (see JC 5.4). Wages are also relatively high in 
CARIFORUM member states, with the exception of Haiti, which is also plagued with the two 
                                                 
53 See DG TRADE http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/stories/full_stories.cfm?id=167&langId=en 
54 According to CCS statistics, in 2008, minerals exports alone even represented 71 % of total exports of CARICOM countries 
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main constraints mentioned above. This reflects mainly that most of the Caribbean countries are 
middle-income countries and their low flexibility compared to other middle-income countries
55
. 
The stated strategy of many governments is to increase value added in the tourism sector. Tour-
ism has been supported by EU interventions in the past and will continue to be supported under 
EDF10. For instance, the OECS project will support the development of the OECS Training 
Centre in Tourism and Hospitality, based in Antigua and Barbuda (Indicator 5.2.1). 
There is no indication of significantly increased employment of women in the region except in 
countries where tourism is developing. Free zone industries have created a lot of jobs for wom-
en in the past, but these industries have receded here again for lack of competitiveness (Indica-
tor 5.2.2). 
Again with the exception of tourism in some countries, there is yet no indication of significant 
diversification of exports. Growth of service exports is not significant and do not show in any 
statistics because of under-declaration of sales and statistical offices that are ill-equipped for 
registering activities in services. Even the light industries, which prospered in the past in some 
countries under free zone regimes, have declined. Even the light industries, which prospered in 
the past in some countries under free zone regimes, particularly in the DR, have declined from 
195,000 workers in 2000 to around 120,000 in 2010.
56
  
Diversification is now stressed in the EDF10 Regional Private Sector Development Programme 
(RPSDP) being implemented by the Caribbean Export Development Agency (CEDA). Howev-
er, the management CEDA is right in stressing that the allocation for innovations of only 
€400,000 (out of a total programme de €32M) is very little, when the economy has to diversify 
(Indicator 5.2.3). 
 
JC 5.3 EU interventions contributed to a better compliance with international SPS and environ-
mental standards and other TBT57 regulations 
No         Yes 
The Caribbean Regional Organisation for Standards and Quality (CROSQ), was the main bene-
ficiary of a component of the EDF9 CISP, with a total budget of €697,000, which managed to 
develop a quality culture and improve the standards of quality of medical and chemistry labora-
tories of the region through training and TA. The organisation and quality of the standards mon-
itoring systems was effectively strengthened, according to CROSQ management, but, according 
to the report on the appraisal of the State of the CARICOM single market, no Member State has 
implemented legislation for all of the regional standards
58
.   
The Caribbean region was also a beneficiary of the successful All ACP Pesticides Initiative 
Programme (PIP) carried out between 2002 and 2010.
59
 The Programme supported the compli-
ance by producers, particularly constraining for small producers, of the new regulatory re-
quirements of the EU, from traceability to EurepGap certification. The latter imposes require-
                                                 
55 See Caribbean: Accelerating Trade Integration, World Bank and OAS, April 2009 
56 Consejo Nacional de Zonas Francas de Exportación, Informe 2010, Santo Domingo  
http://www.cnzfe.gov.do/documentos/informes_estadisticos/Informe_Estadistico_2010_en_Espanol.pdf 
57 Technical Barriers to Trade  
58 Report on the appraisal of the State of the CARICOM single market, CCS, 2010 
59 See Final evaluation of the Pesticides Initiative Programme (PIP), Italtrend, June 2008 
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ments for the storage and safe use of pesticides, good agricultural practice, hygiene, and respect 
for the environment. The overall objective of the PIP (maintaining market share of ACP coun-
tries) was achieved globally as the market share was stable between 2001 and 2006; and the 
exports increased in absolute terms
60
. CROSQ will also receive support under EDF10 on TBT 
issues (indicator 5.3.1 and 5.3.2). 
 
JC 5.4 EU support to regional BSOs contributes to long-term private sector development. 
No         Yes 
According to Business Support Organisations (BSOs) consulted, the Caribbean Trade and Pri-
vate Sector Development Programme (CTPSD), through CEDA, helped them become more 
effective in meeting the needs of their members by improving and expanding training and tech-
nical assistance, sharing of best practices, facilitating participation in promotional and study 
tours, matchmaking exercises, and trade missions. However, it is difficult to measure the out-
comes as the indicators of the CTPSD programme were not formulated to this purpose. 
CEDA was also key support to the Caribbean Business and Investment Support Network 
(CARIBISNET) - a network created in 2006 and now of around 50 established Caribbean Pri-
vate and Public sector non-financial BSOs whose primary goal is to improve collaboration, in-
formation exchange and the development of common services among members. CEDA also 
supported existing Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) and Trade Promotion Organisations 
(TPOs) as well as the establishment of new ones (Indicator 5.4.1). 
The results of the survey carried out by the evaluation team indicate that the support of the EU 
has contributed to develop BSOs. However, except in the main sector of activity of the region, 
which is tourism, the BSOs interviewed
61
 indicate that they are still very dependent on donors 
for their sustainability due to small membership, the size of those members and/or the economic 
crisis (Indicator 5.4.2). 
                                                 
60 idem 
61 See list per country in Annex N°V. 
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Figure 15:  Responses of 19 BSO to the Survey 
 
The efforts of some BSOs to improve the business climate have so far have not given signifi-
cant results. The main impediment to competitiveness remains a poor business climate. Doing 
Business score provides an assessment of the change of business climate of 13 CARIFORUM 
countries between 2006 and 2011. It indicates that the business climate improved slightly in 12 
of those countries and only declined in one of them, namely Suriname. The most significant 
improvement were obtained in Haiti, DR and Guyana, which nonetheless still rank among the 
lower 50% in the world.
62
  
However, the region as a whole is far from ranking high in Doing Business. According to the 
most recent data released by Doing Business
63
, the highest ranking in the Caribbean is St. Lu-
cia’s (ranking only 52 out of 183) followed by an Eastern Caribbean State, Antigua and Barbu-
da, with a ranking of 57. In contrast, The Bahamas is much further down at 85; while Trinidad 
and Tobago and Jamaica, which have traditionally been seen as major corporate centres in the 
region, were ranked at 68 and 88, respectively. St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, which are increasingly promoting their reputation as international business centres, 
stood at 95 and 75, respectively. The other CARICOM nations making it into the top 100 were 
                                                 
62 See World Bank and IFC (2011) “Doing Business 2011), p. 42, available under: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Profiles/Regional/DB2011/DB11-Caribbean-
States.pdf 
63 Not taking into account Barbados, see rankings in http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings 
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Belize at 93, Dominica at 65 and Grenada at 73. Guyana and Haiti did not make it above this 
bar, ranking at 114 and 174, respectively.  
Likewise, the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum released in Sep-
tember 2011 gives a relatively negative picture of the region
64
. The World Economic Forum 
noted that the nations shared “persistent challenges” in terms of a lack of physical security, poor 
development of infrastructure, an inefficient allocation of production and human resources in-
frastructure and increasingly a lag in innovation against other more developed, but also emerg-
ing, economies (Indicator 5.4.3). 
 
ANSWER TO EQ5 
The EU support to a more competitive Caribbean region was significant, but results are modest, 
due to an adverse business climate. The EU supported the traditional industries (sugar, banana, 
rice) directly through special programmes. The Caribbean Trade and Private Sector Develop-
ment programme (CTPSDP) was meant to support the diversification of exports, including in 
the service sector, through the Caribbean Export Development Agency (CEDA). The same pro-
gramme, through CEDA, was also key in the creating and development of a 50 member strong 
Caribbean Network of Business Organisation. A component of the Caribbean Integration Sup-
port Programme (CISP), through the Caribbean Regional Organisation for Standards and Quali-
ty (CROSQ) contributed to the improvement of the quality of products.  
However, the results do not show yet in increased exports. The only significant increase of ex-
ports of goods over the period 2002-2009 was crude materials, mineral fuels and chemical 
products, all related to Jamaican Bauxite and Trinidad and Tobago oil and gas. There are a few 
exceptions. The Rum Support Programme resulted in increased exports and diversified markets. 
CARIFORUM rum exports grew from US$6M in 2006 to US$100M in 2008 only.
65
 Another 
notable exception is the DR becoming the third biggest ACP producer of banana over the last 
10 years. Suriname also restarted banana exports with the help of EU support. The overall strat-
egy of continued transformation of the region from an agro-based production into a service 
economy only progressed with the expansion of tourism.  
The main reasons are an incomplete Single Market, deficient infrastructures, particularly for 
international transport, BSOs far from self-sustainable, and above all a poor business climate. 
According to the most recent data released by Doing Business
66
, no Caribbean country is 
ranked in the first 50 out of 183 countries surveyed. The relatively poor business climate is con-
firmed by the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Development Forum. 
                                                 
64See World Economic Forum under: http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness 
65 See DG TRADE under http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/stories/full_stories.cfm?id=167&langId=en 
66 Not taking into account Barbados, see rankings in http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings 
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4.6 EQ6 Economic Partnership Agreement 
JUDGEMENT CRITERIA RELATED FINDINGS 
JC 6.1 The EU support to the EPA-related reforms has facilitated the negotiation of the EPA. 
No         Yes 
The EU and the CARIFORUM countries started negotiating an Economic Partnership Agree-
ment (EPA) in 2004. The negotiations were divided in four phases and to be completed in 2007 
(it was actual initialled in Dec. 2007 and signed in Oct. 2008). Throughout those phases, many 
studies, discussions and reforms needed to take place at CARIFORUM level to identify its pri-
orities and needs in respect to the trade agreement (Indicator 6.1.1). EU support for the central 
negotiation process was accompanied by the support of other donors who assisted in arriving at 
new regimes to be incorporated into the EPA text as well as in identifying further support need-
ed for implementation (Indicator 6.1.2 and 6.1.3). 
The Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) – turned in 2009 into the Office of 
Trade Negotiation (OTN) of the CARICOM Secretariat – was the official CARIFORUM coun-
terpart for the negotiation process (see JC2) and for this purpose, CRNM/OTN received 
€5.08M in direct assistance to build capacity for negotiations through the EDF8 and through the 
EDF9 CISP. This support basically targeted the attendance at meetings, working groups, studies 
and hiring of expertise, but no institutional or legal reforms prior to or during the negotiations.  
The EPA negotiators established the Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) to identify the 
areas of support for the EPA negotiations and implementation. Inputs from studies prepared 
through RPTF have been used in developing the Road Map and identification fiches for the 
programming of EDF10 regional resources. However, many areas identified remained un-
funded. The estimate, based on the 13 studies that have been completed, indicate a need of re-
sources above €500M. 
The Region received assistance from different sources: National Indicative Programmes (e.g. 
the Institutional Support Programme for Regional Integration (ISPRI) in the DR), Trade.com, 
and the EDF9 CISP, which were mostly executed after the conclusion of the negotiations in 
2007. Thus, the reforms supported under those initiatives had no directly impact on the negotia-
tions themselves, but they were expected to assist the CARIFORUM countries in the implemen-
tation of the EPA. Support has been given to reforms within regional integration process includ-
EQ6: To what degree has the EU co-operation contributed to create the context for deepened trade 
relations between the EU and the CARIFORUM member states and among the CARIFORUM mem-
ber states? 
Justification: EU co-operation with CARIFORUM is a crucial element in each sectoral chapter of the EPA. EPAs 
are first and foremost trade agreements. They aim at achieving development objectives through the promotion of 
regional integration, the gradual integration of Caribbean countries into the world economy, capacity building in 
trade policy and trade related issues, supporting the conditions for increased investment.  
 
EPA-process was supported by the project Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery under EDF8 (€1M) and from 
the Caribbean Integration support programme under EDF9 (a component of €4M out of a total of €40.5M), that is a 
total of €5M totally disbursed. Support to the Forum of Caribbean States for the implementation of the commitments 
undertaken under the EPA is foreseen under EDF10. In addition to these programmes, there is indicative allocation 
of support in various Technical Cooperation Facilities and national programmes related to EPA.  
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ing fiscal reforms, legal drafting and trade in the OECS, CSME, as well as CRNM/OTN, capac-
ity building and training for Ministries of Foreign Trade in Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, and the 
DR, among others (Indicator 6.1.1). 
Some resources in the EDF9 to supported the insertion of Haiti within the EPA context, but 
funds were not utilised.  
The Cultural Protocol was a new addition to the trade agreement, addressing the potential rec-
ognized for CARIFORUM countries. Donor support and particularly EU support (Pro€invest) 
has been critical in the identification of cultural sector needs and all areas prioritized in the EPA 
by CARIFORUM through a regional Consultation, which was held in October 2006. The re-
gional preference clause (art. 238) has given certain countries in the region a legal framework 
that did not exist before (Bahamas-CARICOM, DR-Bahamas, DR-Haiti, etc.). Other new issues 
included intellectual properties, innovation, flexibility of rules of origin, etc. (Indicator 6.1.2). 
There is clear evidence that support relating to the trade negotiations (in particular support to 
the CRNM/OTN) made available capacity which is now helping the region to deal with the next 
steps in the commitments and further pending negotiations. OTN and the CARICOM EPA Im-
plementation Unit have both staff trained by the projects (8 ACP TPS 100, EDF9 CISP, 
Trade.Com, Pro€invest, etc.). Support to the CROSQ (CARICOM Regional Organisation for 
Standard and Quality) is addressing the issue of standards. Furthermore, the EU is supporting 
the establishment of a new body on Food Safety and SPS issues: Caribbean Agricultural Health 
and Food Safety Authority (CAHFSA) with EDF10 funding. 
There was also support at national levels. ISPRI in DR has for instance undertaken training, 
studies and technical assistance for Customs, Ministry of Trade, Foreign Affairs (Foreign 
Trade), etc. Trade.Com supported different capacity building exercise for OECS, Jamaica, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize, Guyana and Dominican Republic. The EDF10 EPA im-
plementing Programme
67
 is expected to address capacity building in customs, SPS, TBT, ser-
vices, Competition Policy, fiscal reform, etc. However, there are limited resources available for 
the CARIFORUM EPA implementing unit (€1.1M). This unit is to undertake important actions 
such as to guide and support the national implementing units or its equivalent in functions, im-
plement regional actions, coordinate on the CARIFORUM side the work of the CARIFORUM 
member states have already identified areas for immediate support in services, support to pri-
vate sector and communications, which are not covered by the present EDF10 EPA implement-
ing fiche or any current funding available. EPA national units, already funded by 
DfID/Cartfund (like Antigua, Dominica, Grenada), will receive support under the EDF10 EPA 
programme (Indicator 6.1.3). 
                                                 
67 See EDF10 EPA Implementation Programme Identification Fiche 
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Box 3:  Project to enhance CARIFORUM capacities in trade negotiations 
The CARIFORUM Grant Agreement (GA), entitled “Enhancement of CARIFORUM Regional Capacity for 
External Trade and Economic Negotiations” (EDF8 ACP TPS 110), was signed in February 2004 and its 
implementation was originally expected to conclude by December of the same year. The total amount of the 
GA was €761,460.  
This project covered mostly the support of the round of negotiations (at Ministerial and Technical level), 
college of negotiators, technical working groups as well as limited expertise. These activities were the 
backbone of the negotiation process. Without this funding an EPA would not have been possible, at least 
not within the expected timeframe. 
This project which started in April 2004 was to provide the initial funding for the EPA negotiation while the 
EDF9 CISP with an initial €5M provision started. Due to the delay of the CISP and the pressing calendar 
of trade rounds, it was necessary 5 riders and additional resources to assist the region until 2007 time of the 
actual start of the EDF9. Total amount provided was €1,089,308. 
According to the present and past heads of CRNM/OTN, CARIFORUM Secretariat as well as private sec-
tor representatives, without donor support, EPA would have not been completed and certainly it would not 
have been completed within the timeframe allocated. It is difficult to evaluate the exact impact of this pro-
ject as it had many complementary, and important other actions, financed by other donors (around 2/3). 
However, given the fact that it financed the key meetings of the EPA negotiations (including the negotiating 
round at technical and ministerial level) it can be stated that these resources were indispensable to support 
the different stages of the negotiation.  
 
JC 6.2 The support to the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM/OTN) has provid-
ed the institution with a reliable funding system and the capacity to effectively prepare 
and participate in trade negotiations. 
No         Yes 
The CRNM/OTN has received funding for multiple donors since its creation and it is now a 
Unit within the CARICOM Secretariat. It still has financial support from direct member states 
contribution as well as donor programmes (EDF9 CISP, IDB, and DfID). Since the beginning, 
it has received donor support
68
. CRNM/OTN is one model of donor coordination in the region. 
EU contributions started in 2004 with 8ACP TPS 110. Currently OTN is the active negotiating 
body of CARICOM countries.  
The OTN was able to begin engagement in the CARICOM-Canada negotiations in 2009. This 
is an indication that capacity building took place not only at the level of the CRNM/OTN core 
staff. A group of persons were trained, (including master degrees), during the negotiation period 
(colleagues of negotiators, technical experts, coordinators of working groups, officials at differ-
ent member states governments), who were able afterwards to use the knowledge for other ne-
gotiations in the context of WTO, CARICOM-Canada, etc. At the moment of this evaluation, 
the OTN was conducting the trade negotiation with Canada, the negotiations were in the third 
round and a joint programme had been established. OTN is engaging in all arenas related to 
trade negotiations on behalf of CARICOM including WTO (it has an office in Geneva) and 
trade with Canada as well as discussions about other potential negotiations. It also expects to 
become part of the negotiation of the build-in agenda in EPA
69
 (Indicator 6.2.1). 
                                                 
68 According to Henry Gill, former Director General CRNM 
69 According to Amb. Gail Mathurin, current Director General of OTN 
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CRNM/OTN received basic funding for the negotiations (2004-2007) from the 8 ACP TPS 110 
(€1.08M), which covered costs for attendance to meetings, technical studies, technical working 
groups, etc. Without this support, it would have been difficult to execute negotiations in the 
agreed timeframe. During that period CRNM also received funding from other EU sources 
(Pro€invest-Trinnex, Trade.com, EDF9 CTPSDP, etc.) and non–Commission sources (CIDA, 
DfID, IDB, Commonwealth Secretariat) which also helped with studies, consultations, work-
shops, etc. (estimated over €5M) The CRNM had to educate and provide consulting services at 
the same time in order to assist public and private sector in arriving at the understanding and 
developing of positions in different areas, including the cultural sector. This required a lot of 
resources, which were not readily available from the EU. The EDF9 CISP had a €4M compo-
nent for the CRNM but only started in May 2007, seven months before the conclusion of the 
negotiations.
70
 Similar challenges happened with other resources aiming to assist in the negotia-
tion process such as the ISPRI programme in DR or the Trade.com project (Indicator 6.2.2). 
Figure 16:  Donor funding received by CRNM/OTN 2004-2009 by main donors 
 
Sources: EU (Cariforum reports, EDF9 estimate based on report spent on trade negotiations (until Oct.2008), DfID and IDB 
figures from CRNM/OTN and USAID and CIDA from IDB Aid for Trade report 2009.  
 
JC 6.3 The EU interventions supported active involvement of the private sector and the NSA in 
EPA negotiations and implementation capacity to exploit benefits of the EPA. 
No         Yes 
The EPA framework agreed in 2004, and all other relevant documents, agree on the importance 
of including Non-State Actors in the process. The CRNM/OTN work plan included the active 
participation of private sector in trade negotiations. However, their participation was limited to 
certain working groups and several seminars delivered to engage them in discussions (indicator 
6.3.1). Only those countries whose private sectors could afford to dedicate resources to follow 
the negotiations and to travel as part of their national delegations to the negotiating round, did 
have a full and active participation. These countries were Barbados (Barbados Trade Team), 
Trinidad and Tobago (Chamber and Manufacturers) and Dominican Republic (more than a doz-
en institutions). Jamaica attended selected meetings.
71
 NSA in Haiti and Haiti participation in 
general was engaged in EPA discussions only after the signature had taken place (Indicator 
6.3.2). 
                                                 
70 See ROM Report of EDF9 CISP 
71 Interviews with private sector in Barbados, Trinidad & Tobago and Dominican Republic. 
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Other Non-State Actors felt they were not engaged in a meaningful way, although they attended 
a few working groups and seminars. They indicate lack of resources, particularly of the NGOs, 
as a reason for this lack of participation. Also information was not shared properly at national 
or regional level in spite of the number of seminars or bulletins produced (Indicator 6.3.3).
72
 
While the engagement of the NSA in the EPA was expected and agreed, there is little evidence 
of resource allocation to increase NSA participation in the negotiation process. The RPTF
73
 
called for the establishment of the Network of Non-State Actors for EPA negotiations coordi-
nated by the Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC) and supported by the Caribbean 
Employer Confederation (CEC), the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL) and the Caribbean 
Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC); however, there were no specific resources 
identified. Two meetings of the Network (under the coordination of the CEC) were held in 2006 
and 2007 with resources from the EDF9 regional TCF and EDF9 CISP. However, the resources 
under the EDF9 CISP allocated to NSA (€350,000) have not been utilised or programmed ac-
cording to the opinion of CPDC, the EDF9 CISP Monitoring Report and CARIFORUM project 
reports. The EDF10 Regional Programme has allocated funding for NSA among the non-focal 
sectors, not as part of the focal EPA-related sector. The identification fiche has been developed 
(Indicator 6.3.1). 
Figure 17:  Results of the survey of BSOs of the region 
 
                                                 
72 Interview Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC) 
73 RPTF meetings join reports 2006 and 2007 
  0% (0) 
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The survey undertaken by the evaluation team (see Figure above) addressing business support 
organisations showed that although the majority (over 60%) had attended a meeting or a semi-
nar regarding EPA, only about a quarter received support to participate in negotiations, built 
capacity or received information on a regular basis. Even the information provision is slightly 
under 50%. This result is similar to the results from interviews with private sector representa-
tives who feel they are not catching up to EPA and lack fundamental support to assist the firms 
in tapping opportunities, neither in the 27 EU member states nor in the EU Overseas Countries 
and Territories / Outermost Regions in the Caribbean. 
The Consultative Committee envisaged in the EPA is still to meet: it is only now in the process 
of appointing members on the CARIFORUM side
74
 although EU counterparts have already 
been established. In the field visits it was clear that there is a gap between EPA implementation 
needs (including competitiveness issues) and the availability and timely processing of those 
resources as stated by all interviewees in public and private sector. 
There has been support to the private sector to increase its competitiveness through the EDF9 
CTPSD phase I and II programmes as well as through national indicative programmes, includ-
ing the Jamaica PSDP and the DR ISPRI programme. There have also been initiatives like the 
establishment of the CARIFORUM-EU Business Forum financed by BizClim
75
, trade missions 
and field visits financed by Pro€invest, market studies, and analyses for co-production agree-
ment in films financed under the EDF9 CISP – all attempting to address different private sector 
needs under EPA. However, as indicated by the EPA implementing Units at national and re-
gional levels, resources to undertake the necessary research and training, and proper implemen-
tation are still very limited. For example, the six EPA Units established are only now being ful-
ly staffed (Indicator 6.3.2). 
Several briefs, booklets, and reports have been financed by the EU through the CRNM and oth-
er programmes. However, there is still a request for further assistance from the private sector to 
fully understand the EPA. A video, Turning point: Insight the Economic Partnership Agree-
ment was financed by Trade.com and coordinated by the CRNM. It is currently available on the 
CRNM website. CRNM also has a radio programme and newsletter, which are extensively used 
for EPA information dissemination. Most documents produced by the different projects fi-
nanced by EU programmes (market studies, briefs, etc.) were also published on the CRNM 
website (Indicator 6.3.3). 
ANSWER TO EQ6 
The EU co-operation contributed significantly to create the context for deepened trade relations 
between the EU and the CARIFORUM member states and among the CARIFORUM member 
states.  
The EPA has redefined the trade relations between the EU and CARIFORUM. In that context, 
the assistance received allowed for the negotiation rounds to happen and to build the capacity 
for such agreement. As far as the EPA also offers a framework for intra-regional relations, it 
has also contributed to improve the framework between CARIFORUM member states, espe-
cially those countries that do not belong to the CSME: Bahamas, Haiti and Dominican Repub-
lic.  
                                                 
74 Selection Criteria and draft list was approved by CARIFORUM Council of Ministers in Dominica in November 2011. 
75 See Report of the project establishing the CARIFORUM-EU Business Forum –BizClim 2008 
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EU support has contributed to the EPA negotiation process basically through all ACP funding 
(8 ACP TPS 110) and the EDF9 CISP towards the end of the negotiation phase. It also contrib-
uted though interventions with other programmes such as Pro€invest, Trade.com, BizClim, 
Hubs and Spokes. EPA support through the CRNM/OTN is the best example of regional donor 
coordination, since many other donors (CIDA, DfID, IDB) contributed to CRNM since its crea-
tion in 1997. 
The EU resources were mostly used to finance the negotiations rounds including preparatory 
technical working groups, technical meetings, principal meetings and ministerial meetings both 
within CARIFORUM as well as CARIFORUM-EU. Support for the EPA from EU and other 
donors contributed to enhance CARIFORUM trade negotiation capacity, as this was the first 
major and comprehensive agreement for CARICOM member states. The fact that CRNM/OTN 
has moved swiftly to start negotiations with Canada is proof of the level of capacity developed. 
Private sector and other NSA participation in the EPA process financed by the EU cooperation 
was limited to a few Technical Working Groups’ participation and RPTF meetings, although in 
the EDF10 funds were allocated for private sector development as well as for NSA participa-
tion. Funding for this purpose was also allocated in several NIPs of CARIFORUM countries 
such as DR, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Haiti. 
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4.7 EQ7 Crime and Illegal Drug Trafficking 
JUDGEMENT CRITERIA RELATED FINDINGS 
JC 7.1 The EU contributed to the strengthening of co-operation between Caribbean Member 
States and regional law enforcement and related institutions in the fight against crime 
and illegal drug trafficking 
No         Yes 
EU interventions contributed to enhance member states’ co-operation and collaboration, 
through institutional strengthening, in the fight against drug trafficking and crime in the region. 
Similar programmes were implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) and the Inter-
American Development Bank. Law enforcement institutions
78
 were equipped with better intel-
                                                 
76 In 1996-2001, the Commission, with EU member states have been the principal financiers of the Regional Plan of Action on 
Drugs – the Barbados Plan of Action (BPA).This Plan addressed demand reduction, treatment and rehabilitation, epidemiologi-
cal surveillance, maritime, customs and judicial cooperation, money laundering, control of precursors with the objective to fully 
integrate drug-related policies in regional development strategies and the social, economic and political aspects of Caribbean 
development. The subsequent focus of this programme aimed at strengthening regional coordination of the various drug control 
programmes by reinforcing relevant, sustainable regional institutions and implementing priority programmes as well as coordi-
nation and cooperation with Latin American countries involved in the cocaine trafficking routes. Major support was provided 
through the Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Centre (REDTRAC) and the training of law enforcement officers 
throughout the region to collectively tackle drug trafficking and organized crime including the undertaking of reviews of trends 
and strategies for drug interdiction and cooperation. Overall, between 1975 and 2001, EU contribution to drug control totaled 
€25M or 1.1% of total cooperation, excluding EIB assistance of €854M. 
77 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), 2008, 2010 
78 Police, customs 
EQ7: To what extent has the EU support contributed to the fight against crime and illegal drug 
trafficking in the Caribbean Region? 
Justification: Illicit drug trafficking constitutes a major factor posing serious problems for regional economic devel-
opment and political and social stability for the Caribbean as a whole, in that it negatively impacts economic growth 
and investment. The programme of drug control in EDFs 9 and 10 entails a continuation of support embodied in the 
1996-2001 Barbados Plan of Action.76 Available data on cocaine trafficked through the Caribbean in 1998, indicated 
that some 35% or 65mt were destined to the USA, 40% destined for Europe77 and the remaining 25% for Canada. 
Most of the traffic was by two routes from South America by way of the Lesser Antilles and the Central Caribbean 
(Jamaica, Haiti, Cuba, DR) and the second route via the Eastern Caribbean and Guyana to markets in the USA, 
Canada and Europe. “Go-fast” boats capable of making a fast turn-around and containers were the preferred 
modes of trafficking. While the EU interventions addressed critical deficiencies in demand and supply, the principal 
focus was on reduction in trafficking to Europe. Insufficient capacity existed for collection of drug-related data to-
gether with a lack of capacity of centralised agencies mandated to assess the information. The result is the absence 
of reliable quantitative consumption data in the Caribbean as in Latin America.   
 
Support under EDF8 and EDF9 continued with the €1M Multi-Country Drug Demand Reduction Programme 
(MCDDRP) and a 5% allocation (€2M) out of the Caribbean Integration Support Programme (CISP) financing 
CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARIMPACS), law enforcement and other supply re-
duction activities. The CISP was funded under a new implementation modality in the form of a Contribution Agree-
ment (€36M) between the CARIFORM Secretariat and the EU for the implementation of regional projects. Total EU 
funding was €40.5M and included funding through Programme Estimates for demand and supply reduction of drugs 
under Result 6 of the programme (with demand reduction €0.8M; capacity building for law enforcement €0.4M and 
CARIMPACS €0.8M). 
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ligence sharing capabilities (Indicator 7.1.2), though after considerable delays. The Regional 
Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC)
79
, with EU assistance, was able to bring the intelligence 
community together and facilitated an upgrading of expertise through collection and sharing of 
data on crime and drugs in the Caribbean region. This was achieved by enhancing the ability of 
such officers and other security officials in the use of Standardised Intelligence tools through 
training of the Intelligence National Focal Points of Contact as well as providing an effective 
forum for collaboration and information exchange among member states and law enforcement 
(LE) bodies who registered a high level of satisfaction with use if the relevant Intelligence 
tools. An increased number of drug interceptions and seizures resulted from intelligence-driven 
counter-narcotic activities.  
Drug Abuse Control programmes were set up or strengthened in Grenada
80
, Antigua
81
, St. Vin-
cent and the Grenadines
82
 and Jamaica, among several other Caribbean neighbours amidst the 
growing drug trade. CARIMPACS undertook a survey on reviewing the status of implementa-
tion of the recommendations of the CRTF on Crime and Security. In this survey, member states 
were requested to provide information on their national policies and programmes to inform the 
report of the recommendations on illegal drugs. This mechanism provided an opportunity by 
CARICOM to assess the state of national policies in this area. Grenada, as one of the major 
marijuana producers in the Eastern Caribbean, had one of the most successful anti-drug pro-
grammes as a result of the drug demand reduction policies and programmes supported by the 
EU, and constitutes an excellent example of the relationship between policies and implementa-
tion. With considerable public support and vibrant anti-drug programme, Grenada recorded one 
of the most impressive success rates of drug eradication. This was favourably impacted by Hur-
ricane Ivan in 2004 with the result that the entire cultivation was wiped out subsequently. More 
recently, these programmes experienced considerable challenges, despite clearly articulated 
policies and enhanced operational programme coordinating capacity, since the economic reces-
sion increased regional drug trafficking as a result of reduced job opportunities (Indicator 
7.1.3).  
In May 2010, the CARICOM Secretariat, in collaboration with the EU, mounted a workshop to 
help a number of member states to facilitate clear national drug strategies with the aim of build-
ing a critical mass of trained persons in implementing good practices in addressing drug related 
problems. Despite this, actual implementation suffered because it was not spread across a suffi-
ciently wide range of member states.  
The level of forensic capability has been below a satisfactory level regionally both in terms of 
the standard of the laboratories and the requisite human capacity both numerically and qualita-
tively. A consultancy report dated January 2011, noted glaring deficiencies (e.g. lack of access 
to a wide set of forensic services, absence of a coordinated regional system for forensic services 
delivery, limited availability of certain critical analytical services regionally, especially DNA 
analysis) and limited positives (favourable access to training opportunities for staff). This exer-
cise was carried out in collaboration with the Liaison Office CARIMPACS and the Interest 
Group towards the development of a Regional Forensic Science Capacity. Some €47,000 were 
                                                 
79 Major Collin Millington, RIFC, Barbados 
80 Grenada established a National Council on Drug Control and has formulated 2007 Master Plan on Drugs. 
81 Antigua established an Office of National Drug Control Policy. 
82 St V & G established a National Drug Abuse Coordinating Agency (NDACA). 
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provided for training of law enforcement officers in the conduct of forensic analysis of precur-
sors, alternative substances and other critical areas identified under EDF10. The original provi-
sion has been increased to facilitate more responsive bids with the increase coming from other 
components, CISNET and the Tools component (Indicator 7.1.4). Intelligence sharing capabil-
ity was enhanced by the expansion of the Caribbean Intelligence Service Network (CISNET) to 
all 15 member states of CARICOM.  
 
JC 7.2 The EU interventions helped regional and national law enforcement and related institu-
tions to coordinate policy and build capacity in implementation monitoring in the fight 
against crime and illegal drug trafficking. 
No         Yes 
These institutions were strengthened through capacity building and policy coordination facili-
tated by expansion and training under CISNET for increased regional effectiveness and impact 
in the fight against illegal drug trafficking and crime. This was achieved by greater intelligence 
sharing and training
83
 (Indicator 7.2.1). Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Jamaica 
set up national coordinating agencies, which improved the national results, but without a visible 
regional effect (Indicator 7.2.2). Confronting the drug demand problem in a concerted manner 
from both the demand and supply sides did not achieve the desired success due to lack of ade-
quate coordination, distances involved and differing levels of readiness to implement respective 
programmes. A Human Resource Development Survey looked at ways to improve the quality 
of training to law enforcement and security officers through possible collaboration focusing on 
the differing capabilities of member states and also through possible standardising of aspects of 
training such as accreditation and curricula. There was no evidence that this training was to lead 
to a coordinated approach to implementation monitoring, and at the time of the field visit, the 
results of the exercise had not been implemented as it was stated, namely, that the results of the 
report will inform the overall human resources development strategy for crime and security and 
the regional crime and security strategy. While there was no integrated and coordinated re-
sponse to implementation monitoring, individual states undertook monitoring of their imple-
mentation activities and some workshops on monitoring and evaluation were implemented by 
the CARICOM Secretariat (CCS). In practice also, it seems that there has not been much col-
laboration between initiatives undertaken by CARIMPACS and those of the CCS in capacity 
building and institutional strengthening in the development of anti-drug strategies.  
National Drug Prevention and Advisory Councils coordinated the fight against illegal traffick-
ing and use of drugs (Indicator 7.2.3) through schools and youth organisations, which addressed 
healthy lifestyle behaviours. Improved capacity to generate better data was achieved through 
EU support to surveillance, data collection and analysis
84
 (Indicator 7.2.4). Project monitoring 
was undertaken in several territories by setting-up entities responsible for twice-a-year data 
collection and reporting against annual work plans and targets to sub-regional Delegation offic-
es. A more comprehensive assessment of member states’ capacity is, however, planned by 
CARIMPACS after the effects of the various training and upgrades can be tested in a meaning-
ful way. 
 
                                                 
83 Law Enforcement Training project €1.0M together with training under IMPACS. 
84 FA MCDDRP 8ACPAB 3; 8ACP DOM 12; 8ACPGRD 11, 8ACP SVG 8 (2003). 
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JC 7.3 The EU interventions raised public awareness of drug-related crimes in the region.  
No         Yes 
Public awareness was raised through educational programmes and targeted messages to special 
groups, communities and civic organisations. This was implemented through programmes in 
schools and the activities of non-governmental organisations. The frequency of requests for 
repeat television and radio programmes and for relevant documentation (posters, pamphlets, 
bookmarkers, badges and billboard) which could be reproduced and distributed to the public 
was evidence of the effectiveness of the public education programme in some territories. Chal-
lenges faced in raising public awareness often related to differences in the nature of the prob-
lem, the level of community involvement, the ability to get national consensus, the commitment 
and quality of leadership and the involvement of the private sector (Indicator 7.3.1).  
These issues negatively impacted the level of results. In light of the fact that individual member 
states were not fully aware of the precise extent of the drug problem, the possession of better 
data facilitated analysis, planning and provided the basis for increased public awareness as a 
result of strengthened capacity in research and monitoring (Indicator 7.3.2).  
However, despite an increase in the reporting of drug related infringements, the data collected 
has not been effectively used for analysis and policy formulation
85
 because of human resource 
constraints (Indicator 7.3.2).  
Additionally, such reports have not been sufficiently widely spread to form a critical mass for 
meaningful analysis and decision-making and to influence changes requiring investments in 
appropriate facilities to ensure separation of different offenders.  
 
JC 7.4. The EU interventions helped to increase regional effectiveness in the fight against drug 
abuse and related crimes. 
No         Yes 
EU interventions contributed, in tandem with other donors, to increased regional effectiveness 
by addressing problems in the Eastern Caribbean states under the MCDDRP and the wider Car-
ibbean through CISP and Result 6 (CARIMPACS) where the emphasis was on delivery of 
training. Some member states were, however, better equipped in human resources, intelligence 
gathering and sharing for concerted action and better policy formulation. EU interventions tar-
geted youths and females, the latter because of the influence such persons have on their male 
counterparts in influencing drug consumption, trade or demands for a lavish life-style (Indicator 
7.4.2).  
EU assistance focused on strengthening both the demand and supply response through training 
and capacity development though with a greater focus on the latter. In this regard, other pro-
grammes benefited through the complementarity of EU initiatives. Reports provided to EU re-
gional offices against annual plans were proof of some impact of EU interventions. That fact 
that other donor organisations were involved in both supply and demand reduction made it dif-
ficult to assess the precise contribution of the EU (Indicator 7.4.1).  
                                                 
85 The data collected was not effectively used through analysis of the information to influence policy formulation and decision-
making because of the lack sometimes of appropriate skills bot quantitatively and qualitatively.  
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The fact, however, that the EU’s focus was principally on the supply reduction component as 
reflected through the several institutions supported through training (e.g. Regional Drug Law 
Enforcement Training Centre (REDTRAC), Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC), law 
enforcement (LE)), the impact was predominantly felt on the supply side, consistent with the 
objective of reducing the flow of drugs into Europe. In this way, the initiatives complemented 
the more robust demand led programmes of the UN and OAS/CICAD. The evidence suggests, 
however, that regional training of law enforcement officers across the Caribbean impacted the 
drug trade as reflected in the level of seizures. Data from the Narcotics Division, Jamaica, re-
vealed the following in seizures (kg) between 2001 and 2006: cocaine 7,335; crack 14; canna-
bis/marijuana 133,680; hash oil 2,904; hashish 222; heroin 0.59 and ecstasy tablets 146,681 
units. Between 1996 and 2006, the training of some 5,194 officers in the Caribbean was partly 
responsible for these results. In addition, this led to a reduced dependence on metropolitan 
countries for training and was also cost effective in that it facilitated training of a larger number 
law enforcement officers equipped, particularly in narcotics interdiction and intelligence gather-
ing. In addition, some 3,783 persons were arrested.  
In other regards, the EU has not achieved its overall objectives and this has been compounded 
by the fact CARIMPACS failed to pass the four pillars of assessment and is further shrouded by 
issues affecting corruption in its operations. The Executive Director’s employment at the re-
gional security was terminated by the governing body, the Council of National Security and 
Law Enforcement (CONSLE) and an Interim Director put in place until the end of 2011
86
. 
 
ANSWER TO EQ7 
CARIMPACS training and capacity development of law enforcement agencies, through the 
Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Centre (REDTRAC), contributed to combating drug 
trafficking and organized crime. Collaboration between the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre 
(RIFC), other law enforcement entities, member states and other stakeholders in data collection 
and analysis helped in assessing the level of threats posed by the proliferation of drugs and in 
informing policy formulation. An increased number of drug seizures resulted from better analy-
sis of information received, which enhanced regional counter narcotic operations. Deficiencies 
identified in member states’ forensic capabilities and in the regional intelligence framework led 
to recommendations to improve forensic laboratories, the provision of forensic services and a 
revision of the system of Intelligence National Points of Contact and services available to 
member states. While EU interventions strengthened regional mechanisms of intelligence and 
information-sharing, in CISNET and National Points of Contact, no evidence exists of any sig-
nificant increase in cooperation between member states or between member states and related 
institutions. Demand reduction initiatives were addressed by training and public education 
through CARICOM but, in the absence of quantitative consumption data, there has been no 
confirmation of any significant demand reduction.  
The late start of CARIMPACS implementation negatively impacted its contribution to evi-
dence-based policy formulation; increased forensic capability in precursors and alternate sub-
stances; increased law enforcement (LE) capability; capacity to analyse regional drug trends 
and for LE agencies to utilise standardised intelligence tools at national focal points or to coor-
dinate policy and implementation monitoring. Though a number of LE training courses were 
implemented, there were no studies or other documentary evidence supporting the beneficial 
use of this support provided by CARIMPACS. 
                                                 
86 http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/LYNNEANNE - 131903868.html. 
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EU interventions contributed to increased public awareness in the fight against crime and illegal 
trafficking through behaviour modification, production of manuals and CDs, “edutainment” and 
other measures. It is, however, difficult to effectively assess the results of EU interventions in 
the absence of appropriate studies to determine actual consumption levels or whether benefi-
ciaries have been effectively using the training or other deliverables. Some sharing of infor-
mation among Drug Councils was effected which contributed to better programmes for demand 
reduction. EU interventions complemented other major donors, notably the OAS, UNODC, 
DfID and the USAID in both demand and supply reduction initiatives in the trafficking of ille-
gal drugs from/through the Caribbean. While EU programmes undoubtedly contributed to re-
duced demand and supply, the precise/overall contribution to increasing regional effectiveness 
in the fight against drug abuse and related crime is difficult to properly assess. 
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4.8 EQ8 Disaster Management 
 
JUDGEMENT CRITERIA RELATED FINDINGS 
JC 8.1 The EU contributed to the establishment of a functional early warning sys-
tem/meteorological radar system. 
No         Yes 
One aspect of EU support to strengthening disaster management in the Caribbean had as objec-
tive supporting four beneficiary countries (Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Barbados and Belize) 
to reduce their vulnerability to adverse weather, particularly floods. The intent of this Regional 
Radar Warning Project was to provide a modern weather radar system (using Doppler
87
 and 
digital techniques) to each National Meteorological Organisation (NMO) of the four beneficiary 
countries, thereby making more accurate, real-time weather data available to the relevant ser-
vices in the region in an easily accessible way.  
Based on desk review, interviews and field visits, it is evident that EU support has made some 
contribution: the four new radar systems have been installed in the target countries and these 
installations certainly represent an important contribution – in terms of hardware – to the estab-
lishment of a functional early warning system/meteorological radar system (Indicator 8.1.1). 
However, at different times and as recently as June 2011 these radars were not working. Fur-
thermore, the related project components dealing with strengthening of human resources to use 
                                                 
87 A Doppler radar is a specialised radar that can measure radial velocity, the instantaneous component of motion parallel to the 
radar beam (i.e., toward or away from the radar antenna), National Weather Service Glossary 
EQ 8: To what extent did the EU interventions strengthen the capacity of the region to better  
manage disasters?   
Justification: Disaster management is a key priority in the Caribbean region, given the frequency of their occur-
rence and the impact they have on the social and economic life of persons and countries. Addressing disaster 
management in the region is a critical part of providing support for economic development and poverty reduction as 
enhancing capacity to prepare for, mitigate, respond to and recover from disasters underpins progress and stability 
in the region.  
 
Disaster management has been primarily supported with the 9 ACP RCA 1 “Regional Weather Radar System” 
project (€12.82M), the EU Contribution to the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF €9M) and the 
“Institutional Support and Capacity Building for Disaster Management in the Caribbean” project (€3.4M). In addition 
to these EDF9 projects support has been provided through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) / 
European Commission Humanitarian Aid department’s Disaster Preparedness Programme (DIPECHO) throughout 
the evaluation period, primarily at the national level but also in some interventions involving multiple countries. For 
example €1,860,000 has been allocated to the Caribbean region under the “All ACP” Disaster Risk Management 
Sub-regional Programme under the EU-ACP Natural Disaster Facility/ 9 ACP RPR 138 which was executed for the 
Caribbean sub-region by the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), wherein activities 
mainly began in 2010. In terms of disaster management support provided to OCTs during the period, the OCTs 
Regional Risk Reduction Initiative (R3I) project (budget of €4.932M) began activities in 2010. In addition, some 
other disaster management support for OCTs has been available through the Global “C” Envelope and Regional 
Allocation For Humanitarian, Emergency and Refugee Aid Assistance for all OCTs (9 PTO REG 014) with a total 
amount of €22M allocated. 
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the technology were not implemented. Capacity issues relating to the executing agency were 
noted in the final evaluation of the intervention as well as in other documentation as negatively 
affecting the achievement of results and timeliness.  
Challenges were experienced in terms of what are perceived by project stakeholders as being 
difficult and complicated EU procurement rules and procedures, which were noted by some as 
contributing to the fact that the capacity building components of the project were not imple-
mented and the related key expected results became unachievable (Indicator 8.1.3).  
It is clear that an entirely functional early warning system/meteorological radar system has not 
been fully established in the region as anticipated by this time, but this is due to reasons beyond 
the successes or failures of EU support alone, such as the functionality of and interoperability 
with other countries’ meteorological systems outside the project scope. The full regional ‘mosa-
ic’ is expected implemented in the near future, and this will render the support provided by the 
EU more useful and relevant into the future (Indicator 8.1.2).  
It should be noted that where these new radars have been operational and utilised, there have 
been some improvements with regards to access to some weather and climate data, including 
composite radar images and all countries’ NMOs and regional meteorological organisations 
have benefited from this at certain times, while radars would have been functional (Indicator 
8.1.4). 
 
JC 8.2 The EU contributed to the adoption and implementation of the Regional Comprehensive 
Disaster Management (CDM) strategy. 
No         Yes 
The Regional Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) Strategy, as managed by the Car-
ibbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) Coordinating Unit (CU), is a key 
guiding regional disaster management strategy in the region with the buy-in and support of 18 
countries (Participating States) and all donor agencies. It addresses a variety of relevant disaster 
management areas related to the various phases of the disaster cycle: preparedness, mitigation, 
response and recovery. EU support through the Institutional Support and Capacity Building for 
Disaster Management in the Caribbean has made contributions to the adoption and implementa-
tion of the Regional CDM Strategy through its regional and national support and is supporting 
donor coordination and complementary in regional disaster management capacity building initi-
atives, one of the intents of the Regional CDM Strategy (Indicators 8.2.1, 8.3.2).  
EU support has been provided and contributions have been made in a number of areas includ-
ing:  
 Enhancing public awareness on CDM, wherein key public education and awareness 
strategies, policies and programmes have already been developed and shared;  
 Information and communication technology (ICT) enhancement and planning; facilitat-
ing regional dialogue and interaction on CDM; development of national CDM strate-
gies;  
 Provision of CDM capacity building at the national, sub-regional and regional levels; 
and,  
 Assisting countries in revising or developing critical CDM legislation through the de-
velopment and dissemination of a draft Model CDM Legislation for countries in the re-
gion to adapt (Indicators 8.2.1, 8.2.2).  
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However, the level of achievement of results during the period has been affected by timeliness 
issues in project management and implementation. The majority of results achieved occurred 
outside the period under review (i.e. in 2011), with the exception of the development of public 
awareness materials, the provision of some ICT hardware to National Disaster Offices, support 
provided for some regional meetings and dialogue, provision of some capacity building and the 
development of the draft CDM Model legislation. The executing agency (CDEMA) experi-
enced challenges with regards to procurement and fund use that resulted in some funds being 
lost to the project and the corresponding expected results were therefore not achieved during the 
expected implementation period, if at all. Monitoring reports pointed to the executing agency’s 
lack of familiarity with EU procurement rules and procedures as one of the causes of imple-
mentation delays and interviews confirmed this as well as issues related to the absorptive capac-
ity of the organisation. Though it was noted that further training and assistance could have al-
lowed certain challenges to be mitigated in a timely manner and thereby avoiding major delays 
and result achievement, future support provision through this organisation is nonetheless being 
questioned by the EU Delegation based on the experiences of managing the project as well as 
on technical, efficiency and absorptive capacity issues.  
Also worth noting is the contribution from the European Commission's Humanitarian aid and 
Civil Protection Directorate General (ECHO) Disaster Preparedness program (DIPECHO) ac-
tivities in countries throughout the region during the period because of the focus of these inter-
ventions on building disaster preparedness (and response) capacity, specifically at the lo-
cal/community level, though mostly in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Lastly, the more re-
cent Regional Risk Reduction Initiative (R3I project) is expected to make contributions to 
building national (and to some extent, regional) capacity for the adoption and implementation 
of the regional CDM Strategy in some key areas related to hazard mapping, GIS, modelling, 
vulnerability assessments, and early warning, and information sharing overall, albeit only for 
OCTs. The warning and hazard mapping/modelling enhancements could benefit the Caribbean 
even beyond the OCTs who would benefit more directly. However, though the project is highly 
regarded in the region and expectations are high in terms of results to be achieved in the near 
future, the project is behind schedule and key results were not achieved as planned during the 
review period (Indicator 8.2.1). 
In addition to support being provided to countries through CDEMA CU, the CU itself is bene-
fiting from direct support as it was transitioning to becoming CDEMA from 2009 to the pre-
sent. The CU is also benefiting from related advisory services, as follow up to an overarching 
institutional audit, as well as from language training, ICT and Human Resources support, all of 
which can serve to strengthen the CU in its ability to manage and implement the Regional CDM 
Strategy and to strengthen its work with PS towards adoption and implementation of the Re-
gional CDM Strategy as well.  
However, most stakeholders agree that thus far, planned organisational changes or enhance-
ments and other capacity building has neither resulted in any real organisational change or 
strengthening nor any improvements in terms of how the CU provides support to countries (In-
dicator 8.2.1).  
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JC 8.3 The EU contributed to enhancing disaster response coordination in the region. 
No         Yes 
The Caribbean is a region very prone to disasters and where a flurry of donor activity can be 
witnessed in (preparedness and) disaster response. Thus, assessing EU contributions to disaster 
response coordination is a difficult task, but can be characterised and explored by looking at the 
degree to which the EU disaster response support can be considered as coordinated with and 
complementary to that of other donors in the region from different points of view in addition to 
documentation. The existence of processes for coordination among EU services presents anoth-
er manner for assessing such contributions.  
There is some documented evidence of planned coordination between other EU support and 
that of ECHO, and vice versa, including project plans pointing to joint field visits, needs as-
sessments for targeting programming and dialogue between the Commission (ex-DG DEV) and 
ECHO DG for planning and coordination purposes. DIPECHO project design documentation 
(i.e. action plans) suggest that there has been planned coordination with other EU initiatives 
funded through the EDF, and vice versa, with a view to synergies, mutual benefits and com-
bined effectiveness (Indicator 8.3.1). In some cases, EDF funding was utilised in a coordinated 
manner to build on ECHO programming, but there are few mechanisms in place to ensure the 
coordination and complementarity on the ground. Opportunities for strengthened cooperation 
and cross-fertilisation in terms of sharing experiences and expertise are therefore being missed. 
A recent evaluation of DIPECHO action plans concluded that linkage and coordination between 
ECHO and other EU services needed to be strengthened. The field phase confirmed that this 
was an issue and there were potential synergies to be capitalised on. There is much to be gained 
from improved coordination systems and processes between ECHO and delegations and be-
tween ECHO and other EU programming overall (Indicator 8.3.1).  
There is evidence shared from stakeholders met and from documentation reviewed to suggest 
some complementarity between EU support and that of other donors in addressing post-disaster 
needs. The EU was perceived by key national stakeholders and other donors both as collabora-
tive and as providing important complementary financial support through ECHO during the 
response phase. Given the nature of ECHO programming in particular, implemented through 
and with partners that are deeply entrenched in national and regional coordination platforms 
and systems, documentation and interviews suggest complementarity is indeed sought. Key EU 
partners such as the Red Cross or OXFAM coordinate and work jointly for immediate response 
needs assessments in affected countries and work with other donors and regional response or-
ganisations for coordinated response and related programming (Indicator 8.3.2). DIPECHO 
action plans note that these projects have been (or are planned to be) undertaken in coordination 
with and in complementary fashion to other donors’ activities in the country (or region), includ-
ing the CDM Strategy. DIPECHO was noted as filling a particular niche (or gap) in terms of 
donor disaster management programming, focusing on the community level in the post-disaster 
context. The EU was noted as a key player, if not the leader, in some of the donor working 
groups active in the sector and region, in terms of coordination on programming in disaster and 
other aspects. The EU also contributes to the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, 
working in coordination with other donors in this regional catastrophe fund for Caribbean gov-
ernments and contributing to an important post-disaster financial resource for countries (Indica-
tor 8.3.2).  
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However, a recent evaluation of DIPECHO action plans has also recommended that DG ECHO 
should become more involved at the regional level and with other donors active in countries 
and in the region, with a view to strengthened complementarity, coordination and overall effec-
tiveness in the EU’s disaster management support. The field missions confirmed this need. The 
EU is recognised as a strong supporter of disaster management in the region and a valuable 
partner, but increased communication and further coordination would lend to programmatic 
improvement in this area (Indicator 8.3.2). 
 
ANSWER TO EQ8 
EU contributed significantly to strengthen the capacity of the region to manage disasters by 
enhanced disaster response coordination and to a modest extent through provision of technolo-
gies for improved meteorological forecasting and support to regional initiatives addressing dis-
aster preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery. 
The EU contributed modestly to the establishment of a functional early warning system radar 
system. Though not all four Doppler radars installed in 2009-2010 were considered fully func-
tional in 2010 or 2011, they will form part of the region’s enhanced disaster management ca-
pacity once fully functional. However, the related capacity building did not take place due to 
challenges in procurement by the implementing agency. 
The EU contributed modestly to the implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Disaster 
Management (CDM) strategy. Through the Strategy, EU supported capacity building in disaster 
management in a number of areas. However, much of the anticipated results emerged only after 
the period under review due to delays associated with the implementing agency in procurement 
and fund use. The implementing agency was noted by key stakeholders for poor management 
and low efficiency. With continued funding available, the EU remains committed to support 
regional disaster management programming nonetheless. In addition, a low level of EU visibil-
ity in this area was noted.  
The EU contributed significantly to enhanced disaster response coordination. There was com-
plementarity between EU and other donor support in addressing post-disaster needs; EU is rec-
ognised as a lead-donor in disaster management and for its active involvement in donor work-
ing groups. The EU is also seen as coordinating well with other donors at the local and national 
levels through ECHO. However, planned coordination between different EU aid modalities 
were not always effective or did not always take place. Coordination and coherence between 
ECHO and other EU services could be strengthened to enhance EU disaster management pro-
gramming. 
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4.9 EQ9 Human Resource Development 
 
JUDGEMENT CRITERIA RELATED FINDINGS 
JC 9.1 Tertiary education / training institutions (TEIs), representing most of the CARIFORUM 
member states, have established co-ordinated programmes that explicitly relate to re-
gional integration and enhance the use of ICT. 
No         Yes 
The CKLN I-II projects represent a coordinated programme that enjoys political support from 
the CARIFORUM member states and represents Tertiary education / training institutions (TEIs) 
in most of them (Indicators 9.1.1 and 9.3.1). Project objectives relate to regional integration and 
the enhanced use of ICT is a main strategic focus (Indicator 9.1.3). CKLN-I was to create the 
organisational framework in the education sector in 2007-2009. The on-going CKLN-II (2008-
2013) focuses on the infrastructure and is to roll out the C@ribNET regionally and expand both 
the substance of TEI-involvement and the number of TEIs involved (intentionally including 
other actors, e.g. from the private sector). The level of involvement of TEIs range from the 
elaboration of strategic plans to the start of the first courses (see table under indicator 9.1.2). 
CKLN I and II have been strongly delayed (see textbox below). The first phase, which was to 
establish the fundament in the national education sectors in terms of enhanced TEI capacity for 
distance education and strengthened national research networks, did not fully meet that objec-
tive. Therefore, a reallocation of funds under CKLN-II in 2011 serves the continuation of these 
activities. While project implementation finally seems to be on track from 2010 onwards, major 
outputs of CKLN-II only started to be created in 2011.  
The project results that should lead to outcomes, in terms of enhanced distance education and 
development of national and regional research networks have yet to materialise. For example, 
                                                 
88 CKLN I-II is supported by several donors and managed by the World Bank. However, the EU is providing approximately 
75% of the funds. Source: Financing Education in Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, Sep 2010, Vol 1: An Overview of 
Education Initiatives Financed by the EU 1990 – 2010, p.21 
EQ9: To what extent has EU support for education and training contributed to regional economic 
integration? 
Justification: Under the focal sector “Intensification of Regional Integration / Economic Repositioning”, the EDF9 
CRSP mentions that the objective of training an internationally competitive labour force will relate with the new 
paradigm of Caribbean competitiveness (knowledge-based economy). Considering the many small and relatively 
isolated island states in the region and their needs for coordinated efforts, distance education and enhanced use of 
ICT, the team considers such support to be of importance for needed human resource development, as reflected in 
this evaluation question.  
 
Support to the development of Vocational Tertiary Education & Training In Caribbean Region - University of Tech-
nology Jamaica (€2.6M) still dates from EDF8. The Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network (CKLN-I) followed 
shortly after by the Capacity Building and International Support to the Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network 
(CKLN-II) have been allocated in total €12M under EDF988. Initially programmed support to Regional Law School in 
The Bahamas was cancelled. In addition, as dealt with under the above EQs 3 and 4, the EU has also provided 
significant support for capacity building within the institutions for regional and sub-regional integration. (For other 
EU sector support, see the Information Matrix, Annex VIII). 
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hardware and training in the application of new software in one participating TEI had only ena-
bled the offering of one such course until now. Various interlocutors did not find that CKLN-I 
had resulted in institutional or ICT-network creation and were of the opinion that Caribbean 
TEIs were finding other network solutions while waiting for CKLN results.  
CKLN is the main contributor to the EQ-statement that specifies: “coordinated programmes 
that explicitly relate to regional integration and enhance the use of ICT”. Other projects that 
attempted to serve this objective have been less successful. After lengthy delays, a project that 
was to support the Regional Law School in the Bahamas with a new library never got off the 
ground, due to limited interest by the involved governments, including the Government of the 
Bahamas, which did not provide its foreseen counterpart contribution (Indicator 9.1.5). The 
project that was to support the Development of Vocational Tertiary Education and Train-
ing, on the Caribbean Region level, at the University of Technology (UTech), Jamaica, did 
materialise but with modest results, partly due to lack of full support from the University.
89
 Po-
litical and institutional support from Member States and TEIs has been most forthcoming for 
the CKLN-projects, with their inherent and highly prioritised ICT-element. 
It was raised by interviewees during the field study that the regional support for the education 
sector had not been very well coordinated with the support at the national level. 
 
Box 4:  Delays in the start of project CKLN 
The idea of a Caribbean “Centre of Excellence for Knowledge and Skills Development” (inspired by the 
World Bank-Global Development Learning Network) was first raised by World Bank Director to the 
Caribbean heads of state in 2002. A start-workshop took place in 2004 for what was then named the 
Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network; the CKLN-management was recruited and the World 
Bank enquired the EU for CKLN-funding. Fast EU funding was possible below a ceiling of €2M and the 
CKLN-I budget of €1,999,000 was allocated in 2004. However, it was followed by several years of 
waiting for the elaboration of first the EU-World Bank Agreement and next the World Bank-CKLN 
Agreement.  
 
The CKLN-management introduced the concept of the “Caribbean digital hole” to the EU. In response, 
late 2007 the EU communicated the availability of €10M for the development of infrastructure and a 
financial proposal was signed in 2007 – to be followed by similar delays as for CKLN-I. CKLN-II im-
plementation only started effectively in 2010 (see Case Study for further details). 
Source: Field phase interviews and documentation research  
 
JC 9.2 EU support has contributed to a better match between human resources needs in tech-
nical capacity across the region and the graduates of TEIs. 
No         Yes 
Through the CKLN projects, the EU support to the education sector in the Caribbean is to con-
tribute to the creation of a framework for a better match between TEI-outputs and the need for 
strengthening the human resource base, particularly regarding ICT capabilities. Strengthened 
ICT competencies are commonly acknowledged as being of key importance to Caribbean hu-
man resource development, even if stakeholder assessments of the seriousness of the problem 
                                                 
89 Information conveyed to the Evaluation from the EUD Jamaica. UTech was approached several times for supplementary 
information without response. In the files of the regional EUD, Guyana was found only a progress report from 2006. 
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varied. Stakeholders also indicated that the regional projects in this field are not very well inte-
grated with national sector strategies or with the EU support for them. 
As stated by TEI-stakeholder interviews and the 2010-Final Evaluation of CKLN-I, the extent 
to which the expansion of ICT capabilities is reflected in the TEI education and distance educa-
tion is still limited (Indicators 9.2.1 and 9.3.2). According to responses to the evaluation survey 
(see Annex VII), the CKLN still has some way to go before it is well known by its potential 
partners. In conclusion, the regional EU support has not yet contributed to a better match be-
tween human resource needs in technical capacity across the region and the graduates of TEIs. 
The creation of the CKLN-network is combined with a new sector philosophy based on an in-
vestment-approach and to be run on sound business principles. So far, no evidence is available 
about the impact of this approach on the optimal use of the existing human resource base in the 
Caribbean region (Indicator 9.2.2). 
 
JC 9.3 Functioning networks established between education and training institutions on the 
Caribbean regional level have created the conditions for a lasting integrated pro-
gramme. 
No         Yes 
The CKLN is to establish functioning networks between national education and training institu-
tions at the Caribbean regional level. Its sustainability rests on the continued political – and 
financial – support from the CARIFORUM Member States, and on the development of a viable 
business plan responding to the market niche, which is part of the overall rationale of the pro-
ject. In the project documents, the impression is created that future CKLN sustainability primar-
ily rests on its ability to sell bandwidth to TEIs as well as to the public and private sectors (In-
dicator 9.3.2). But according to the CKLN, its ICT-network has to be considered “a public 
good” implying that, in addition to membership fees, public subsidies would be needed. The 
World Bank was of the opinion that infusion of private capital would be needed, possibly by 
sharing the network with private companies. After the field visit, the issue has been addressed 
by CKLN through a consultancy financed by another donor.
90
 
The political and institutional sustainability of the CKLN is ascertained by the CARIFORUM 
Governments having reiterated their support to it. At the March 2010-CARICOM Heads of 
Government meeting, an instrument was signed that establishes CKLN as a CARICOM Inter-
governmental Agency. The governance structure is, nevertheless, still not decided. It is foreseen 
that the final structure will anchor CKLN with CARICOM and the Member Governments, 
while keeping its relative autonomy (Indicator 9.3.1). However, possible future government 
subsidies have not yet been discussed explicitly according to the available sources. It is there-
fore assessed that there is strong need for CARICOM to re-address the future institutional status 
of CKLN and its financial implications. 
The on-going development of the business plan will be of pivotal importance to the future 
CKLN viability for the realisation of the initial commercial approach. The award of a contract 
for the design of C@ribNET regional strategy in 2010 was considered a milestone by the EU 
and since then, contracts have been awarded for the subsequent national strategies (Indicator 
                                                 
90 Information from EUD, Barbados. The conclusions were not yet known by January 2012. 
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9.3.2). Ultimately, financial sustainability will depend on the ability of the CKLN to create sub-
stance in the network through its on-going activities in order to make it attractive for TEIs, 
which may find other solutions.  
Sector observers put forward the view point that CKLN is not well coordinated with the EU-
supported Latin American research network, CLARA. CLARA also attempts to cover the Car-
ibbean region, especially the non-Anglophone parts, and considers its technological solutions 
better than CKLN. In this line of thinking, there is an unproductive clash between the local ge-
opolitical concept of “Latin America and the Caribbean” and the EU “ACP-concept” resulting 
in in-activity in the non-Anglophone parts of the Caribbean. Caribbean TEI-association with 
US or Canadian-based research networks was also mentioned as an alternative to the CKLN-
option. 
Generally, EU visibility is poor in the sector, since the project results have only materialised to 
a limited extent and the CKLN projects are being managed by the World Bank while the EU is 
providing approximately 75% of the funds. The sector support does not have implications for 
other crosscutting issues, except, potentially, youth and gender, once results in terms of open 
and distance education may materialise. Given the CKLN implementation conditions and the 
modest results of the UTech project, added EU value is not identifiable. 
 
ANSWER TO EQ9 
EU support has contributed to regional integration by addressing the needs for economic diver-
sification in strengthening the human resource base, notably through the education and re-
search-related ICT-infrastructure projects, Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network, 
CKLN, I-II. Through the establishment of a regional IT-connection, these projects contain a 
potential for enhanced regional integration by upgrading the IT-capability of Caribbean Tertiary 
Education Institutions (TEI), regional and international TEI-connectedness and by increased 
TEI-capacity for offering open and distance learning opportunities.  
However, due to implementation delays, the CKLN projects did not yet produce results that 
could be measured and, therefore, no visible improvement of the match between TEIs and la-
bour market needs. The potential impact of the EU’s regional education sector support has been 
reduced by the abandonment of one project, Regional Law School in the Bahamas, and by 
modest results of another, “Development of the Vocational Tertiary Education & Training in 
Caribbean Region” (JC 9.1 and 9.2). 
With recent reconfirmation of Government support for the CKLN, there is continued political 
backing-up of the projects, even if the organisational structure is still to be identified. Initially 
expected to be based on commercial terms, financial sustainability is now assumed by the 
CKLN management to require government subsidies. However, the adequacy of this option 
needs to be explicitly addressed by CARICOM (JC 9.3). 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions have been organised under two main categories:  
1. Principal conclusions (PC), 
2. Complementary conclusions (C), including sector related conclusions  
The conclusions are clustered according to the major issues raised in the Evaluation Questions 
that are relevant for the regional strategy and for learning from experience:  
 Strategic approach and design (PC1, C6-7) 
 Coordination (complementarity and EU added value) (PC2, C16-17) 
 Implementation modalities (PC 3-4, C 8-9) and  
 Effectiveness, impact and sustainability (PC5 and sector related conclusions C12-18). 
In addition, there are conclusions relating to crosscutting issues (C10) and EU visibility (C11). 
For each conclusion, a table assesses the importance of the conclusions (▲▲▲=very high, 
▲▲=high, ▲=moderate), the strength of the supporting evidence (▲▲▲=very high, 
▲▲=good, ▲=limited) and (when found) the possibility to generalise the conclusion as lesson 
learnt for other contexts is indicated. The evaluation questions to which the conclusions is refer-
ring and the recommendations that are founded on the conclusion are indicated.  
An overall assessment completes these conclusions. The recommendations based on these con-
clusions are presented in the next section. 
 
5.1 Principal Conclusions  
We retained five Principal Conclusions (PC) ranked from PC1 to PC5.  
RELATED TO THE STRATEGIC APPROACH AND DESIGN  
PC1 
The regional strategies of the EDF9 and EDF10 were high-
ly responsive to the priorities of CARIFORUM, thanks to 
an increased political dialogue, and they were coherent 
with its policies on poverty reduction, sustainable develop-
ment and integration into the world economy. 
Origin: EQ 1 
Criteria: relevance and 
coherence 
Importance: ▲▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲▲ 
The EU cooperation is more formally tied into cooperation with the CARICOM Secretariat and 
CARIFORUM (now one of CARICOM directorates) than any other donor is. Political dialogue 
with the region increased during the time scope of the evaluation. Political dialogue with the 
region is a challenge since the EU focuses on support to the regional integration of the Caribbe-
an ACP States represented by CARIFORUM while the historical main engine of regional repre-
sentation and integration is CARICOM, which is mostly formed by the former British West 
Indies.  
Political dialogue increased in 2006 with the participation of Commissioner Louis Michel in 
CARIFORUM meetings with Ministers of External Relations, ambassadors of the Caribbean 
States and the SG of CARICOM/CARIFORUM. The EPA process also intensified dialogue on 
the most important policy areas and on the reform agenda. The EU and CARIFORUM Heads of 
State and Government, during the May 2010 EU-CARIFORUM Summit, adopted an outline for 
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a Joint EU-Caribbean Strategy which is coherent with the wish of the two regions for a bi-
regional political dialogue to become the main vehicle for addressing a range of issues of com-
mon interest. Two years earlier, in May 2008, the Joint Statement adopted at the third EU-
CARIFORUM summit in Lima, had already confirmed the commitment of both regions to es-
tablish a structured and comprehensive political dialogue.  
Related to: Conclusions: C6 and C7 
 
RELATED TO COORDINATION  
PC2 
With some exceptions, the effectiveness of the international 
efforts to enhance regional integration has been significant-
ly reduced by the lack of a donor coordination framework.  
Origin: EQs 1 
Criteria: Coordination 
and effectiveness 
Importance: ▲▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲ 
Generalisation potential ▲▲ 
Until now, coordination between donors was driven by the donors themselves. After the disap-
pearance of the Caribbean Group for Caribbean Economic Development (CGCED) led by the 
World Bank, the coordination of the interventions of development partners and the CCS has 
been weak, except in the East Caribbean Region through the East Caribbean Development 
Group (ECDG, with UNDP assuming secretariat) – but even here coordination has not yet 
reached the point of joint programming or evaluation missions. Institutional assessments are 
often duplicated. The main obstacle has been the CCS-preference for bilateral relations with 
donors.  
However, coordination was effective in the areas of support to EPA negotiations, disaster man-
agement and energy. 
Related to: Conclusions C16 and C17 
 
RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION  
PC3 
Two important efficiency issues are the weaknesses of the 
CARICOM secretariat and the limited capacity at the na-
tional level to implement policies decided at the regional 
level.  
Origin: EQs 2,3 
Criteria: efficiency 
Importance: ▲▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲▲ 
Generalisation potential ▲▲ 
As identified by EUDs and ROM reports, major bottlenecks are clearly the lack of administra-
tive capacity at national level and a disconnect between national absorption capacity and the 
activities developed at regional level. The CSME programme of EDF10 drew the lesson by 
remedies consisting in a new monitoring system and a standby facility for capacity-building 
support for the CARICOM Member States.  
Related to: Conclusions PC4, C8 and C9 
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PC4 
Effectiveness and impact of the regional EU support is lim-
ited by the fact that regional integration has lost some po-
litical momentum in many Caribbean countries.  
Origin: EQs 1, 2 
Criteria: relevance, effec-
tiveness, efficiency 
Importance: ▲▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲▲ 
Generalisation potential:  ▲▲  
Regional integration has lost some political momentum in many Caribbean countries. The new 
generation of Caribbean political leaders has lost part of the global perspective and it is less 
regionalist. In addition, the level of debt and the economic crisis has made short-term urgent 
responses a priority for most governments.  
The programming and implementation of the CRIP is hampered by the absence of a clear re-
gional development strategy, still under elaboration by the CCS. The idea of a Road Map, draft-
ed by the beneficiary to compensate for this absence, was good but it did not help the program-
ming. The Road Map was not based on a clear strategy, was produced late, had no timetable 
and it has not been updated since September 2009. Its usefulness was further reduced by almost 
70% of the needed action indicated as high priority.  
It is worth also to mention here the difficulties encountered in organising a regional seminar 
about the Final Draft Evaluation Report as is usually done in EU evaluations. In the end, the 
foreseen seminar was cancelled, mostly because of costs involved in travelling from the region to 
Guyana, HQ of the CCS.  
Related to: Conclusions: PC3, C8 and C9  
 
RELATED TO IMPACT   
PC5 
In most sectors reviewed during the evaluation, the results 
of EU interventions were modest, with the positive excep-
tion of the support to the EPA negotiations and the growth 
of some exports (like rum for the entire region, and bana-
nas for Dominican Republic). 
Origin: EQs 3, 4,5,6,7,8,9 
Criteria: effectiveness, 
impact and sustainability 
Importance: ▲▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲ 
As illustrated graphically in the Figure 18 under the following section, Overall Assessment, and 
documented in the findings and answers related to the EQs 3 to 9, the results of interventions 
were just acceptable, except for the support to the EPA negotiations.  
Related to: Conclusions: C12-18  
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5.2 Complementary Conclusions  
We retained 5 Complementary Conclusions (C) ranked C6 to C10. 
RELATED TO THE STRATEGIC APPROACH AND DESIGN 
C6 
Delegations in charge of the regional programmes report of 
lack sufficient staff for effective programme management 
considering the many components of EDF9 and EDF10. 
Origin: all EQs  
Criteria: efficiency, inter-
nal coherence 
Importance: ▲▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲ 
Generalisation potential ▲▲ 
The EDF9 regional programme was too scattered, considering the limited staff resources for its 
management by the EUDs (see table n°5 in section 3.3). The financial resources of EDF10 in-
creased from €97.8M under EDF9 to €165M and a more focused approach was meant to facili-
tate its management. However, due to the absence of clear priorities expressed by the CCS and 
adequate donor coordination, also the EDF10 turned out to be too scattered. The Guyana EUD 
asked HQ for a reinforcement of its staff dedicated to the regional programme. The Barbados 
EUD also asked HQ for a reinforcement of its staff, being in charge of Barbados, the OECS 
countries, the OCTs and a significant number of regional projects (increased during EDF10 due 
to the EPA implementation programme through international organisations based in Barbados). 
The regional programmes under CEDA, OECS, CKLN are now under the responsibility of this 
EUD as well as two thirds of the EPA Programme (new Rum, CDB, Caribbean Regional Tech-
nical Assistance Centre (CARTAC), CROSQ). Between operations and finance and contract, 
the Barbados EUD calculates the regional programme occupies the equivalent of 2.5-3 jobs.  
Related to: Conclusions PC1, C7 
  
C7 
The coordination and complementarity between national 
and regional programmes was weak.  
Origin: EQs 1, 9 
Criteria: internal coher-
ence  
Importance: ▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲ 
Generalisation potential ▲▲ 
With the notable exceptions of the NIPS of Barbados, DR, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and 
Tobago, the coordination and complementarity between national and regional programmes was 
weak. The EU support in education at regional level is reported not very well coordinated with 
its sector support at the national level. According to the Programming Guidelines of the EU 
(2007), the RIP should be designed first. Due to EPA negotiations longer than expected and the 
delay in the design of the EDF10, the NIPs were drafted and signed first.  
Related to: Conclusions PC1 and 4  
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RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES 
C8 
Finding the right implementing agency for the regional pro-
gramme remains a challenge. 
Origin: EQs 3,5,7,8,9 
Criteria: efficiency 
Importance: ▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲ 
In spite of continued support, the CCS is rarely the adequate right implementing agency for the 
regional interventions. The CCS remains the implementation agency for the main donors like 
EU, UK or Canada, but became less important as implementer than other organisations in the 
region such as CRNM, CDB, WB, IMF, CDB, OECS, ECCB or UNDP. However, these re-
gional organisations and international organisations tend to be overburdened by projects of in-
ternational donors. 
Related to: Conclusions PC5, C9 
 
RELATED TO CROSSCUTTING ISSUES 
C9 
Taking into account the recommendations of the previous 
Caribbean Region Evaluation, all crosscutting issues have 
been taken into consideration in the EDF10 Regional Pro-
gramme. 
Origin: EQs 1 
Criteria: impact 
Importance: ▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲▲ 
One of the conclusions of the earlier evaluation of regional EC support (2005), referring to 
EDFs 8 and 9, considered that “Cross-cutting issues have been insufficiently addressed, partic-
ularly poverty and gender issues in the context of the negative impact of regional trade liberali-
sation”. Since then, all relevant crosscutting issues have been taken into consideration in the 
design and programming of the EDF10 regional programme. 
 
RELATED TO EU VISIBILITY 
C10 
 
EU Visibility remains an issue for projects related to Crime 
and Drugs Trafficking, Disaster Management and the 
CKLN. 
Origin: EQs 8 and 9 
Criteria: impact 
Importance: ▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲ 
While the EU is highly visible in post-disaster support and coordination, its regional disaster 
management support and programming through other channels – such as DIPECHO, EDF and 
the ACP-EU Natural Disaster Management Facility – remains unknown to many key stakehold-
ers in the region at the national and regional level. There is a similar lack of EU visibility re-
garding the support to the fight against Crime and Drugs Trafficking and the CKLB-project is 
perceived as relating to the implementing agency, the World Bank. 
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5.3 Sector-related Conclusions 
We retained 7 Sector-related Conclusions ranked from C11 to C17. 
RELATED TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION  
C 11 
The Single Currency has been reduced to a long-term ob-
jective after the decision at the Summit of Heads of State in 
July 2011 to concentrate on overcoming the obstacles and 
delays incurred in the completion to the Single Market. 
Origin: EQ 3 
Criteria: Relevance, im-
pact, sustainability 
Importance: ▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲ 
 Generalisation potential ▲▲ 
The Heads of Government of CARICOM approved in 2007 the “Single Development Vision 
and the Role of the Single Economy”. A “Preliminary Outline of the Strategic Plan for Regional 
Development” was circulated in November 2010. There is still a need for completing the draft-
ing and adoption of a “Strategic Plan for Regional Development”. 
Related to: Conclusions PC4, C14, C15  
 
RELATED TO COMPETITIVENESS 
C 12 
Only in a few cases, the EU interventions contributed to 
increase the competitiveness of industries of the region.  
Origin: EQ 5 
Criteria: effectiveness, 
impact, sustainability 
Importance: ▲▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲▲ 
Generalisation potential ▲▲ 
The EU interventions have contributed to increase the competitiveness of traditional industries, 
but only in a few cases managed to make them competitive on the international markets. There 
is no indication yet of a diversification of exports. The efforts to organize a shift from a few 
agricultural exports, eroded by the loss of preferences, to a service based exports has not yet 
born the expected fruits. The trade with the OCTs and DOMs in the region is stagnant, due in 
large part to a similar offer but also to poor transport options. 
Related to: Conclusions PC4, C16 
 
RELATED TO SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION 
C13 
 
In spite of support from the Commission of the European 
Union and other donors, DR-Haiti cooperation has not 
progressed much during the period of the evaluation.  
Origin: EQ 4 
Criteria: effectiveness, 
impact, sustainability 
Importance: ▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲ 
Cooperation and integration is of major importance for DR and Haiti sharing the same island. In 
spite of the support received from EU and other donors, economic cooperation and integration, 
except trade of the DR to Haiti, has not progressed much during the period of the evaluation. 
The renewed support under EDF10 is perfectly justified in light of the recent reactivation of the 
political relations and of the Joint Commission DR-Haiti. Still, the main development issues of 
the two countries sharing the same island will not be addressed without a strong cooperation, 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of EU co-operation with the Caribbean Region 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
Page 73 
whether it is in the political, economic, security, infrastructure, health, disaster management or 
environment protection.  
Related to: Conclusions PC4, C12, C15  
 
 
C14 
 
EU support is likely to impact positively on the East-
Caribbean sub-regional integration 
Origin: EQ 4 
Criteria: effectiveness, 
impact, added value, sus-
tainability 
Importance: ▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲ 
The EU supported only indirectly the integration of the OECS, but the EU is likely to become a 
major contributor under the new EDF10 programme (€12.6M) that is meant to enhance the 
technical capacity of the OECS countries, the Secretariat and its Export Development Unit 
(EDU) to manage an expanded portfolio of interventions. The value added by the EU, due to its 
experience in regional integration, is very important for the countries concerned, for the Carib-
bean region and for the entire Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region, since the OECS is 
the most advanced integration scheme in the LAC region.  
Related to: Conclusions PC4, C12, C14 
 
RELATED TO EPA 
C 15 
EU resources were critical to the success of EPA negotia-
tions 
Origin: EQ 6  
Criteria: effectiveness, 
impact, coordination, 
sustainability 
Importance: ▲▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲▲ 
 Generalisation potential ▲▲▲ 
EU resources were critical to sustain EPA negotiations, although those resources were only a 
small part of the resources needed and spent on the entire negotiation process. Haiti participa-
tion was fully engaged in EPA discussions only after the signature. The EPA process also pro-
vides an example of good donor coordination in the Caribbean region.  
Capacity built at CRNM/OTN is still being used today in current negotiations with Canada. The 
current staff of the EPA Implementing Unit in CARIFORUM was part of the CRNM-EPA ne-
gotiations process indicating transfer of capacity. 
Related to: Conclusions PC2, PC 4, C12 
 
RELATED TO DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
C 16 
While the EU is a recognised sector lead donor, its internal 
coordination can be enhanced and its support for building 
disaster management capacity has produced modest re-
sults, mainly due to delays incurred by the executing agen-
cy, CDEMA. 
Origin: EQ 8  
Criteria: effectiveness, 
efficiency, coordination, 
impact, sustainability 
Importance: ▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲ 
 Generalisation potential ▲▲ 
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The EU is a recognized leader in regional donor coordination for immediate disaster response 
but there are opportunities for improved coordination between ECHO and other EU services, 
which could strengthen EU disaster management support in the region. 
EU support for building disaster management capacity in the Caribbean has produced modest 
results:  
 Though the required capacity building did not take place, the EU supported the instal-
ment of needed radars in four countries.  
 The EU contributed modestly to the adoption/ implementation of the Regional CDM 
Strategy through support provided through CDEMA; results achieved were mostly out-
side the review period, due to delays/challenges attributable to the executing agency. 
EU support in disaster management experienced significant efficiency challenges related to 
procurement process and administrative procedures that implementing/executing agencies con-
tinue to struggle with. This resulted in significant delays, funds being lost and project activities 
not being implemented as planned. 
Related to: Conclusions PC2, PC4  
 
RELATED TO HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 
C17 
 
The overall results of the interventions have been limited 
and the prospects for financial sustainability of the CKLN-
projects are not entirely clear. 
Origin: EQ 9   
Criteria: effectiveness, 
impact, sustainability 
Importance: ▲▲ 
Evidence: ▲▲ 
While the overall relevance of regional EU support for higher education and its ICT-
connectedness is undisputed, even if not reflected as a focus area in the EDF10, the sector re-
sults are the modest owing to:  
 Considerable CKLN implementation delays, originating in the interplay between the EU 
as the main funding agency and the implementing agency, the World Bank, as well as in 
an apparent periodically low World Bank project prioritisation. The latter issue has, 
however, been redressed. 
 The balance between the education and the ICT-infrastructure elements in the CKLN 
has been more in favour of the infrastructure than foreseen in the overall EU sector ob-
jectives and the delays have resulted in sequencing where the infrastructure develop-
ment has not been solidly anchored in the TEI-base. 
 Some sector projects have been abandoned or have had modest results owing to lack of 
agreed government support or to an apparent lack of dedication of implementing TEIs in 
the CARICOM member states. 
The conditions for financial sustainability of the major CKLN-project are still not clear, while 
the issue is being dealt with by CKLN. Earlier foreseen reliance on commercial activities ap-
pears partly replaced by a need for Government subsidies. Some of the recommendations of the 
2010-Final Evaluation of CKLN-I still need to be dealt with. 
Related to: Conclusions: PC4 
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5.4 Overall Assessment  
The relevance of the strategy designed for the time scope of the Evaluation is high. However, in 
all focal and non-focal sectors, with one exception, the results of EU interventions are only ac-
ceptable, as shown by the following graph summarizing the findings of each of the nine EQs. 
Figure 18:  Results of EU interventions according to the Evaluation Questions 
The investigations, carried out under the different phases of the Evaluation and with different 
tools by the Team, point out three major, long-term difficulties met in the implementation of the 
EU strategy and its interventions in favour of the region: 
 A weak CARICOM Secretariat, 
 A less regionalist outlook of the leaders of the region, 
 Limited administrative capacity of most CARICOM member states to implement re-
gional policies. 
The positive exception is the contribution of the EU interventions in the support to the EPA 
process. However, we should distinguish between the negotiation phase and the implementation 
phase. The negotiation phase was carried out successfully thanks to level and the flexibility of 
the support. The implementation phase started only recently and it is likely to suffer from the 
same shortcomings as the other sectors of intervention (see EQ8).  
 Low Medium High 
EQ1: Degree of correspondence between EU cooperation objectives 
and CARIFORUM priorities + coherence with EU member states' and 
other donors' objectives 
   
EQ2: Extent of support for achievement of expected regional strategy 
results through institutional frameworks and aid modalities chosen 
   
EQ3: Extent of contribution to deeper and wider regional economic 
integration in the Caribbean 
   
EQ4: Extent of contribution to integration of sub-regions within the 
group of CARIFORUM members 
   
EQ5: Extent of contribution to a more competitive Caribbean region 
within the global economy 
   
EQ6: Extent of contribution to creation of context for deepened trade 
relations between EU and CARIFORUM member states and among 
CARIFORUM member states 
   
EQ7: Extent of contribution to fight against crime and illegal drug traf-
ficking in the Caribbean region through EU support 
   
EQ8: Extent of strengthening of disaster management capacity of the 
region through EU interventions 
   
EQ9: Extent of contribution to regional economic integration through 
EU support for education and training 
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The institutional frameworks, and the aid modalities, were not the most adequate to compensate 
for the abovementioned difficulties, since the following was found: 
 Limited complementarity between RIP and NIPs, 
 Poor donor coordination, except in support to disaster management, to the energy sector 
and to trade negotiations, 
 Limited staff resources of Caribbean EUDs. 
The support under EDFs 9 and 10 were and are too scattered. 
 
Table 11: SWOT analysis of EU intervention in Caribbean Region in the period 2003-2010 
STRENGTHS 
1. Consistent and fruitful political dialogue with 
CARIFORUM, resulting in responsive strategy 
2. Excellent knowledge of the region due to histori-
cal relations of Europe with the region 
3. As the most advanced integration framework, 
the EU provides high added value to the integra-
tion efforts of the region 
4. Closer partnership between EU and the region 
thanks to the EPA 
5. Foundations laid by EPA for increased economic 
benefits on both sides  
6. The EU is the main donor in the region 
7. Recognised EU position as disaster manage-
ment lead donor 
WEAKNESSES 
1. Loss of regionalist perspective on the part of Car-
ibbean political leaders 
2. Disconnect between adoption of integration poli-
cies and the capacity of implementation at nation-
al levels. 
3. Deficiencies of CCS and some regional imple-
menting agencies, in particular IMPACS and 
CDEMA, result in delays and reduced impact. 
4. Limited coherence between regional and national 
programmes 
5. Limited results of cooperation in most sectors 
6. Coordination of donors without a consistent 
framework and support from the CCS 
OPPORTUNITIES 
1. EPA increases economic growth 
2. Plans for enhanced donor coordination may 
increase results and added EU-value 
3. Internal and external coordinating role in disaster 
management may be strengthened for the benefit 
of the sector 
4. Efficiency may be enhanced by strengthening the 
capacity of EUDs of the region  
5. Positive impact of the progress of the East-
Caribbean sub-regional integration (OECS) 
6. Open and distance learning may become an 
important tool for enhancing human resource de-
velopment. 
THREATS 
1. Trade agreements negotiated, and under negotia-
tion, may rest attention to regional integration  
2. EPA does not produce expected results 
3. Possible double-dive recession 
4. Protracted or insufficient institutional reforms in CCS 
and regional agencies  
5. Increasing crime in the Region jeopardises societal 
stability, investment and economic growth 
6. Without financial self-reliance, CKLN may become a 
financial burden for the Member States 
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6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations, based on the findings and conclusions of the evaluation, are presented 
here under two groups: general (GR) and sector-related recommendations (SR). In each catego-
ry, they are listed in order of priority: very high, high or medium. For each recommendation is 
indicated the conclusions on which it is based and to whom it is addressed. When relevant, the 
recommendation is followed by comments and a suggestion of short and medium-term actions 
to be taken. Recommendations are ranked by order of priority under table n° 12 at the end of 
this chapter. 
6.1 General Recommendations 
We retained three more important recommendations, each linked to a different conclusion(s). 
 
GR 1 Basis: PC 2, C6 Priority: Very High 
Recommendation is addressed to: EU HQ and the EUD, Guyana  
Statement of the overall recommendation: 
The EU should continue to support the development and adoption of the comprehensive and 
efficient donor coordination system that was due to be presented by CCS in June 2011.  
This will help design an EDF11 regional programme more focused and therefore easier to implement.  
Short-term action to be taken:  
a) Common joint diagnostics, reviews, and institutional assessments with other development partners 
b) Ask CCS to circulate ASAP the promised donors’ coordination system and call for a donors’ meet-
ing  
 
GR 2 Basis: PC 3, 4, C 7 Priority: Very high 
Recommendation is addressed to: EU HQ 
Statement of the overall recommendation: 
In application of new programming guidelines, complementarity should be enhanced by draft-
ing the Regional Strategy before the National Strategies and by making it a frame of reference 
for the bilateral cooperation of EU member states with the region.  
Short-term action to be taken:  
a) Organise regular meetings at the Heads of Delegation-level and experts/thematic-level between the 
Caribbean EUDs.  
b) EDF11 funds should be allocated for regional meetings on political and experts’ levels in order to 
ensure that the EU-cooperation is in line with the CARIFORUM priorities and policies.  
 
GR 3  Basis: C 11 Priority High 
Recommendation is addressed to: EUD in Caribbean Region, EU HQ 
Statement of the overall recommendation: 
HQ should make sure the Delegations of the Region press for application of visibility rules by 
all EU funded projects/programmes.  
Short-term action to be taken:  
Strictly apply Communication and Visibility Manual for EU External Action, consider Workshop 
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6.2 Sector-related Recommendations 
We retained 5 sector-related recommendations. 
 
SR 4, EPA  Basis: C 16 Priority: Very High 
Recommendation is addressed to: EU HQ, the EUDs in the Caribbean region 
Statement of the overall recommendation: 
The EDF10 should include the attendance and involvement of NSA in EPA related activities 
(information, training, studies, monitoring and evaluation).   
Short and medium-term action to be taken:   
a) Use similar approach as with the EPA negotiations. There is a basis for donor coordination and for 
other donors’ contribution to the process (as DfID is already doing). 
b) Enhance the outreach programme and the public awareness and information programme since there 
are many information gaps. 
c) Take into account the considerable amount of training, information and consultation needed to move 
agendas at regional level as based on the experience (and success) of the EPA negotiation process. 
 
SR 5, Regional Integration and Com-
petitiveness  
Basis: C 12-13 Priority: Very high 
Recommendation is addressed to: EU HQ, CCS, EUDs in the region 
Statement of the overall recommendation: 
EDF should allocate more funds to the competitiveness issues of the Caribbean region. This can 
be achieved mostly through support to productive development policies, business climate re-
forms, clustering initiatives and small and medium size enterprise development. 
Short term action to be taken: 
At the regional level, the interventions should be coordinated with the other donors supporting competi-
tiveness, particularly with the Compete Caribbean programme (US$40M), funded by DfID, IDB, and 
CIDA.  
 
SR 6, Disaster Management  Basis: C 17 Priority: Medium 
Recommendation is addressed to: EU HQ, the EUDs in Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad 
Statement of overall recommendation: 
The involvement of ECHO in disaster management programmatic discussions should be 
strengthened, from the design stages and throughout implementation. 
Short term action to be taken: 
c) Ensure that ECHO representatives are invited to all disaster management strategic plan-
ning/programming discussions in person or via telephone/internet and/or to comment on decisions 
made or documentation produced. 
d) Build in a role for ECHO representation to be able to share views on an on-going basis through im-
plementation and monitoring of disaster management interventions.  
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SR 7, Disaster Management  Basis: C 17 Priority: Medium 
Recommendation is addressed to: EU HQ, the EUDs in Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad 
Statement of overall recommendation: 
The EU should develop a disaster management strategy (or programming framework) for the 
Caribbean and disseminate widely among donors/development partners and countries, ensuring 
that the selected executing agencies address EU visibility. 
Short term action to be taken: 
a) Develop strategy / framework 
b) Disseminate/share it within EU services, with regional partners and with national stakeholders with 
a view to informing and coordinating with key partners and stakeholders.  
 
SR 8, Human Resource Development  Basis: C 18 Priority: High 
Recommendation is addressed to: EU HQ and the EUDs in Guyana and Barbados 
Statement of the overall recommendation: 
The EU should analyse how regional interventions in the education and training sector can add 
value in a synergetic interplay with national sector interventions, incl. through harmonisation of 
post-secondary interventions, labour market assessments and knowledge management with the 
needs of CSME. 
Short term action to be taken: 
a) Conduct a regional analysis of how synergy can be strengthened between the regional and national 
interventions in the education and training sector.  
b) Specifically CKLN-related:  
 Analyse if possible synergies between CKLN and the CLARA network are being fully utilised 
 Clarify the future institutional set-up for CKLN and what is required to obtain financial sustain-
ability for CKLN 
Table 12: Ranking of Recommendations by order of priority 
 
Priority Very 
High 
High Me-
dium 
GR 1 - The EU should continue to support the development and adoption of the comprehensive and 
efficient donor coordination system that was due to be presented by CCS in June 2011. 
X   
GR 2 - Complementarity should be enhanced by drafting the Regional Strategy before the National 
Strategies and by making it a frame of reference for the bilateral cooperation of EU member states 
with the region. 
X   
SR 4 - The EDF10 should include the attendance and involvement of NSA in EPA related activities 
(information, training, studies, monitoring and evaluation).   
X   
SR 5 - Improving competitiveness through coordinated support for an improved business climate at 
regional and national levels.  
X   
GR 3 - The Delegations should also press for application of visibility rules by all EU funded projects/ 
programmes in the Region. 
 X  
SR 8 - The EU should analyse how regional interventions in the education and training sector can add 
value in a synergetic interplay with national sector interventions, incl. through harmonisation of post-
secondary interventions, labour market assessments and knowledge management with the needs of 
CSME. 
 X  
SR 6 - The involvement of ECHO in disaster management programmatic discussions should be 
strengthened, from the design stages and throughout implementation. 
  X 
SR 7 - The EU should develop and disseminate a strategic /programmatic framework that presents the 
highly relevant and varied programmatic lines of EU disaster management support in the Caribbean. 
  X 
